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ABSTRACT
How do the different organizations in the Soviet defense decisionmaking
apparatus interact and influence each other in the decisionmaking process?
What role do bureaucratic and organizational politics play in the deci-
sionmaking process and how do they influence Soviet defense policy as a
whole? This dissertation addresses these questions through a case study
of the Soviet air defense forces (the Troops of the Air Defense- -VPVO)
usixu^CBH^tl- level model of the Soviet defense decisionmaking structure
jiff yf'fV' f as . In this model the General Staff is assumed to act as a
unitary strategic actor, while the military services behave as organiza-
tional and bureaucratic actors , attempting to influence the adoption of
policy, and mediating its implementation.
This case study examines the evolution of the Soviet air defense forces
from their formation as a service in 1948 to the present. Particular at-
tention was paid to the interaction of the VPVO with the General Staff
during several periods of doctrinal and strategic change. It was found
that while in several instances the VPVO was able to influence policy
through biased representations of its capabilities and advocacy of its in-
terests, these attempts were generally unsuccessful. In most instances
the General Staff and VPVO either had shared interests or the General
Staff was able to tnttli* VPVO objections to a proposed policy change.
Only in one instance was persistent advocacy of the VPVO able to reverse a
policy decision by the General Staff. Thus, the study indicates that
while Soviet military services do attempt to influence policy by advocacy
of their interests, these attempts are not usually successful due to the
predominance of the General Staff in the Soviet defense decisionmaking
structure.
Despite the lack of success of its advocacy the VPVO was found to exhibit
many of the characteristics expected of a bureaucratic organization: In-
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cremental decisionmaking, conservatism, suboptimal learning behavior, and
some inter-branch conflict. Substantial evidence also indicates that
problems of inter-service coordination have proven difficult to resolve
and that significant inter -service rivalry and conflict took place during
World War II and may still occur today.
This dissertation therefore indicates that there are limits on the ap-
plicability of organizational and bureaucratic politics models of Soviet
defense decisionmaking as they do not incorporate the unique contributions
of the General Staff. Nevertheless, organization theory does provide a
good model of the internal behavior of the VPVO has a distorting influence
on the implementation of strategy and operational art. The model of
Soviet defense decisionmaking used, f0t§^0^^f0tlf^acy^txa.tm$i.c motor
model vith the organizational and bureaucratic bohavior of the VPVO, thus
provides a richer and more accurate representation of the Soviet defense
decisionmaking process than either model alone.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Stephen M. Meyer
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1.1 Why Air Defense?
Over the past 40 years the USSR has built up and maintained an im-
mense air defense force consisting of over 9,000 surface-to-air missiles
(SAMs), some 2,200 interceptors and a netvork of 10,000 radars.* Herbert
York has estimated that since 1948 the Soviets have spent over $^0 bil-
lion dollars on air defense, compared to $50 billion for the U.S.. In an
era when the ballistic missile is dominant what purpose does this force
serve? Do the Soviets expect it to allow them to fight and win a nuclear
war, and if so how? Is it just a reaction to the remaining large U.S.
bomber force? Is it an example of bureaucracy run amok, continuing to
maintain forces despite a diminishing threat and poor prospects for effec-
tiveness? While there have been many such conjectures concerning the
Soviet air defense forces (Voyska protivovozdushnoy oborony--VPVO, or
Troops of the Air Defense) there have been very few studies of the evolu-
tion of this fores and the reason! behind its existence. 3 In this dis-
1 Department of Defense (1987; 59).
2 York (1987; 9, 24).
3 The Air Defense Troops underwent a reorganization and name change in
1981, previously they were referred to as the National Air Defense Troops
(VPVOS)
. I shall use the acronym VPVQ when referring to the post-1981
service or to the service in general' and the VPVOS acronym when discussing
th« pre- 1981 service or tfas, QQSMlsns^sAr- defense eonponsnt.
The only major work to go beyond the ABM treaty debate is Deane (1980).
Articles and other works include Lord (1986), Petersen and Clark (1985),
Monks (1977), and the serlss of chapters by Jones (and later Breightner)
in the Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual.
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sertation I investigate the factors behind the creation tod evolution of
'"'
the VPVO, its forces and operational art. To do so requires more than a
historical examination of forces and literature- -we need a model of how
the Soviet defense decisionmaking system works In ordar to frimeour ques-
tions and answers. Thus the second theme of this dissertation is the for-
mulation and application of a model of Soviet defense decisionmaking that
incorporates considerations of both strategic military analysis and orga-
nizational behavior. Before turning to the theory, let us briefly examine
the development of the VPVO over the past forty years.
The modern VPVO may appear to be something of an anomaly, but it did
not always appear so. At its inception in 1948 the U.S. bomber threat was
very great- -and not only the nuclear threat. Given the relatively small
stockpile of nuclear weapons in the late 1940s to early 1950s U.S.
strategic bombing plans called for a prolonged nuclear and conventional
bombing campaign against targets in the USSR and Eastern Europe. Against
such a threat (turboprop bombers with conventional weapons) a strong air
defense force could be expected to have a significant effect. As the
nuclearization and modernization of the U.S. Strategic Air Command (SAC)
progressed, though, bombers became more difficult targets and each could
carry several multi-megaton bombs. But the Soviets also fielded new tech-
4 Operational art is the term used by the Soviets to refer to a service '
s
"strategy" --how it uses its forces in wartime and how they interact with
the other armed forces. It is thus a higher level of military art than
tactics, but lower than strategy which deals with the use of all the ser-
vices in waging a war.
5 The Joint Chiefs of Staff •Charioteer" war plan of 1948 called for anN
initial attack against the USSR using 133 atomic bombs, followed in the
next two years by an additional 200 atomic bombs and 250,000 tons of con-]
ventional bombs. See Cave Brown (1978; 5-7).
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nology, deploying a massive system of jet fighters, radars, and the first
generation of surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). Thus through the 1950s it
was not clear whether the advantage lay with the offense or defense, and
both sides continued to try to gain the upper hand. During this period
there was at least the possibility that an effective air defense could be
created.
But by 1960 a new weapon had appeared that cast the entire air
defense mission into doubt--the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)
.
The ICBM was unassailable by air defense means, and while efforts to de-
velop anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems were accelerated the tech-
nological problems were formidable.
The U.S. and USSR reacted in very different ways to this new tech-
nology. While the U.S. (under McNamara's tenure in the Defense Depart-
ment) began a long-term drawdown of U.S. air defense forces, the USSR em-
phasized the development of ABM systems and continued a major moderniza-
tion of its air defense system with SAMs. This emphasis on air defense
continued throughout the 1960s, even as the share of U.S. equivalent
mega tonnage (EMT) and warheads carried on bombers decreased as ICBM and
submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) increased.
With the signing of the ABM treaty in 1972 the situation again
changed dramatically. Many in the West viewed the treaty as Soviet accep-
tance of the concepts of deterrence and mutual assured destruction (MAD)
and consistent with this expected the Soviets to turn away from damage-
limiting and war- fighting strategies. But despite these expectations,
6 For a critical review of this literature see Deane (1980; 9-11).
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the Soviets continued to maintain and modernize their large air defense
force, adding more SAMs and replacing old interceptors with new. The VPVO
was by this time the second largest Soviet service in manpower, and while
it ranked fourth out of the services in budget share this was greater than
that allocated to the Strategic Rocket Forces. This continued stress on
air defense has been viewed by many in the West as evidence of continued
Soviet war fighting plans, or as evidence of the VPVO just following its
old patterns.
By the 1980s the VPVO began a new modernization of both SAM and in-
terceptor forces, as well as undergoing a major reorganization of its
forces. With the appearance of the new cruise missile threat the impor-
tance of the VPVO appeared to be upgraded.
Strategic air defense has thus played a major role in Soviet milita-
ry policy, but we still understand very little about it. Too often it is
either considered an anachronism or its forces are lumped in with those of
the Soviet Air Force in simple "bean counts" of the military balance.
This approach ignores the unique characteristics and missions of the VPVO
and tends to simplify the development and evolution of its forces. In or-
der to understand the rationale behind the creation and evolution of the
VPVO we must examine the details of forces, weapons, and operational art.
To guide the process of formulating questions and interpreting answers,
however, we need to develop a model of the Soviet defense decisionmaking
process
.
7 CIA (1978; 5-6). The services, in Soviet order of priority are the
Ground Forces (SV) , Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) , the VPVO, the Air
Forces (WS), and the Navy (VMF)
.
1.2 Modeling Soviet Defense Decisionmaking
I propose that the most appropriate model for our purposes is a
hybrid of an organizational politics model combined with a unitary
strategic actor model. 1 call this the integrated model of Soviet defense
decisionmaking. This odd hybrid may seem contradictory but it is well
adapted to the peculiarities of the Soviet defense structure and decision-
making process. This model provides a framework for understanding the re-
lationships between the principal actors in the Soviet defense decision-
making process: the political leadership, Defense Ministry leadership, the
General Staff and the services. It is a multi- level model that provides
for different decisionmaking processes at different levels, with organiza-
tion theory the predominant model at the service level responsible for op-
erational art and tactics. This model is set out in the following chap-
ter, but a few of its key points are reviewed here.
This study of the VPVO is a "plausibility probe" that investigates
whether such an integrated model provides a sound explanation of the
Soviet defense decisionmaking process in the case of the VPVO. This
model postulates that the General Staff behaves like a unitary strategic
actor, assessing the threat, responding appropriately, and pursuing its
own internally motivated programs. But while the General Staff is the
"brains of the army" it must implement its decisions through the services,
and here the possible influence of bureaucratic politics and organization
theory manifests itself. Not only is the implementation phase somewhat
8 George (1979; 52).
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dependent upon the services , but the services nay also attempt to play a
role in the upper-level decisionmaking process. Thus we have a combina-
tion of unitary strategic actor and organizational bahavior interacting at
different levels and with different degrees of influence. But in applying
the model we must take note of several important distinguishing character-
istics of the Soviet defense decisionmaking process.
First, we must recognize that the influence of the services in the
Soviet military is lass than that in tha U.S.. This is due to the
presence of a strong General Staff with real powers over resource alloca-
tion and planning. The service's domain of responsibility is limited to
operational art, tactics and a shared responsibility (with the General
Staff) for weapons development.
Second, many of the decisions that affect operational art and even
influence strategy are made at levels well below the political leadership.
The image of a military completely under the rigid control of the
civilians is misleading. It is at this level, where strategy is imple-
mented in operational art and tactics that we should expect to see the
primary impact of organizational biases and distortions.
Third, while service influence may be significantly less than in the
U.S., we should not automatically write it off as negligible. Through the
manner in which operational art is formulated, and occasionally through
attempts to directly participate in higher level decisionmaking processes,
the service* do exert some limited influence in tha formulation of
strategy .
Overall, the rationalizing influence of the General Staff may tend
to mute the effects of organizational interests and bureaucratic politics.
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We should therefore expect that the organizational distortions of
rationality should be less prominent than in the U.S. defense planning
process and limited primarily to the areas of operational art and tactics.
The evidence amassed in the following chapters shows that such a
model does provide a rich explanation of Soviet defense decisionmaking and
its policy outputs. Thus, the development of the VPVO over time exhibits
a broad responsiveness to the external threat but many of the specific
characteristics of operational art and tactics are less closely tied to
external factors and show the influence of organizational behavior.
This can be demonstrated in the case of VPVO development after the
ABM Treaty. While some Western analysts might argue that the continued
support of air defenses without a corresponding missile defense is irra-
tional, the continued support of the VPVO was largely due to its being as-
signed a mission more consistent with evolving Soviet strategy: defense of
lines of communications (LOCs) and rear areas in the course of a general
conventional war. But while adding this new mission, or increasing its
emphasis, the VPVO still retained its homeland defense mission as a hedge
against U.S. bomber developments and in the hope of being able to prevent
any conventional attacks on the Soviet homeland. This decision was not
the result of pure bureaucratic inertia, but instead it grew out of mili-
tary needs and the capabilities of the VPVO forces then existing. On the
implementation level, however, organizational behavior does seem to have
influenced the outcome, as the VPVO misperceived and misinterpreted the
lessons of regional conflicts that could have raised the effectiveness of
VPVO forces if properly applied. Tbtt*, at these two different levels dif-
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ferent processes were at work resulting in a mixture of responsive, ra*
tional policy with inefficient implementation.
In the chapters that follow the integrated model is laid out in
detail, and the evolution of the VPVO from the end of World War II to the
present is examined. The importance of distinguishing between levels of
decisionmaking and analysis is stressed throughout, and the implications
of organization theory for VPVO internal behavior are examined in detail.
Most of the analysis makes use of VPVO historical literature, as con-
temporary problems are often examined in surrogate discussions of the
Great Patriotic War. 9 Since this literature begins in 1959 most of the
debates and discussions considered will be from the 1960s through the
1980s --the period of greatest change in the VPVOS. Finally, the last
chapter pulls together both the theory and data to assess the relevance of
the model to Soviet defense decisionmaking and to present the overall ans-
wer to the question, why the VPVO?





Creating a model of Soviet defense decisionmaking must be undertaken
with an appreciation for the unique characteristics and traits of the in-
stitutions and actors that participate in the decisionmaking process.
Most studies of Soviet defense decisionmaking have concentrated on the top
decisionmaking levels, stressing the top-down creation of doctrine and
strategy. This concern with the top leadership (such as the General
Staff) reflects the strong Soviet emphasis on centralization of military
decisionmaking. Yet even within a highly centralized organization there
may be room for dissent and the representation of diverse organizational
interests and viewpoints. In this chapter I outline an integrated model
that incorporates a multi-level and multi-stage decisionmaking process
that reflects the varied levels of responsibility and power in the Soviet
military establishment.
The key question addressed here is the nature of service interaction
with the General Staff. In the Soviet defense structure the General Staff
is a powerful actor controlling resources, information, and access to the
political leadership. To what extent can the services react to or in-
1 These approaches are categorized and examined in Meyer (1984; 257-68).
Some of the best efforts to study the impact of institutional structure,
organizational politics and interest groups on Soviet defense decisionmak-
ing are Alexander (1978-9), Alexander (1984), Kolkowicz (1971), Spielmann
(1978), Warner (1977), Wolfe (1979).
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fluence General Staff proposals and decisions? Are there avenues through
which the services can articulate their interests and directly or in-
directly influence the Soviet defense decisionmaking process? Before ad-
dressing these questions ve first need to set out the various levels and
institutions involved in the Soviet defense decisionmaking process.
2.2 Levels of Analysis: The Soviet Defense Structure
In order to properly specify a model it is necessary to indicate at
what level of analysis it is expected to function. Most models try to fit
several levels with one theoretical approach. Better results may be ob-
tained by using a model that contains interlocking sub-models correspond-
ing to different levels of analysis. Three distinct levels of the Soviet
defense decisionmaking structure may be distinguished, and they are out-
lined below.
Level 1: The Defense Council
The Defense Council is a subset of the Politburo and the top milita-
ry and foreign policy leaders that considers matters of general direction
and planning of defense matters. It is the decision-making body of last
2 Alexander (1984; 9-22). The multiple -level framework and three-stage
decisionmaking model are set forth in Meyer (1988).
3 The exact composition of the Defense Council is not known, but a likely
list is presented below. Note that these members are not all equal in
power by any means. They may, however, participate in the decisionmaking
process at this level. Party: general secretary, second secretary, secre-
tary overseeing the Department of Defense Industry (DODI). State:
Chairman of the Council of Ministers, the head of the KGB and possibly the
Foreign Minister and chief of the Military- Industrial Committee (VPK)
.
Military: Minister of Defense, probably the Chief of the General Staff,
and on some occasions the Commanders in Chief of the services. See Warner
(1985; 4-7), Jones (1985; 6-10), and Gelman (1984; 63-70) for a listing of
probable members of the Defense Council. The listing here includes some
players who may not be formal members of the Council, but who may partici-
pate in some decisions in a slightly enlarged arena, such as the Polit-
buro.
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resort and greatest power. Important weapon acquisition, strategy, and
doctrinal issues are examined at this level.
Since the Defense Council is a critical institution we may Look to
the definition of its responsibilities for a picture of the issues consid-
ered at this level. Jones, citing the Soviet constitution, gives the is-
sues considered by the Defense Council as:
(1) the review and decision of all major questions
relating to maintaining the security of the country, strength-
ening its defensive capabilities, and developing its military
potential;
(2) determination of the basic directions of and plans
for military development (including military manpower procure-
ment policy)
;
(3) direction and coordination of the work of the
entire Soviet state apparatus, making sure that defense inter-
ests are considered in deciding all matters of state adminis-
tration. 5
The issues considered by the Defense Council are thus very broad,
dealing with doctrine and overall defense planning, rather than specifics
of operational art or weapons acquisition.
The relative power of the Defense Council members varies widely
and the ultimate decisionmaking power lies with the Politburo members on
the Defense Council. While the top military leaders (Minister of Defense
and perhaps Chief of the General Staff) may play some role in formulating
4 Note that this set of top leaders does not correspond well to Mills'
definitions of leadership circles. Instead of envisioning the leadership
as concentric circles, as does Mills, this approach skims the upper strata
from three groupings for a specific decision-making area. See Mills
(1981; 592-596).
5 Jones (1985; 7).
6 During wartime the Defense Council would become the State Defense Com-
mittee (GKO) that would directly oversee the war effort and the work of
the General Staff.
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draft decisions and discussing options and might be expected to represent
bureaucratic interests, their power and influence is very limited in com-
parison to the other members. Indeed, in many respects the military
leaders are cast more in the role of supplicants.
Level 2: Strategy and Coordination
At this level doctrine is realized in strategy, resources are allo-
cated, plans for the services are integrated, and war plans drawn up. The
chief role is played by the General Staff, and by the Collegium of the
Ministry of Defense. The General Staff has overall responsibility for
coordination and scrutiny of the services' plans, while the collegium ap-
pears to be more a forum for collective decision-making between the ser-
vices and other parts of the Ministry of Defense. The Collegium may be a
principal forum for bureaucratic politics between the services. At this
level there may also be participation by the Party secretary responsible
for defense industries, as well as the Chairman of the Council of Minis-
ters, and the Ministers responsible for the various defense industries.
7 This is particularly true for the period when Dmitry Ustinov was Minis-
ter of Defense and a Politburo member. Ustinov did not act as a military
representative advancing the military's interests, but rather as the
Party's man put in place to oversee and restrain the military. During
this period, then, the military's bureaucratic representation on the
Defense Council was very limited.
8 Jones (1985; 12-22).
9 Party: CC secretary for DoDI , CC department head for administrative
organs, Politburo members with special defense interests. State: Council
of Ministers, defense industry ministries, the Military- Industrial Com-
mittee chairman. Military: Minister of Defense, the General Staff, the
Commanders in Chief of the services, Deputy Ministers of Defense.
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Level 3: Operational Art and Weapons Specification
The third level is service -centered. The service staff is one of
the primary actors, as are the service Commanders in Chief and the heads
of the branches. There is some symmetry between this level and that of
level 2: where the primary issues at level 2 were inter -service, here the
issues are intra- service and inter-branch. This level performs several
crucial functions, developing operational art, detailed specification of
weapons and direct oversight of weapons development. ° In these areas the
services come into contact with other actors: the Central Committee, De-
partment of Defense Industry (DoDI) , designers and design bureaus, defense
plants, research institutes, and other participants in the weapons ac-
quisition process. *
The three levels examined above clearly differ in their power and
responsibilities, and it should not be surprising that they also differ in
their decisionmaking processes.
At the top level the Defense Council is a small, diverse group
without clearly defined institutional interests and may perhaps best be
modeled by a conflict approach. It may also be highly dependent upon the
personality and power of the General Secretary. *
10 On the weapons development and acquisition process, see Alexander
(1978-9; 31-32).
11 Party: Central Committee DoDI, Military-Political Administration
(MPA) . State: defense ministries and administrations, design bureaus and
plants, industry and Academy of Science research institutes. Military:
Commanders and deputy commanders of the services, the General Staff, ser-
vice staffs, branch of service heads, possibly Military District com-
manders
.
12 In this case traditional "kremlinology" is the accepted method for
determining the power balance in the Politburo and hence the Defense Coun-
cil. At this level considerations of personal power, personality, coali-
tion formation may strongly influence the positions taken by the actors,
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Conversely, level 2 appears to be more homogeneous, as It is com-
posed primarily of military personnel, and the differences in power are
less. But while these personnel may share some common values and inter-
ests, on a more specific level they can be expected to have diverse in-
stitutional and personal interests.
At Level 3 the services may be expected to behave as do other large
organizations, trying to further their own interests and exhibiting the
characteristics of organizational behavior discussed below.
A successful model of Soviet defense decisionmaking must be able to
incorporate these different levels, their responsibilities, and the dif-
ferent decisionmaking dynamics at work.
2.3 A Model of Soviet Defense Decisionmaking
Given these three levels in the Soviet defense decisionmaking pro-
cess, how can we fit them together into one model? Since there have been
many studies of the top level, I intend to focus on the problems of
strategy and operational art- -levels 2 and 3. At these levels the
dynamics of the decisionmaking process are quite different from the top
level, and I propose that a model integrating the unitary strategic actor
model of the General Staff and the organizational politics model of the
services will provide the best explanation of Soviet defense decisionmak-
ing. For want of a better term, 1 shall call this the incegrmcad model of
Soviet defense decisionmaking.
(continued)
and a bureaucratic politics model does not appear to apply.
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How can we model the role and influence of the services and the Gen-
eral Staff on Soviet defense decisionmaking? I argue that the General
Staff is the unitary strategic actor at the core of the decisionmaking
process, weighing the threat in a relatively unbiased manner and determin-
ing Soviet responses to it, as well as pursuing its own programs to fur-
ther develop the Soviet force structure. Unlike the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in the U.S., the General Staff has a viewpoint that supersedes that of the
services, and it has the power to carry out its decisions. J The General
Staff therefore functions as an actor that behaves in a manner consistent
with the balance of power theory. As Posen has indicated in his study of
military doctrine, balance of power theory presents the best explanation
of military doctrine, and in the Soviet case the General Staff is the body
that has primary responsibility for ensuring balancing of military
strategy and military-political doctrine. We therefore expect the policy
decisions of Level 2 to reflect the General Staff dominance and be broadly
rational and tied to the external threat, rather than the product of orga-
nizational politics.
Given the strong role for the General Staff, the domain of responsi-
bility and the power of the services is more limited than in the U.S..
The services do have responsibility for the elaboration of operational
art, and share responsibility for weapons development with the General
Staff. While more constrained than in the U.S. these areas of responsi-
bility present opportunities for service interests to influence the final
outcome of the decisionmaking process.
13 Rice (1987).
14 Posen (1984; 220-41).
-20-
The services exhibit behavior characteristic of large organiza-
tions and can best be represented by a model based on organization theory.
An organizational politics model has been selected because the work of
Posen has indicated that at the level of operational art, organizational
interests and the institutional structure of the decisionmaking process
may have a significant effect on policy output. Furthermore, Posen 's work
suggests a number of characteristics of organizational behavior that ap-
pear to be applicable to the Soviet services and defense decisionmaking
structure.
The interaction of these two levels and models is characterized by
neither a rational actor nor organizational model, for different issues
may produce a different mix of factors and the two models fit different
levels of analysis and problems. Throughout the course of this disserta-
tion the role and influence of these two levels will be examined in order
to determine their relative weight in the overall decisionmaking process.
One element of the integrated model is a multi-stage framework for
decisionmaking. Three stages are envisioned: 1) agenda-setting and ad-
vocacy, 2) decision, 3) implementation. While these stages may occur at
any of the levels of the decisionmaking structure, there are strong asso-
ciations between some of the stages and levels. For strategic -level is-
sues agenda -setting, debate and decision would occur primarily at level 2
while implementation would be the responsibility of the service level. In
the course of implementing any such decision, though, further issues arise
and more decisions must be made. Many of these decisions will be made at
15 Posen (1984; 222-8).
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the service level, again through a multi-stage process. With this frame-
work, then, we may see a number of iterative decisionmaking processes
flowing from one initial decision, with the subsequent decisions occurring
at ever lower levels. The crucial nexus is that between decisionmaking
and implementation, for if the decision is made at level 2 then implemen-
tation usually takes place at level 3 and below. In passing between
levels the intent of the decision may be altered as problems of its
realization are confronted and as the subordinate organizations filter the
decision through their own interests, capabilities, and perceptions.
Thus, we can expect final outputs from the implementation stage that have
travelled through a number of intervening levels and that might come out
quite differently from what the decisionmaker intended.
Of particular interest are Issues that "bubble up" from the service
level, a phenomenon not usually expected in a highly centralized struc-
ture. An issue may arise within the service which may then attempt to
place it on the agenda of higher level bodies (such as the General Staff)
,
where the issue is debated and service positions articulated. The deci-
sion may be made at the General Staff level, and then returned to the ser-
vice for implementation. I ssuee may therefore move between levels at dif-
ferent decisionmaking stages and may be traced as they go from level to
level. For example, if a program becomes very expensive it may attract
the attention of the political leaders and the other services. In such a
case the program may move up from level 3 to the upper levels, requiring
more than formal approval from them. Such a phenomenon may have taken
place in the case of ABM deployment in the late 1960s.
22-
Thus , the model is able to accommodate Issues that arise at dif-
ferent levels of the decisionmaking structure and track the movement of
these issues through the structure and decisionmaking stages, while also
taking into account different decisionmaking processes at the different
levels. The foundations and implications of these decisionmaking pro-
cesses at the different levels are examined in the next sections
.
2.3.1 Level 2: The General Staff
The Soviet General Staff plays a critical role in Soviet defense de-
cisionmaking in that it occupies a position that transcends that of the
services and frees it from service biases and interests. 6 Such a posi-
tion implies that the General Staff may come close to the ideal of the
"rational strategic actor" even though it may have its own organizational
interests and biases. At the very least it serves as a high level in-
tegrator and mediator of service interests, imposing a central allocation
of resources and priorities that is intended to produce a more tight coup-
ling between the services and national strategy. While the services may
attempt to engage in bureaucratic politics, the General Staff is clearly
the primary power, and has the capability to mediate, and probably to de-
cide, on a wide range of issues concerning the services. '
16 One important reason for this is that a General Staff officer does not
usually rotate back into his service and his promotion path is determined
by the General Staff. Thus an effort is made to engender loyalty to the
General Staff rather than to the services. This is quite a different
dynamic than that operating in the Joint Chiefs of Staff where, until
recently, officers were rotated through and promotions were determined by
the services. See Scott and Scott (1984; 117).
17 For discussions of the power and influence of the General Staff see
Rice (1987), Warner (1985; 14-16), Meyer (1985). Furthermore, the high
stature of the Chief of the General Staff may make it easier to get
higher- level support for General Staff recommendations for decisions that
exceed the power of the General Staff to enact by itself.
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It is the General Staff that has the responsibility for implementing
the military- technical side of doctrine, developing strategy, war plans,
overseeing weapons development, and coordinating the work of the many ser-
vices and branches of the military. 8 Furthermore, the General Staff is
the main repository of military expertise and knowledge, giving it an im-
portant source of influence and authority that is denied to civilian in-
stitutions in the decisionmaking process. 9 All these responsibilities
and assets give the General Staff a role quite different from that of the
U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff.
The interaction between the services and the General Staff is an im-
portant factor affecting Soviet defense policy and force structure.
First, in implementing decisions made by the General Staff the services
may have a strong influence on the final form, and even success or fail-
ure, of those decisions. Second, the services may attempt to influence
the decisionmaking process in order to further their own interests.
Third, the operational art developed by the services may influence the de-
velopment of strategy and doctrine through the military leadership's per-
ceptions of the capabilities, effectiveness, and methods of use of forces.
Fourth, many of the issues that fall under the service's jurisdiction may
have significant effects on U.S. perceptions of Soviet strategy and doc-
trine as the U.S. "rationalizes" what may be lower-level operational deci-
sions as high-level strategic decisions.
18 During wartime the General Staff would be reconstituted as the Staff
of the Supreme High Command (Stavka VGK)
,
and would bear direct responsi-
bility for overseeing combat operations, particularly those of the
strategic nuclear forces.
19 Meyer (1985; 41-47).
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In this model the General Staff is seen as an integrator and as a
powerful actor in its own right. It cones close to being the standard ra-
tional military actor. Yet the General Staff's decisions are implemented
by the services, which have their own interests and biases. It is in the
implementation of these decisions that the effects of organizational
politics may be most strongly felt.
2.3.2 Level 3: The Services
If the General Staff is a unitary strategic actor, then the services
appear to be best represented by a model based on bureaucratic politics
and organization theory. These two approaches to organizational behavior
are integrated here in an organizational politics model. Organizational
behavior directed externally (e.g. advocacy of interests) is modeled by
bureaucratic politics, while internal behavior (learning behavior, deci-
sionmaking) is modeled by organization theory.
The bureaucratic politics model predicts that policy will be shaped
by the interaction of bureaucratic interests and the actors representing
them. While other factors are included in the model the decisionmaking
process is seen as a game in which the various actors advocate their in-
terests and attempt to sway the decision in their favor. °
Do Soviet military leaders behave like bureaucratic actors? This
question is critical to the success of the organizational politics model.
20 The standard works on this topic are Allison (1971) , and Allison and
Halperin (1972) . Studies employing the bureaucratic politics model in-
clude Halperin (1972), Valenta (1979), the papers collected in Halperin
and Kanter (1973). For cogent critiques of the model see Freedman (1976),
Nathan and Oliver (1978).
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Certainly, there is reason to doubt that models and theories may be trans-
ported across cultures and still retain their validity. *1 Nevertheless,
with appropriate adaptation to the specifics of Soviet culture and organi-
zational structure the bureaucratic politics model should fit and provide
insights into the Soviet defense decisionmaking process.
Do Soviet military leaders behave like bureaucratic actors? The
answer is a qualified "yes." Military leaders do appear to be proponents
of increased defense spending and do advance their own service inter-
ests. 2 Indeed, there is every reason to believe that the bureaucratic
politics model works best in dealing with military organizations where
loyalty to the service is highly valued, career advancement is determined
by the service, and the players spend a long time in their service absorb-
ing its traditions and values. 3 Top military positions are usually
21 This is the basis of Dawisha's (1980) arguments against the use of
bureaucratic politics in the Soviet context.
22 For discussions of this topic see Kolkowicz (1971), Marshall (1971),
Warner (1977), Khrushchev (1974; 25-28), Valenta (1979). One of the most
interesting results of Valenta 's study of the Soviet decision to intervene
in Czechoslovakia is that the military was at the forefront of the inter-
ventionists. This is in keeping with the bureaucratic interests of the
military, and is consonant with the interests imputed to the U.S. military
by Allison.
23 Western studies of military organizations stress the process of
socialization and professionalization. Thus, Huntington (1957; 7-79)
elaborates a "professional military" ethic that is theoretically ap-
plicable to officers in all nations. An important component of socializa-
tion is the identification of the officer with the military service, a
loyalty that in theory is subsidiary to his dedication to the country, but
which in fact becomes intertwined. An officer with long service in a ser-
vice may be expected to have to some degree absorbed the values and out-
look of that service. Jones (1985; 92-94), however, notes that this iden-
tification with the service may be somewhat less in the USSR than in the
U.S. and ties to the services may be weaker in the USSR than in the U.S.
Also note that there is greater cross-service mobility than in the U.S.,
although not so much in the Brezhnev years.
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filled by officers vho have risen through the ranks of a service and have
had a long time to absorb the values and interests of their service.
Furthermore, they have usually reached the apex of their career, for there
are few higher positions that a service chief might aspire to, particular-
ly if he is not a Ground Forces officer. " This may make the service
chiefs less concerned with the views of the General Staff and the civilian
leadership. This is particularly true during the Brezhnev period where
"stability of cadres" resulted in most officers being promoted from within
and when only the most grievous errors (or illnesses) would result in a
service chief being removed. & Hence the service chiefs are in a good
position to become advocates for the interests of their service.
What are the interests of the services? There are strong pressures
on the heads of bureaucracies to enhance their own position and to in-
crease the resources available to the bureaucracy. ' The services may
24 There may, indeed, be some careerism but it is most likely to be fur-
thered by loyalty to the organization that does the promoting- -the service
(and one's direct superiors). See Downs (1967; 92-5).
25 The General Staff is dominated by (former) Ground Forces officers and
it is rare for a non-Ground Forces service chief to be promoted to Chief
of the General Staff or other high (First Deputy Chief) position.
Biryuzov (who headed the VFVOS then the Strategic Rocket Forces) is an
exception- -he seems to have been Khrushchev's crony and supported the
Cuban missile plan. Another exception is Batitskiy, who was briefly First
Deputy Chief of the General Staff before being appointed Commander in
Chief of the VPVOS
. Again this was during Khrushchev's time when loyalty
to Khrushchev took priority over other characteristics. Both Biryuzov and
Batitskiy also had Ground Forces experience during the war and the post-
war years.
26 Gorbachev's approach of shuffling service chiefs appointing chiefs
from different services (e.g. Haksimov, Tret'yak) may be directly aimed at
this problem, as well as indicating a need to "clean house" in some of
these services.
27 Downs 's work provides great insight into the generation of bureaucratic
interests and the interaction of bureaus with other organizations and the
environment. Downs (1967; 93-95, 103-111). Military services are a par-
ticularly fitting example of bureaucracy as they provide a good (national
security) that is very difficult to measure and assess during peacetime.
See Downs (1967; 24-25) for the criteria for a bureaucracy. Downs often
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stress the need for greater resources and may act to protect their mis-
sions and domains of responsibility from encroachment. To facilitate
the advocacy of the organization and to ensure the indoctrination of per-
sonnel the bureaucracy may also develop a bureaucratic ideology that
presents the roles, missions, goals and values of the bureaucracy to both
external and internal consumers. Such an ideology, if accepted by those
responsible for resource allocation, can be a significant tool in advocacy
for increased resources. 9
The scope for service advocacy is more limited than in the U.S., for
there are no outside avenues of appeal (for example to the Congress) . The
external behavior of the services is primarily directed towards the Gener-
al Staff, rather than a direct appeal to higher civilian authority. u The
range of actors in the decisionmaking process is also restricted by the
monopoly of the military on military expertise. This monopoly results in
debates and arguments being largely played out within the defense com-
munity, rather than expanding to civilian experts.. The number of
(continued)
refers to military services as bureaucracies, see for example Downs (1967;
199-200).
28 Downs (1967; 211-222).
29 Downs (1967; 237-46).
30 In the U.S., of course, appeal to Congress or even to the President is
a time -honored way of performing rn end- run around the Secretary of
Defense or other top-level opposition. Given the level of centralization
it is rather unlikely that similar avenues are open to Soviet service
chiefs. Khrushchev does, however, recount one episode in which the Com-
mander of the Navy attempted to reverse a decision by direct personal
arguments. The attempt failed, and the admiral was replaced. Khrushchev
(1974; 25-27).
31 Civilian experts in the defense industries may be involved, but their
influence is much less than civilian analysts or defense industries in the
West.
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participants in a debate is therefore rather restricted and the same ac-
tors may appear in a number of different decisions, a factor enhanced by
the relative longevity in position of most top military leaders. All of
these factors tend to limit the range of debate, particularly the desire
to settle military matters "in-house."
The bureaucratic politics model gives rise to a number of proposi-
tions concerning the service's interaction with other parts of the deci-
sionmaking structure. * In the case of the VPVO these propositions may be
summarized as
:
Propositions Concerning External Behavior.
Interests and Advocacy:
--The VPVO will act to maintain or increase its size and wealth,
thus it may not only advocate its current missions, but may also
advocate expansion into other areas if sufficient resources are
provided.
--The Western threat may be inflated in order to support VPVO re-
quests for funding. At the same time, the threat must be present-
ed as being manageable and not overwhelming.
--Inter -service rivalry may be evident over both resources, mission
allocations, and means of interaction. However, the General Staff
may enforce some level of integration producing a "negotiated en-
vironment" between the services.
32 The phenomenon of a number of recurring players fighting over deci-
sions may result in a the gradual increase of personal considerations in
technical decisions as old grudges and vendettas build up. Unfortunately
there is no contemporary evidence that allows us to examine these sorts of
factors in the decisionmaking process, although the memoir literature
certainly points to the prevalence of inter-personal conflict among the
top military leadership.
33 Posen (1984; 41-59).
34 Posen (1984; 53-54).
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While the bureaucratic politics model provides a useful framework
for examining the interaction of the service with other institutions , it
says nothing about the internal mechanisms and behavior of the service.
For this we must turn to organization theory.
The classic statement of organization theory by March and Simon is
taken as the point of departure for this study as it presents a clear,
coherent framework that lends itself to the derivation of propositions
that can be tested against data. It is supplemented by Downs 's work on
bureaucracies. For our purposes the elements of organization theory may
be broken into several topics: decisionmaking, inter-branch behavior,
learning behavior, and institutional history.
The decisionmaking theory proposed by March and Simon is perhaps the
most important aspect of organizational theory. The work of March and
Simon moved away from earlier value -maximizing, rational actor concepts of
organizational behavior to introduce the concept of "satisficing, " relax
-
ing the need for a wide-ranging search of all possible options. J It
posits that a more easily reached satisfactory option would be preferable
to a more distant optimal option. 6 The importance of searching for solu-
tions in the problem area, and of employing standardized procedures for
decisionmaking (standard operating procedures -- SOPs) was also empha-
sized. 37 Both of these decisionmaking processes lead to incremental ism
35 March and Simon (1958; 140-41).
36 March and Simon (1958; 136-142)
37 Cyert and March (1963; 101-113,114-127), Downs (1967; 175-84). March
and Simon (1958; 141-50) refer to SOPs as performance programs, the term
SOPs appears In Allison (1971; 67-8).
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and conservatism, as well as a willingness to settle for suboptiaal solu-
tions to problems
.
March and Simon also recognized that an organization's internal be-
havior may play an important role in decisionmaking and organizational
output. Divisions of an organization may have their own values and goals,
and conflict among sub-units may be endemic. This conflict may prevent
the formation of all but the most general overall organizational values
and goals, with decisionmaking less a function of consensus and rational
argument than a struggle for divisional power. ° The organization thus
moves even further away from the ideal of rational decisionmaking. Even
within such a context, however, the basic agreement on core values (for
example, creating an air defense system) may provide a basis for continu-
ing organizational interests and advocacy.
With respect to organizational learning, outside stimuli and expe-
rience may be filtered through the organizational interests and mindsets,
resulting in inefficient and misdirected learning behavior. This process
is very similar to that of decisionmaking, for the information is pro-
cessed and responded to through much the same channels using similar pro-
39
cedures. 7 Thus reponsiveness to an external stimulus may vary and not
necessarily be appropriate to the stimulus.
Do Soviet bureaucracies fit the model provided by organization
theory? There is now a sufficient body of literature on Soviet
bureaucracies to indicate that they do indeed follow the broad outline of
38 See Cyert and March (1963; Chapters 3, 6) and Elmore (1978; 217-226)
39 Downs (1967; 179-83, 191-204), March and Simon (1958; 139-41).
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behavior sketched above. ° While there may be exaggerations or distor-
tions in some areas of behavior, the basic picture remains accurate.
Thus, in the USSR there appears to be a premium on avoiding responsibility
for making controversial decisions --"passing the ruble" up to a higher
authority is a common means of avoiding decisions. * This tendency has
several consequences: it increases centralization, it increases the time
for decisionmaking, and may reinforce tendencies to inertia and in-
crementalism as all levels seek the least-controversial decision. Fur-
thermore, as the problem gets sent to ever higher levels the possibility
of its being "lost in the shuffle" or overlooked increases, and so
problem- solving by flight or oversight becomes even more likely.
This avoidance of responsibility and high risk- avers ion might have
an effect on the level of advocacy. Some studies have shown that the
Soviet defense industry is reluctant to take on technologically challeng-
ing tasks because of the high risk involved and the penalties for fail-
ure. z Thus, instead of pressing for newer, more modern arms they tend to
advocate incremental innovation and simpler weapons that they can reliably
design and produce. 3 In the military services this risk-aversion may
manifest itself by a tendency to keep missions relatively simple but at
the same time to increase resources in order to accomplish those missions
more reliably. Thus, there may be less of a tendency for an organization
40 A number of studies in various areas have examined Soviet bureaucratic
and organizational behavior. See, for example, Alexander (1978-9), Ber-
liner (1976), Hough (1977), Spielmann (1978), Warner (1977), Wolfe (1979).
41 Alexander (1978/9; 29-30).
42 Alexander (1978-9; 28-9).
43 Alexander (1978-9; 31).
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to seek to expand its domain of responsibility unless there is a greater
offsetting increase in available resources to ensure that the
responsibilities do not overrun the resources.^ In this case we still
expect to see advocacy for increased resources . Furthermore , if the new
responsibility is viewed as closely related to the core mission of the
bureaucracy strong advocacy may be mounted for both the increased role and
for the necessary resources. 5
Finally, the role of incentive structures in Soviet bureaucracy is
also important. Berliner has shown how incentive structures in Soviet in-
dustry stifle innovation and there is evidence of similar tendencies in
the military services, where "rocking the boat" may be even more dis-
couraged. The strong emphasis on fulfilling norms, and the incentives
provided for this also has a strong effect on the performance of work. In
the military if performance measures do not measure true combat per-
formance or reward non-realistic training the incentive structure could
have a profound impact on the effectiveness of the forces. This aspect of
the problem will be dealt with in more detail in a later chapter.
Overall, then, there are good reasons for believing that the model
sketched out above should apply to Soviet bureaucracies and to the milita-
ry services. ° Again, this theory gives rise to certain propositions con-
cerning the organizational behavior of the services. Following some of
Posen's extrapolations from organization theory ' and the general proposi-
44 Downs (1967; 195-97).
45 Downs (1967; 198-200).
46 Alexander (1978-9), Warner (1977; 1-103), Wolfe (1979; 49-77).
47 Posen (1984; 41-59).
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tions described above we may draw a number of propositions concerning the
VPVO's likely behavior:
Propositions Concerning Internal Behavior
Decisionmaking:
--The VPVO will develop standard operating procedures (SOPs) for
both operations and planning. A form of "bureaucratic mindset"
may also be developed.
--We expect to see incremental innovation in operational art and
tactics, with conservatism prominent.
--Weapons should show slow innovation rates, and incremental design.
--The VPVO may deploy obsolete weapons, or weapons that are not op-
timized to meet the threat.
--Force structure and deployment should remain fairly constant over
time and may not be rapidly responsive to changes in strategy or
operational art.
--Organizational changes may be very slow, unless imposed from out-
side or triggered by catalytic events.
Inter-Branch Behavior:
--Inter-branch Conflict: There may be contention between the bran-
ches as to how to provide the most defense for the money. This is
particularly likely between the Surface- to-Air Missile Troops (SAM
Troops) and the Fighter Aviation branch (IA VPVO)
.
--The mix of SAMs and aircraft may shift if one branch or the other
gains a dominant position in the service.
Learning Behavior:
--Lessons learned from the combat experience of local wars will be
filtered through the existing biases and preconceptions of the
service and data tending to challenge strongly held view's will be
discounted. Lessons will thereby tend to confirm existing views
or policy or will result in incremental change.
How can we use this model to understand and explain organizational
behavior? In the next section the means and methods of applying the model
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are examined.
2.4 Applying the Model
In applying the integrated model ve are interested in discerning the
relative influence of the General Staff and the services. To do so the
evolution of the VPVO over tine has been examined, breaking it down into a
number of specific "choice opportunities," periods during which changing
technology and doctrine raised a number of important issues pertaining to
operational art and strategy. During each of these periods the relative
influence of the two levels is assessed by examining discussions and argu-
ments concerning the VPVO and their outcomes.
One important measure of the interaction between the General Staff
and the VPVO is the extent to which the propositions of the "pure" organi-
zational politics model are moderated by the unitary strategic perspective
of the General Staff. Thus, in the absence of the General Staff we would
expect the organizational politics model to be the dominant model explain-
ing VPVO policy. With the General Staff, however, we should expect dif-
ferent results as the General Staff limits the assertion of organizational
interests. Thus, many of the propositions listed above may be less promi-
nent in the Soviet case than in the U.S.
Conversely, the organizational politics model also proposes that the
output of a pure General Staff dominant model will be mediated and in-
fluenced by the organizational politics model, producing distorted out-
puts. By merging the General Staff dominant and organizational politics
models we may therefore arrive at a richer appreciation of the factors in-
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volved in Soviet defense decisionmaking and the interaction between deci-
sionmaking levels.
To test the propositions about the VPVO's be"havior an understanding
of the VPVO's operational art and missions is crucial. To this end, con-
tent analysis of Soviet military sources is used to discern the critical
elements in the VPVO's operational art and how they change over time. By
relating these changes in operational art and mission to the overall
strategic picture and Soviet force posture, an understanding of the VPVO's
response to internal and external developments will emerge. The relation
between changes in operational art, perceptions of the threat, and the
state of the threat will be examined, looking for indications of VPVO
responsiveness to threat stimuli.
The study is chronological in nature, in order to capture the evolu-
tion of VPVO operational art and events in the decisionmaking process.
Four broad periods will be examined: the formation of the VPVO (1948-60),
a pre-ABM treaty period (1960-1972), a post-ABM treaty period (1972-1980),
and the reorganization period, 1981-1986. These periods also roughly cor-
respond to periods of change in Soviet doctrine and strategy: the nuclear-
oriented Revolution in Military Affairs, the transition to greater conven-
tional capability, and the later conventional phase. Events of interest
such as the interceptions of the KAL airliners in 1978 and 1983, and the
Vietnam and Mid East wars are treated within these periods. On the doc-
trinal and strategic levels, attention is paid to the VPVO's justification
of its role and mission within the context of Soviet military doctrine.
In the chapters that follow the divergence from the General Staff
rational-actor model will be stressed. We will examine the role of orga-
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nizational interests and influences in the decisionmaking process and
determine to what extent these influences distorted the output expected





The problems of sparse data and lev signal -to-noise ratio are always
present in the study of Soviet defense policy. By looking at a specific
service, and for certain themes, it is possible to conduct a study with a
high level of detail over a long time span. This should allow maximum use
of the available data.
The basic source of data is a content analysis over time of Soviet
writings on the VPVO ranging from 1959 to the present. Primary sources
are the Soviet military journals Vestnik PVO (FVO Herald), Voyenno-
istoricheskiy zhurnal {Military-Historical Journal) and the restricted
journal Military Thought, as well as Soviet books on the VPVO. These
sources present some clear and illuminating discussions of VPVO opera-
tional art and tactics that allow many of the propositions listed above to
be tested.
VPVO deployments , weapons , and force structure must also be examined
in order to fully understand the VPVO's capabilities and the relationship
between the writings and reality. Data on force structure has been ob-
tained from a variety Western sources. Of particular concern is whether
there appears to be a lack of consonance between operational art and force
structure. Such a difference may be explained through the different orga-
nizational processes used to produce the two outputs , a matter that will
be examined in more detaiL-in later chapters.
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2 . 6 Summary
The model outlined here presents itself as an effective tool for
describing Soviet defense decisionmaking. It has two major aspects: 1)
the explanation of internal service behavior, especially operational art,
and 2) the interaction between the service and the General Staff. By ex-
amining the VPVO's evolution with an organizational politics model we may
gain important insights into the place of strategic defense in the broader
context of Soviet defense policy.
The following chapters trace the evolution of the VPVO from its in-
ception to 1986 with special attention to the theoretical aspects raised
by choice opportunities (the ABM debate, the reorganization debate, reac-
tions to local wars) . The relevance of the organizational politics model
to VPVO operational art and force structure is stressed throughout, but








The VPVOS was not created from thin air. Instead the nature and
structure of the new service was strongly determined by the long-term
evolution of Soviet air defenses, particularly the crucial testing of the
Great Patriotic War. During the war the VPVO's organizational structure
and operational art received great attention and the lessons of the war
played a major role in the structure and operational art of the post-war
period. In this chapter the early origins of the VPVO are briefly traced,
setting the stage for the war, and the war years are examined in some
detail.
3.2 The Inter-War Period: 1918-1941
Towards the end of World War I aircraft became an important military
instrument and the creation of effective air defenses became an issue of
great concern for the warring parties. Early air defenses were created
around cities using fighter aircraft and artillery modified to fire at
large angles against aerial targets. In Russia defenses were established
around important cities such as
4
Petrograd and Odessa. For observation
1 The Soviets refer to the war on the Soviet-German Front as the Great iJt*
Patriotic War. This is contradistinction to the term World War II', which 2 J-&W&
refers to combat in all theaters of war. This usage is convenient and
will be employed here as well.
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and warning a special service (the voyska vozdushnaya nablyudeniya,
opoveshcheniya i svyazi- -VNOS , or Troops of Air Observation, Warning and
Communications) was formed.* Point defenses were created around the city
and particular targets within the city and there was little centralized
command and control at the regional or
.
.national level . z~* Throughout the
war, though, there appears to have been little air activity against Rus-
sian cities, the bulk of German airpower being concentrated against the
Western front.
After the October revolution the Bolsheviks inherited the PVO system
of the Russian army. Despite the attempts of VPVO historians demonstrate
Lenin's great interest in PVO, the PVO appears to have played little role
in the civil war or the war with Poland, as neither adversary had sig-
nificant quantities of aviation able to reach important objectives. In-
stead, air defense appears to have been primarily an issue of tactical
concern with air combat the primary means of defense.
During thn 1920s and 1930s the main problems in establishing an ef-
fective PVO system were elucidating the operational art and creating an
efficient organizational and i n—ml structure. As airpower became a
stronger force and the perceived Western threat grew larger, these ques-
2 See Svetlishin (1964) for a detailed discussion of the Petrograd and
Odessa defenses, especially page l^S for the VNOS forces. Information on
the general system of PVO of Russia may be found in Batitskiy (1968),
Chapter 1. A short overview of the development of the PVO is presented in
Batitskiy (1976b; 316-321) and a slightly more comprehensive version may
be found in Ashkerov (1960; Chapter 1).
3 Svetlishin (1964; 109-110).
4 On the attempts to invoke Lenin's blessing see Batitskiy (1968; 18-22).
tempts by PVO historians to portray a major role for the PVO in the
civil war seen .very strained, suggesting that its real role was fairly in-
significant. Similarly, the Polish war is hardly mentioned, again sug-
gesting little role for the PVO. See Batitskiy (1968; 9-17).
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tions received much attention from Soviet military theorists and arms de-
velopers .
In 1924 the first PVO regiment of zenitnaja artillerija (anti-
aircraft artillery- -AAA) was formed, followed in 1927 by the first AAA
brigade. The FVO system maintained a structure with point defense lying
within FVO sectors created in the border nil!tary districts . These sec-
tors were headed by combined- armed officers who had a number of other
responsibilities, with the exceptions of Moscow and Leningrad, where there
were established PVO posts. Warning (VNOS) posts were created throughout
the frontier military districts. 5
In 1927, as part of the military reforms proposed by Frunze, a PVO
department was created in the Red Army staff. During the 1920s the
bases of FVO operational art were established by a number of
theoreticians, particularly N. A. Borodachev. Borodachev argued for a
delineation between defense of the front line (troop PVO) and defense of
the rear of the nation with the latter a separate force. PVO was present-
ed as a complement to a strong air and ground offensive that would destroy
enemy aviation both on the ground and in the air. Tactics for fighter
aviation (istrebitel'naya aviatsija--IA) and AAA were also worked out dur-
ing the 1920s. 8
5 Batitskiy (1976; 317), Batitskiy (1968; 30-31).
6 Batitskiy (1976; 317), Batitskiy (1968; 43).
7 Svetlishin (1979b; 76-77), Svetlishin (1974; 81-82). There are some
difficulties with the use of these secondary sources: the views of early
authors are sometimes distorted to make points relevant to contemporary
issues. The context and nature of these two articles suggests, however,
that they are basically historically correct although there may be some
changes in emphasis from the original.
8 See Svetlishin (1979b; 77).
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The development of the PVO system received even more attention in
the 1930s. In 1930 the PVO department was reformed as a directorate and
charged with developing a PVO plan for the entire country for 1930-1933.
A new decree concerning PVO was also promulgated, establishing PVO objec-
tives at important centers and establishing the post of Chief of PVO for
the point, appointed by the People's Commissariat for Military and Naval
Affairs. 9 The Chief of PVO would have operational control of all PVO and
civil defense forces at the objective, regardless of their service af-
filiation. In the military districts with PVO sectors independent PVO de-
partments were created and the formation of separate AAA batteries and
regiments was continued.
In 1932 the PVO was removed from its subordination to the Red Army
Staff and was reformed as a PVO Directorate directly subordinate to the
USSR Revolutionary Military Soviet (Rewoyensovet) , the highest military
body of the nation. The PVO Directorate, headed by S . S. Kamenev led the
PVO service for the entire natici. In the military districts PVO direc-
torates were created, headed by a PVO Chief for the military district with
direct leadership of PVO preparation and special PVO and civil defense
units of the district. The PVO Chief of the military district was direct-
ly subordinate to the military district commander, and only "in special
relations" subordinate to the Chief of the PVO Directorate. 11
This organizational structure has several important features
.
First, it increased the prominence of the PVO, placing it at a high
9 Soviet sources use the word objective to designate a defended site or
point. This avoids confusion with the word "target" which can mean either
the defended target or the attacker being targeted.
10 Batitskiy (1968; 44-45).
11 Batitskiy (1968; 44-45), Batitskiy (1976; 317).
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strategic level. Second, it created a system where the PVO had forces
designated to it, but had few forces of its aim. Third, while establish-
ing a national -level leadership, most of the control and power remained at
the military district level. .The Chief of PVO for the military district
was responsible to the district commander, rather than to the Chief of the
PVO Directorate. Thus the problems of dual subordination of both PVO J^,^
forces and leadership that were to become so critical in the early period
of the Great Patriotic War were first incorporated in this early organiza-
tion of the PVO.
The tendency towards creating larger AAA units continued during this
period with the creation of the first AAA divisions and the augmentation
of PVO units around Moscow, Leningrad and Baku. Then in 1937 the first
PVO corps were created around these cities while PVO divisions were creat-
ed around other centers. The PVO corps were "combined ants" units in
that they included AAA divisions, searchlight (zenitnyy prozhektor- -ZP)
regiments
,
antiaircraft machine-gun (zenitnyy pulemet- -ZP1) regiments,
aerostat (aerostat zagrazhdeniya- -AZ) regiments and VNOS warning regi-
ments. Separate brigades were created for the defense of smaller objec-
tives. Fighter aviation designated for the PVO remained as part of the
Soviet Air Force (voyenno-vozdushnyye sily—WS)
,
although in time of war
they would be under the operational control of the PVO Chief of the mili-
tary district. 13
12 Batitskiy (1968; 45-46).
13 Batitskiy (1968; 46-47). Technically, the Air Force was the Red Army
Air Force, but the modern term will be used here to avoid confusion. On
Soviet Air Force organization at the beginning of the war see Kozhevnikov
(1977; 43-46).
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Most of the organizational changes in the 1930s reflected a trend
towards larger PVO forces and the integration of many different branches
into combined arms units. Control, however, still remained at the milita-
ry district level.
The years 1940 and 1941 saw more reorganizations of the PVO as the
results of the Finnish wars and the German attacks on the Western front
were assimilated. These changes did not, however, greatly change the
locus of control.
In 1940, as a result of Finnish war experience the People's Com-
missariat for Military and Naval Affairs was reorganized into the People's
Commissariat for Defense (Narkomoborony) and a number of its subordinate
directorates were reorganized. The PVO Directorate became the Main PVO
Directorate (Glavnoye upravlenoye PVO--GU PVO) but the GU PVO still did
not have operational control over the PVO forces in the military dis-
tricts, although it apparently took over some administrative and support
functions from the Narkomoborony. Its functions were limited to planning,
providing arms and ensuring combat readiness.
In February 1941 more changes were made, creating PVO zones coinci-
dent with military district borders and commanded by military district of-
ficers. The PVO zones were again headed by an assistant to the military
district commander and in large zones with many units an intermediate
brigade-level command was established to control the scattered resources.
This reorganization thus arranged the PVO on a territorial basis and
maintained its subordination to the military district. Deployment of
forces between zones and assigning of priorities was done by the General
14 Svetlishin (1979a; 14-16), Batitskiy (1972; 15)
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Staff, not the GU PVO. The PVO forces in the zones themselves would be
controlled by the military districts and would become operational forma-
tions (ob'yedineniy) in wartime. Furthermore, the AAA of ground force
units was not under the control of the military district Chief for PVO, as
they were an integral part of the combined arms army units. 5 This system
of control was maintained until after the outbreak of war.
The PVO zones were themselves differentiated by their proximity to
the front. A strip varying in width from 200 to 600 km was designated a
threatened zone, in which targets were attainable by German aviation.
Most of the PVO assets were concentrated in the PVO zones within the
threatened zone.* 6 Particular attention was also given to the major ad-
ministrative and industrial centers of Leningrad, Moscow and Baku where
large forces were concentrated and where IA designated for PVO use was
directly subordinate to the Chief of PVO for the military district.
*
7
This organizational structure played an important role not only in
the VPVO's history, but also in its historiography. The mixed subordina-
tion of forces and the absence of centralized national -level control has
been criticized by almost all authors discussing the development of the
VPVO. Furthermore, these questions of control took on great immediacy in
the late 1970s and early 1980s when the VPVO organizational structure was
changed to resemble that of the «sarly 1940s. As the following section
also shows, the deficiencies of the military district based organizational
15 Batitskiy (1968; 47-48), Svetlishin (1979a; 14-16), Batitskiy (1972;
15).
16 Batitskiy (1972a; 14), Svetlishin (1979a; 18-19).
17 Svetlishin (1979a; 18-19), Yerofeyev (1973b; 59).
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structure were many, from the VFVO's perspective, and had a definite af-
fect on the effectiveness of PVO in the first few months of the war.
During the Great Patriotic War the organizational structure of the
VPVO underwent a number of changes in response to the changing situation
at the front and the various inefficiencies of the existing structure.
These changes illustrate the importance attached by the Soviet military to
perfecting organizational structures in order to increase effectiveness
and also indicate a number of difficulties in organizing air defense that
continue to this day. Thus, we must study these changes not only for
their intrinsic interest but also for what they reveal about current PVO
issues, and the VPVO's interpretation of these issues. The history of the
Great Patriotic War both provides the empirical data for the study of
problems of PVO and provides a medium (historiography of the Great
Patriotic War) for discussing them.
As we have seen, changes in the structure of the VPVO continued un-
til February 1941 but when the war came in June both the organizational
structure and PVO forces proved inadequate. The German surprise attack of
June 22, 1941 caught the PVO unprepared. Not only were large numbers of
aircraft destroyed on the airfields but AAA forces had not been put on
full combat alert and in some cases were located in camps far from their
wartime deployment areas
. (German source* claim 1,811 Soviet aircraft
destroyed on the first day, and over 4000 by the end of the first week,
18 Koldunov (1984b; 18-19) presents a fairly negative picture of the
state of combat readiness of VPVO forces at the beginning of the war,
while Batitskiy (1968; 67) presents a more sanguine picture.
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Those aircraft that remained were largely outdated and the ground force
AAA units were greatly understrength. Furthermore , in the chaos of the
first days and weeks of the war many AAA units found themselves engaged in
anti-tank battles (since their guns turned out to be highly effective in
the anti-tank role) while IA designated for PVO missions was often pre-
empted for close air support (CAS) of retreating troops. 20 The forces
available to the VPVOS are listed in Table 3.1.
With the beginning of the war the military districts were subsumed
into fronts but the rapid retreat of Soviet forces upset the pre-war PVO
plans as the objectives to be defended ware overrun by the German ground
offensive. The few PVO forces that remained were used in bits and pieces
with little effect. As a result, a new series of organizational changes
were instituted by the Supreme High Command (VGK)
.
The Initial changes took part in the ground force AAA units , as they
were amalgamated in an attempt to increase their concentration and effec-
tiveness but losses due to enemy action had already resulted in a situa-
tion where little could be done to make the AAA an effective force. * PVO
forces of the military districts had been included in Front formations and
19 For the German figures see Hardesty (1982; 15). The Soviet figure is
given in Lavrent'yev (1972; 25).
20 For information on Soviet aircraft and AAA types see Batitskiy (1968;
33-41). Desnitskiy (1959; 39-41) presents a good discussion of some of
the difficulties of the first few weeks of the war with particular
reference to the buildup of the Moscow PVO force. Batitskiy (1968; 67-96)
presents lots of war stories, including AAA anti-tank engagements, while
Tur (1962; 16-19) and Lavrent'yev (1972; 25-27) critique both AAA force
levels and the general organization of PVO at the beginning of the war.
Svetlishin (1979a; 25) reprints part of the directive transferring AAA to
anti-tank units.
21 Tur (1962; 17-18).
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were used to screen lines of communication (LOCs- -railroads, bridges,
roads, pipelines) as well as for direct air and ground defense. But this
use of the PVO forces did not allow them to carry out the primary mission
of defending cities and other major objectives. *
As the front moved eastwards , an air threat to Moscow began to
emerge, prompting the State Defense Committee (Gosud&rstvenniy Komicec
Oborony--GKQ) to issue a decree on July 9 calling for the strengthening of
the Moscow PVO. As a result of this PVO defenses were concentrated around
Moscow creating a dense, echeloned, circular defense around the city.
Indeed, the problem of air defense appears to have been of great concern
to the top Soviet leadership, and particularly to Stalin. At his meeting
with Harry Hopkins in late July 1941 to discuss lend-lease supplies the
first thing Stalin requested was 20,000 pieces of and -aircraft artil-
lery. Stalin had also personally overseen one of the first major ex-
ercises of the Moscow PVO on July 21, 1941 just one day before the first
German attack on Moscow. J
German air attacks on Moscow began on July 22 and continued until
early spring, although the bulk of the attack took place in the fall. The
air battle over Moscow, occupies, a placc>»4»> Smrttn fifr 4afon— history
similar to thatr of .the Rattle yBrtt^iSt Iff British military nIstory. It
is presented as a classic example of successful PVO, preventing the
22 Svetlishin (1979a; 27).
23 See Batitskiy (1968; 97-105) for a discussion of the decree and the
forces deployed. For some more detailed figures of forces deployed and
their control structure see Svetlishin (1979a; 39-51).
24 As quoted in Werth (1963; 281).
25 Konstantinov (1981a; 66-67).
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destruction of Moscow and (by implication) the fall of the city. 26 While
the interpretations of this battle will be examined in detail later, it
must be noted here that while a dense and fairly successful air defense
was created, the German attempts to destroy Moscow do not seem to have
been pressed home as the Luftwaffe was primarily concerned with support of
ground troops in the ground offensive ratfcirWWJ^WJftBw
.
In November a major reorganization of PVO forces took place, a
reorganization that set the stage for the emergence of the VFVO as a sepa-
rate service. The dual subordination of AAA and IA forces had not proven
effective and the State Defense Committee on November 9, 1941 unified and
centralized the control of the PVO troops formerly under military distr ict
or front control. Thus was formed the Voygj^ PgQ-_a£gaa«-XlCgy_QS) . the air
defense troops of the nation. The VFVOS was to be headed by a Deputy
People's Commissar for Defense, with a main staff and corresponding bran-
ches (e.g. AAA) and support services (e.g. VNOS). Thus the VPVOS was
given operational control of all PVO forces, except for some left to the
Fronts and the Leningrad PVO forces . Moscow and Leningrad corps regions
were formed and PVO division regions replaced the other PVO zones, except
for those in the Far East. 2 ' On November 24 the Narkomoborony published
a directive listing the units to be subordinated to the VPVOS and which
would remain subordinate to the ground forces, completing the first stage
26 The historical literature on the defense of Moscow is enormous, al-
though much of it is repetitive and unimaginative. Some of the best and
most detailed works are: Desnitskiy (1959), Batitskiy (1968; 97-127),
Svetlishin (1979a; 51-64), Svetlishin (1966), Mikhaylenko (1979). A good
Western discussion of the air war that describes both Soviet and German
difficulties is Hardesty (1982) especially Chapter 3 on the battle for
Moscow.
27 Svetlishin (1979a; 77-78).
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of the reorganization. 8 This established a strict delineation between
the PVO forces organic to the ground forces (troop PVO, or later PVO SV)
and the VPVOS forces responsible for defending rear area targets such as
LOCs and large administrative -industrial centers. ' Although this
delineation has at times been blurred and even erased, the separation of
these two forces has had a major impact not only on the organizational
structure of the modern VPVO but also on its operational art. As we shall
see, the tension between air defense of strategic and tactical targets is
one of the crucial aspects of the development of modern Soviet air
defense
.
While the VPVOS historical literature considers this reorganization
a great occasion, the PVO SV literature highlights the negative aspects.
The transfer of the majority of AAA forces to the VPVOS left the troops
almost without any air defense, particularly given the lack of air
cover 30
This reorganization did not solve all of the VPVOS 's control prob-
lems. While IA was formally designated for and subordinate to the VPVOS,
it still remained irithin the Air Force system, relying upon their service
and maintenance units. Major inter-service conflicts arose between the
VPVOS and Air Force leadership over the support and missions of these air-
craft. 31 As a result in January 1942 , fighter aviation designated for PVO
was transferred from the Air Force to the PVO, in essence becoming a
28 Batitskiy (1968; 125-6).
29 The term PVO SV will be used throughout to designate the Ground Forces
air defense component, although the PVO SV was only formally created as a
Ground Forces branch in 1958.
30 Tur (1962; 17-18).
31 Svetlishin (1973a; 97-98), Chedleyev (1977; 82).
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branch of the PVO. By the beginning of 1942 the VPVOS had taken on the




During 1942 there were no further major changes in the VPVOS organi-
zational structure, although the Moscow corps region was reformed into the
Moscow PVO front, while the Leningrad and Baku corps regions became PVO
armies. This change allowed an expansion of officer and administrative
staffs in order to better manage the growing PVO forces in these
regions. * The PVO SV, however, waa finally placed under the central con-
trol of the Commander of Artillery. Since the November 1941 reorganiza-
tion PVO SV forces were distributed throughout the fronts and armies. All
PVO SV units were now subordinate to the Commander of Artillery of and the
post of Deputy Head of Artillery for PVO was created, with equivalent
posts at the front and army levels. Army PVO regiments were also created,
unifying some of the disparate PVO units, and increasing the concentration
of fire. The new arrangement allowed for concentration and centralization
of PVO SV forces and the creation of the first AAA Groups used to provide
concentrated protection for Armies. The PVO SV also began to receive
more AAA as the industries relocated East of the Urals began to increase
their production. IN particular, they began to receive the mid-calibre 85
mm gun which previously had only been distributed to the VPVOS.
"
At Stalingrad VPVOS units were operationally subordinated to the
Ground Forces Front, a temporary and local reversal of the independent
32 Svetlishin (1979a; 79).
33 Svetlishin (1979a; 81).
34 Tur (1962; 19).
35 Tur (1962; 19-20).
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centralized control of the VPVOS. ° On balance, though, the VPVOS
retained and performed its missions (defense of cities, LOCs , concentra-
tion areas) and received more modern fighters and AAA that raised its ef-
fectiveness. J/
By mid- 1943 the need for yet another organizational change was felt.
The catalyst was, ironically, the first Cmmh attempt to carry out
strategic bombing in the deep rear of the nation. This was precisely the
threat that the VPVOS was formed to counter and even by its own accounts
the VPVOS did not perform well. By mid- summer 1943 German forces were
preparing for the "Citadel" offensive at Kursk and the Luftwaffe launched
attacks in early June against industrial targets in Saratov, Gor'kiy and
Yaroslavl'. These attacks took the VPVOS in these regions by surprise and
PVO performance was poor. Indeed, the attacks demonstrated a lack of
coordination between PVO SV and the VPVOS, as well as poor coordination of
LA and AAA forces in the targeted areas. 8
As a result of the shortfalls in VPVOS performance, the Supreme High
Command apparently concluded that the VPVOS was concentrating too much on
the active front areas while neglecting deep rear' areas. On June 29, 1943
it again decreed a major reorganization of the VPVOS. This reorganization
attempted to solve the problem of controlling forces over large areas by
splitting the VPVOS into two PVO front* , one in the East and one in the
West. (The Moscow PVO front was shortly afterward renamed the Moscow Spe-
cial PVO Army, leaving only the two PVO fronts.)-*' PVO front commanders
36 Svetlishin (1979a; 99-100).
37 Svetlishin (1979a; 84-87).
38 Svetlishin (1979a; 134-137), Batitskiy (1968; 241-253)
39 Yerofeyev (1973b; 61).
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would have a smaller number of forces to manage without giving up too much





position of Coaaander of the
Abolished, and the FVO front commanders apparently reported
directly to the Commander of Artillery. A Central Staff apparatus and
ocher administrations were retained under the VPVOS . Qjj€E3lt§?jffltaxa-
tion between FVO SV and VPVOS that had been established "in^Horambar 1941
was blurred. Both forces now reported to the Commander of Artillery, and
the intent appears to have been to increase the coordination between the
forces. ° In fact, the two forces appear to have largely maintained their
separate roles, with the Commander of Artillery's supervision of the VPVOS
being only nominal. This demotion of the VPVOS plays an important role in
the historiography of the VPVO, and as will be demonstrated later, the
discussion over the wisdom of this action becomes a touchstone for con-
f
temporary arguments over the unification of VPVO and PVO SV forces
.
After Kursk the Soviet Army moved to the offensive, posing new prob-
lems for the VPVOS. As the front moved westwards the problem of defending
targets in the deep rear diminished, while the new problem of defending
territory and cities liberated from the Germans arose. This also placed
great demands on the VPVOS' s ability to coordinate Its actions with the
PVO SV forces, for as Soviet troops entered an area the PVO SV would pro-
vide initial air defense but it would have to be relieved by the VPVOS so
40 Svetlishin (1979a; 149-150). For more detail on the Front commanders
and their forces see Batitskiy (1968; 199-201).
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as to accompany the advancing troops. If the relief were not carried out
in a timely fashion either the troops would outrun their air defense and
operate without protection, or the PVO SV would move forward while the
VPVOS lagged behind, creating an undefended gap between the two PVO sys-
tems. In fact, both problems occurred. Part of the blame for this
shortcoming was attributed to the VPVOS front organization: the West PVO
front was overloaded and had few reserves while ^he East PVO front was al-
most dormant. Transfer of forces between the two fronts, however, was
complicated by the very fact that they were separate, and apparently re-
quired the intervention of higher authorities. Furthermore, the VPVOS
division and corps regions did not closely correspond to ground forces
fronts, complicating the coordination between the VPVOS and the Ground
Forces. 41
To address these problems, the Supreme High Command again intervened
to change the VPVOS ' s structure. In March-April 1944 the PVO front system
was modified, creating Northern, Southern and Transcaucasus PVO fronts in
place of the old East and West fronts.' This new structure allowed easier
transfer of VPVOS units from the rear and reduced the number of active
units controlled by each front. At the same time, PVO corps and division
regions were transformed into actual corps and divisions. Where before
the designation and control of forces was determined by the boundaries of
the region, the new forces would retain their own designation and control
structure as they moved forward, just like their counterparts in the
Ground Forces. The corps and divisions were also realigned so as to pre-
vent the overlap of PVO forces and Ground Forces, further improving coor-
41 Svetli^hin (1979a; 178-180), Batitskiy (1968; 272-273).
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dination. Finally, control of logistics was centralized and given to the
VPVOS so that the PVO fronts no longer had to rely on the Ground Forces
front logistics system. z
This reorganization appears to have worked out fairly well and there
was no further tinkering with the VPVOS structure for another 8 months.
In December 1944, due to the increasing width of the Soviet-German front
and distance from Moscow, the North and South fronts were transformed into
the West, South-Vest and Central PVO fronts, and the front commanders and
their staffs were moved to more forward locations to facilitate command
and control. The Central front was created to manage the defense of rear
objectives, while the Transcaucasus front was left as before. 3 This
proved to be the last reorganization of the war (with the minor exception
of the mobilization of some PVO forces in the Far East) , coming just a few
months before its end.
3 . A Summary
In reviewing the history of the organizational structure in the
Great Patriotic War several important points must be emphasized. First,
while other services underwent reorganization during the war, the VPVOS 's
experience appears unique. The creation of the VPVOS as a guesi- service
followed by its demotion to a branch of Che artillery set the stage for
'Its later reemergence as a separate service. Second, the distinction be-
tween air defense of troops <PVO SV) and administrative -political centers
and the rear areas of fronts (VPVOS) was institutionalized early in the
42 Svetlishin (1979a; 179-180), Batitskiy (1968; 274)
43 Svetlishin (1979a; 190-191).
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war and maintained throughout the war. This delineation of tasks is one
of the basic features of the Soviet air defense system and has important
operational consequences. Third, problems of interaction between VPVOS
,
PVO SV, the Ground Forces, and the Air Forces arose throughout the war and
the organizational changes were attempts to resolve these problems and
produce an efficient air defense system. To some extent these attempts
succeeded, but as will be demonstrated later, inter-service and inter-
branch coordination problems were never completely solved, and they form
the antecedents for modern coordination problems.
While the development of VPVOS operational art will be examined in
detail in a later chapter, it is worthwhile making a few general points
here. Throughout the war there was a tendency to increasing the central-
ized control of VPVOS forces through the creation of larger formations,
such as PVO fronts . At the same time , as modern radar and radio equipment
was introduced (particularly in late 1943) the VPVOS began a slow transi-
tion from point defenses to area (zonal) defenses. This shift allowed
more efficient use of VPVOS resources.
It is also worth noting that the primary missions of the VPVOS
shifted over time. At the beginning of the war, and particularly in late
1941, the primary task of the VPVOS was defense of large cities and lines
of communications (LOCs) of troops. As the Soviets took the offensive the
weight of the missions changed, and while administrative-political targets
retained top priority, more and more of the VPVOS forces were committed to
LOC defense and defense of the rear areas of Ground Forces fronts. None-
theless, by the end of the war over half of the PVO forces were designated
44 Svetlishin (1979a; 248-250).
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for the defense of large centers . Indeed, Moscow, which for a long pe-
riod of time was well out of reach of German attack had enormous VPVOS
forces surrounding it at the end of the war, a concentration that has con-
tinued to the present.
Throughout the development of the VPVOS in the Great Patriotic War
the importance of efficient organization and command and control is
stressed. This theme continues throughout the modern period as well, and
in the late 1970s to early 1980s becomes a matter of prime importance,
bearing on the mission definition of the VPVOS.
In the chapters that follow the post-war development of the VPVOS is
examined, and throughout the influence of the Great Patriotic War experi-
ence is clear, both in surrogate arguments and as the formative experience
that gave birth to VPVOS operational art and tactics.
45 Svetlishin (1979a; 218-225)
46 Desnitskiy (1959; 53).
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CHAPTER 4
THE POST-WAR YEARS AND THE VPVOS BUILDUP
4 . 1 Introduction
In the post-war years the VPVOS underwent a!&aJor buildup in forces
and became the second-ranking Soviet military service. Facing a massive
U.S. bomber force the Soviet reaction was to attempt to create a thick and
effective defense that would blunt any U.S. attack and enable the USSR to
win the war on the ground. But the decisions on the scope and nature of
the air defense forces appear to have been largely based on inflated
estimates of VPVOS effectiveness and so the seemingly "rational' response
to the U.S. threat was influenced by organizational biases. Furthermore,
this misestimation by the VPVOS had a significant influence on higher
level considerations of strategy and doctrine. In this case all three
levels of the Soviet defense decisionmaking structure appear to have been
convinced of the need for a strong air defense. The VPVOS was able to
successfully influence perceptions and decisions at higher levels in the
decisionmaking structure. In this chapter the reasons behind the estab-
lishment and buildup of the VPVOS are examined, particularly the U.S.
threat, the political and military doctrinal context, and perceptions of
PVO effectiveness.
4.2 The First Post-war Period: 1945--1953
In the post-war years the issue of air defense took on great impor-
tance in Soviet defense policy. Development and deployment of large
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calibre AAA and new radars was accelerated and jet aircraft were designed
and built. As with the rest of the armed services, in 1945-46 the VPVOS
was reorganized and troop levels were reduced. But at the sane time, the
stature of the VPVOS began to increase and in February 1946 the position
of Commander of VPVOS was created, subordinate to the Commander of Artil-
lery of the Soviet Armed Forces. While the re -establishment of this
position went part way towards undoing the changes of June 1943, the VPVOS
Commander was not a service chief. This promotion would take place later
in the 1940s as the threat increased still further.
4.2.1 The Threat
The USSR had never faced a major strategic bombing threat during the
Great Patriotic War. While cities such as Stalingrad had been razed from
the air these attacks were by short-range aviation and the targets were
front-line cities. The interception of massive bomber attacks at long
ranges and great depth was not a skill developed during these years. Yet
at the end of the war the USSR faced just such a challenge. First, the
U.S. had die atomic boob, and for all the Soviet downplaying of its effec-
tiveness the military leaders were aware of the new threat inherent in
1 Batitskiy (1968; 343-48). Note that most of the other combatants had
deployed large -calibre AAA during the war and the USSR was trying to catch
up, although this is not mentioned in Soviet accounts. Furthermore, many
of the radar gun- laying stations were apparently originally provided to
the USSR by the U.S. under Lend-Lease programs.
2 At the same time the four PVO Fronts were transformed into PVO dis-
tricts.
3 Batitskiy (1968; 340-341). Much of this material on the post-war de-
velopment of the VPVOS may also be found in Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin
(1972).
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this weapon. Second, the USSR faced an opponent that had a massive
strategic bombing force and extensive experience in its use. Ho longer
would evacuating industry to East of the Urals work, for as the ranges of
bombers and power of nuclear weapons increased no sanctuaries would
remain
.
in 1948 the U.S. stockpile of nuelear weapons was fairly small and
war plans called for a combined nuclear and conventional attack on the
USSR. Indeed in 1948 there was only one wing of atomic -capable aircraft
and approximately 50 atomic weapons. Whether the Soviets had detailed
knowledge of these forces and plans is unknown, but it is likely that they
were able to estimate the U.S. stockpile and capabilities.
There was another threat to the USSR, and a more Immediate one: U.S.
reconnaissance flights near and over Soviet territory. These flights
served not only to infuriate Soviet leaders over the violation of their
sovereignty but may also have triggered deep fears of surprise attack, for
in the months before Barbarossa the Germans had also conducted extensive
aerial reconnaissance. Soviet air borders were quite porous and ex-
tensive, moderately deep, U.S. reconnaissance overflights of Soviet terri-
tory began in late 1950. ^>n one day in 1950_SAC_jaad_47 aircraft flying I
over SoviatjBirspac^. While a few U.S. aircraft were lost, the Soviets/
seem to have been almost powerless to prevent these overflights.
4 See Cave Brown (1978; 5-29) for an overview of U.S. war plans of the
late 1940s.
5 See Kohn and Harahan (1988; 86).
6 Dinerstein (1962; 175) argues that the Soviets could have figured out
the approximate size of the stockpile.
7 Werth (1964; 142).
8 Beschloss (1986; 77-78). Relatively shallow penetrations and border
reconnaissance flights were apparently carried out before this. The type
of aircraft used is not specified, but they were probably modified B-29
bombers (later RB-47 and RB-57) that would appear indistinguishable from
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Finally, the outbreak of the Korean war also increased Soviet per-
ceptions of the likelihood of war, and seems to have increased concern
about air defense
.
4.2.2 The VFVOS and Soviet Strategy
The Soviet response to the perceived U.S. threat was a fairly ob-
vious one: to develop strategic defenses and to try to catch up in of-
fensive striking forces. Most Western attention has been given to the
latter: the Soviet efforts to develop the atomic bomb and to copy and
Q
mass-produce the B-29 bomber. But at least as much effort was being put
into defense against U.S. strategic forces and this emphasis was con-
sistent with Soviet doctrine during this period.
Under Stalin, Soviet doctrine was strictly defined and could not be
tampered with even by the professional military. ° The basis of the doc-
trine was the distinction in military science between "permanently operat-
ing factors" that could influence the outcome of a war and "temporary op-
erating factors" that only had short-term significance and could not de-
cide the outcome of the war. * Surprise was considered a temporary opera-
(continued)
regular bombers to Soviet radar. Lemay tells of one mission when SAC flew
all its reconnaissance aircraft over Vladivostok at high noon with only
two MiG sightings and no interceptions. This may be the same incident
Beschloss refers to, although Lemay does not fix the date other than "the
1950s." See Kohn and Harahan (1988; 86).
9 On Soviet bomber development see Monks (1977; 214-22), Kilmarx (1962;
250-62).
10 Garthoff (1962; 61-3).
11 Dinerstein (1962; 33). Some of the permanent factors were: stability
of the rear, morale, quantity and quality of the armed forces, organiza-
tional abilities.
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ting factor, and consistent with this it was argued that a surprise first
blow, even with nuclear weapons, could not be decisive.' With such a
view of surprise the creation of an air defense system to blunt a nuclear
and conventional attack and to enable the country to function during the
war made sense. If the first nuclear strike might not be decisive, multi-
ple sorties with both conventional and nuclear weapons might be required,
and the air defenses would be able to inflict significant attrition
against the attackers. ' Therefore, even if the PVO did not achieve ex-
tremely high attrition it might be able to exact a high enough penalty to
greatly reduce the effectiveness of air attacks over time. a Indeed,
Stalin appeared to be highly concerned about the danger of U.S. attack and
Khrushchev reports that in the late 1940s Stalin ordered Moscow surrounded
by 100 mm AAA at constant combat readiness. 5 Thus, not only was the
creation of a strong PVO system consistent with, and even required by
12 Dinerstein (1962; 33-34).
13 Dinerstein also notes that U.S. bomber forces were dependent on bases
close to the USSR, and if these could be overrun or destroyed then the
U.S. strategic threat would be eliminated. Dinerstein (1962; 175-6).
14 This conclusion Is supported by an analysis conducted by the Joint
Chiefs of Staff in 1949 that showed very serious SAC losses of approxi-
mately 30Z that would cripple it during an extended air campaign against
the Soviet Union. By the early 1950s, however, when General LeMay took
over SAC the level of proficiency of SAC had increased significantly and
estimates of attrition decreased as new weapons and better training were
incorporated. See Cave Brown (1978; 24-27).
15 Khrushchev (1974; 11, 533). According to Penkovskiy Stalin had Mar-
shall of Artillery Yakovlev, former chief of the Main Artillery Direc-
torate jailed for "having done a poor job of organizing the country's air
defenses." Penkovksiy (1965; 317). Unfortunately Penkovskiy does not
specify when this occurred, although Akhromeyev (1986; 844) lists Yakovlev
in this post during the Great Patriotic War and from 1946-48 and there do
not appear to be any "blank spots' or major setbacks in his career. If
true it is a good reminder of both Stalin's stress on PVO and the dangers
of not fulfilling his demands.
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Soviet doctrine, but it seems to have had the backing of Stalin himself.
Indeed, only with his support and intervention could the program of VPVOS
armament and reorganization have taken place
.
The turning point in VPVOS history came in 1948 when the VPVOS was
again reorganized and finally became an independent service , although it
was headed by a Commander, rather than Commander in Chief. c This move
undid the reorganization of June 1943, essentially returning the VPVOS to
its stature of January 1942. It did not, however, place the VPVOS at the
same level as the other services, although it did indicate much greater
prominence within the defense structure.
The mission of the VPVOS was fairly clear, If not very easy: to
defend the Soviet homeland against air attack. This involved defense of
both urban- industrial and military targets and VPVOS resources were spread
fairly thinly. 17 The VPVOS began to receive new equipment, such as jet
aircraft and new AAA, while surface-to-air missiles (SAHs) were developed.
Indeed, during the early 1950s a major shift in aircraft strength from the
Soviet Air Force to the VPVOS was noted by U.S. intelligence, suggesting
16 A the same time Soviet territory was divided into a border area and
internal territory. PVO of the border areas was controlled by the com-
mander of the respective Military District, to whom all means of PVO in
the district were subordinated. The Navy was given responsibility for
defending its bases. The VPVOS apparently had primary responsibility for
defense in the internal territory if the border areas were penetrated.
See Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin (1972; 25), Batitskiy (1968; 349-350). It
is interesting to note that this decision was made during the year that
most Western historians consider the start of the Cold War.
17 See Curtis Lemay's (former Commander in Chief of SAC) comments in
Kohn and Harahan (1988; 86-87). There is very little good numerical data
on VPVOS forces during this time period, even from declassified sources.
Most sources lump all fighters together without noting service designation
or mission.
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that priorities were changing in response to the U.S. challenges. Projec-
tions indicated that by 1954 the VPVOS would have over 3,500 fighter air-
craft of which approximately 2900 would be jet interceptors. 18 But
despite these increases in force sire there were still real limitations on
VPVOS capability, since IA forces had no nighttime or poor weather capa-
bility and while radar -controlled AAA was available it was unlikely to
score high kill rates. 19
VPVOS operational art also was developed, focusing on defense of in-
dustrial economic centers using massive Fighter Aviation (IA) and AAA
forces on their approaches. From World War II a number of conclusions
were drawn. Point defense was recognized as ineffective and the theory of
the anti-air operation was developed. The anti-air operation was elabora-
ted and named in 1953, becoming a fundamental part of training and opera-
tional art. The anti-air operation was to incorporate all branches, and
even other services, coordinating their actions over a wide expanse of
space and through a number of separate or linked battles. It also re-
quired great attention to the concentration of force and the timely crea-
tion and use of reserves as critical components of the operation. °
During this period the Korean war gave the Soviets a chance to test
some of their new equipment, particularly radar -controlled AAA and the new
MiG jet fighters, both of which proved quite effective. * Tactics were
18 Young (1952; 3, Table IV). I am indebted to Jeff Sands for providing
access to his declassified materials for this research.
19 Dinerstein (1962; 179).
20 Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin (1972; 26-28), Batitskiy (1968; 353-357).
21 Krasnov and Korzun (1972; 88-89), Orlov (1977), Babich (1987; 62-64).
Some of the subsequent effectiveness inflation may have been due to the
very good performance of the MiGs against U.S. B-29 bombers during the
early part of the war. However, these two aircraft were not of the same
technological level, and extrapolating from the Korean experience to jet
bombers would have been misleading.
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also developed during this period that formed the basis for VPVOS tactics
through to the mid-1960s. The Korean War experience appears to have
justified Soviet interest in dense air defenses.
Finally, even after the 1948 upgrading to a service tinkering with
the VPVOS organizational structure continued. U.S. reconnaissance over-
flights became so serious in 1951 that Soviet sources claim the incursions
precipitated a reorganisation that established & frontier air defense sys-
tern in the border military districts, consisting of IA, warning (VNOS) and
support units. z This organization was designed to concentrate control of
PVO forces in the districts that were being overflown, but according to
Soviet sources it also complicated control arrangements and hampered
leadership, as it spread responsibility for air defense between the Soviet
Air Force, the Ground Forces (AAA), and the VPVOS. In 1953 the border air
defense regions vers united with the VPVOS, resulting in a unified and
centralized nationwide air defense system. J
Tnus, during this first post-war period the VPVOS went through a
number of reorganizations and in the process was established as a service,
although not on a par with the other services. The U.S. threat, forcibly
brought home by penetration of Soviet airspace by reconnaissance aircraft,
was increasing, while the U.S. stockpile grew and new jet bombers came
into the U.S. inventory. Under such circumstances Soviet interest in PVO
22 But apparently excluding AAA forces which remained in the Ground
Forces or under military district control. The border defense system was
headed by K. A. Vershinin, who was a deputy commander of the Air Force,
not the VPVOS.
23 Batitskiy (1968; 352), Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin (1972; 25).
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is understandable. Furthermore, as considered in more detail below, the
development of new PVO technologies held out hope for great increases in
PVO effectiveness compared to past wars.
4.3 Building a Modern Air Defense System: 1954-60
After 1953 the VPVOS's place in the Soviet defense structure and its
role in Soviet military strategy increased greatly. The first indication
of this growing prominence was the creation in Ray 1954 of the position
ofLCommander in Chief of the VPVOS (yfag wAa.aJmWiffiyjttfljtg»r °f
Defense) and the VPVOS joined the ranks of the.other services, placing
second to the Ground Forces in the protocol listing. This new position
indicated the high priority being given to development of strategic
defenses
.
4.3.1 The VPVOS and the Revolution in Military Affairs
After Stalin's death in 1953 Stalinist military science underwent a
reappraisal leading to changes in Soviet military doctrine stressing the
revolutionary nature of new combat technologies . The name given to this
new era in warfare was the "Revolution in Military Affairs." The Revolu-
tion in Military Affairs was far from clear of political implications,
though for Khrushchev was its mc in proponent and the Revolution played a
critical role in his approach to defense and foreign policy. ^
24 Yakimanskiy (1973; 44).
25 The most detailed accounts of the revolution in military affairs and
its impact on Soviet policy may be found in Dinerstein (1962), Wolfe
(1964), Wolfe (1970), Garthoff (1962).
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The Revolution in Military Affairs emphasized nuclear weapons and
missiles over the traditional ground and naval forces and posited that a
new world war would be nuclear from the start. Hence the emphasis in arms
shifted from conventional forces to nuclear forces. In keeping with this
Khrushchev made major cuts in Ground Forces personnel in 1955-7, 1958-9,
and a partial cut in I960. 26
Along with this new nuclear emphasis came increased concern over the
impact of surprise attack. In late 1953, Soviet authors began to
reconsider the proposition that surprise was only a temporary operating
factor and some suggested that nuclear weapons might Increase the sig-
nificance of this factor in a future war. This increased stress on the
role of surprise acted to increase the importance of air defense, for a
surprise nuclear attack could conceivably be decisive in a future war if
not countered.
While Western analysts tend to discuss Soviet plans in terms of a
Soviet first strike, the Soviets were concerned about the possibility of a
U.S. first strike. 28 For this reason the VPVOS was to be In a state of
constant combat readiness and it assumed a strategic importance as the
first line of defense against possible U.S. aggression. The second role
of the VPVOS would be to provide a defense against remaining U.S. forces
in case of a Soviet first strike. 2 ' But while this may have made sense in
the mid-1950s when most U.S. nuclear forces were deployed near Soviet bor-
26 Wolfe (1970; 164-6).
27 Dinerstein (1962; 180-87).
28 There were good reasons for this. See Rosenberg (1981-2; 27, passim)
29 Wolfe (1964; 189-96).
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ders and within range of Soviet theater forces, by the end of the 1950s
the advent of the B-52 bomber allowed U.S. forces to be rebased in the
U.S. At the tine the Soviets had no means of carrying out a first strike
•gainst these targets despite Khrushchev's boasts about producing IQMs
like sausages.
For much of this period the VPVOS would have had to fend off a major
U.S. strike, whether first or second. To do this required a further
buildup and modernization of VPVOS capabilities. Indeed, the increased
concern over surprise attack heightened the importance of the VPVOS and
placed greater demands upon it. Now the VPVOS would not only have to
blunt a mixed nuclear and conventional Attack over time, but instead would
have to repel a major nuclear attack. This demanded much higher effec-
tiveness against incoming bombers
The development of the VPVOS was therefore very consistent with
Soviet military doctrine as it developed during the 1950s under Khrush-
chev's tutelage. But in addition to military considerations there were
also political considerations.
The decision to promote the VPVOS to the status of a full service
must have been approved by the Politburo itself, as such a move was very
rare and resulted in the creation of a new Deputy Minister of Defense
position. But the timing of the upgrading is itself interesting, as it
followed a major defeat for Malenkov over foreign policy. As Diners tein
has shown, in March and April of 1954 Malenkov was forced to back down on
his claims that a future nuclear war would result in the destruction of
world civilization. ° In contrast, Malenkov was forced to espouse the
30 Dinerstein (1962; 69-77).
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view propounded by Khrushchev and his allies, that a nuclear war would
mean the collapse of capitalism, but not of socialism. x By the end of
1954 Malenkov had been removed from power, with this battle one of the
defeats that resulted in his downfall. 2 In view of this it does not ap-
pear that the upgrading of the VPVOS in May of that year is a coin-
cidence. 3 It is likely that one major component of the debate was
whether strategic defense was feasible, or whether political accommodation
and detente was a more reliable means of ensuring Soviet security. * In
this case the winning of the debate by the Khrushchev faction gave rise to
the decision to upgrade the VPVOS to a service and assign it high
priority. Furthermore, throughout the 1950s the VPVOS appears to have
31 Dinerstein (1962; 74-76).
32 See Medvedev and Medvedev (1978; 54). Malenkov was removed from power
in 1954 but his resignation as Chairman of the Council of Ministers was
not announced until February 1955.
33 Interestingly, less than two years earlier the VPVOS had been in-
timately involved with the downfall of another political figure: Beria.
The actual arrest of Beria in July 1953 was carried out by the top of-
ficers of the Moscow PVO district (then commanded by K.S. Moskalenko) , un-
der the direction of Marshal Zhukov. Apparently the Moscow Garrison and
Kremlin guard were not trusted enough to perform this task. For a remark-
able eye-witness account of the arrest and the PVO's role in it see
Bystrov (1988a, b,c).
While it is tempting to speculate that this duty rendered was repaid with
the creation of a service, there is no good reason to believe it. First,
the new Commander in Chief was not one of the officers participating in
the arrest (nor was his successor). Second, such a quid pro quo seems
quite out of keeping with the arrangement of the project and the relative
power of the VFVO and the Party: the Party does not have to "request fa-
vors" from the services. Third, it is highly unlikely that defense deci-
sions are made on such highly irrational grounds. Fourth, the top of-
ficers involved seem to have been acting for personal reasons , rather than
out of any service loyalty.
34 Most sources cast this argument as one over foreign policy in its
broadest sense. My comments here do not deny it, but I do suggest that
the more concrete topic of resource allocation and priority for strategic
defense may have been a major part of the debate.
•70-
been given high priority in resources and Khrushchev himself seems to have
been a leading advocate of air defense.
Khrushchev's personal role in directing Soviet defense policy was
very great, and his views were reflected in the developing Soviet force
structure. Thus, Khrushchev's strong belief 1» %he mttperlorlty of rockets
over aircraft led to a strong emphasis on the production of ICBMs and
SAMs. * Indeed, Khrushchev had some very clear ideas concerning the ef-
fectiveness of air defenses : in several places in his memoirs Khrushchev
alludes to very high effectiveness and at one point clearly states that
SAMs were expected to have very high effectiveness and that the results of
Vietnam and the Middle East were extremely disappointing. 6 Khrushchev
also appears to have strongly supported the buildup of VPVOS forces, at
one point noting that such defenses had much greater priority than naval
forces. '
One reason for this continuing concern with the VPVOS was the U-2
overflights beginning in 1956 that penetrated even deeper into Soviet ter-
ritory than previous reconnaissance missions. ° Khrushchev convincingly
recounts his sense of outrage and indignation at the U.S. overflights and
Soviet "impotence" in the early years. 9 While such emotional responses
35 So strong was the stress on rockets that proponents of traditional
aircraft had to resell them as "rocket-carriers." Thus, VPVOS fighter-
interceptors became (air-to-air) rocket-carriers.
36 Khrushchev (1974; 41, 43-44, 51,). Estimates of very high PVO effec-
tiveness was one of the reasons why the Soviet intercontinental bomber
program never received strong backing.
37 Khrushchev (1972; 26, 35).
38 Beschloss (1986; 119-23). The first flight was over two of the most
important and heavily defended objectives in the USSR- -Moscow and
Leningrad.
39 Khrushchev (1972; 448-9). More many other sections of his memoirs,
this section rings true
.
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were not the primary reason for the priority given to the VPVOS it seems
highly likely that these continual reminders of U.S. capability and Soviet
ineffectiveness goaded the Soviets into increased attention to the air
defense problem. All the more so, since if U-2s could operate with im-
punity then U.S. bombers might also operate without heavy losses.
*"
The VPVOS was thus considered an essential part of Soviet strategy:
the strategic defense to complement the (delayed and limited) strategic
offensive capabilities. The priority given the service with its promotion
to second place (before the Air Force and Navy) plus the support evinced
by Khrushchev are clear indications that the top leadership considered
this mission of great importance and was willing to support its continued
modernization during a period of overall reductions in troop manpower.
Given the U.S. strategic bomber threat and the continued overflights such
a high priority seems a sensible and rational policy. However, as will be
demonstrated below, this rational decision was based on estimates of VPVOS
effectiveness that were distorted by organizational perspectives. Before
passing such a judgment we need to examine the forces created by the VPVOS
and to estimate their real and perceived effectiveness.
4.3.2 VPVOS Force Structure
40 Soviet paranoia should not be underestimated in this case. Even
though the U-2 was strictly a reconnaissance aircraft it would not have
been impossible to modify it for bombing missions with nuclear weapons.
Given Soviet concern over surprise attack the specter of a lone nuclear
-
armed U-2 starting a war with a surprise attack on Moscow (and destroying
Soviet command and control and leadership) must have given the VPVOS
nightmares.
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During this period the VPVOS underwent a *apid «xp*naion. 41 Inter-
ceptor aviation was modernized although through the mid 1950s it still
lacked all-weather capability. 4 ^ Total IA forces by the end of the decade
numbered approximately 4000 aircraft, most of which were the newest and
most sophisticated produced by the Soviet aircraft industry.
A simultaneous buildup was conducted in the area of SAMs . Immedi-
ately after the war the Soviets had initiated work on SAMs, with the
benefit of captured German documents, equipment and personnel. This
program resulted in the SA-1 SAM, 3,200 of which were deployed in two con-
centric circles around Moscow starting in 1954. This missile remained
deployed until the early 1980s, when replacement with SA-10 SAMs began. 5
Later in the 1950s a more capable missile, the SA-2 was developed for high
altitude air defense, scoring a notable victory in shooting down Gary
Powers 's U-2. Eventually up to 4600 SA-2s were deployed by the mid-1970s,
although since then their number has gradually been reduced. & (See Fig-
ure 5.1.) In recognition of their growing role the SAM Troops (ZeniCnyy
41 Lee (1959; 125).
42 IA was based primarily on the MiG-15 and MiG-17 jet fighters in the
early 1950s. These aircraft possessed good maneuverability and overall
performance compared to Western aircraft but lacked an all-weather or
night capability as they had no radar. See Lee (1959; 122-123). They
were replaced in the mid to late 1950s by the supersonic MiG-19 and for
all-weather use the Yak- 25 was developed. Towards the end of the decade
new fighters, such as the MiG-21, new Sukhoi (the Su-9/11) interceptors
and the successor to the Yak-25, the Yak-28 were also being developed.
See Green (1959; 143-145), Kilmarx (1963; 262-265).
43 Kilmarx (1963; 266-267).
44 Stockwell (1959; 239).
45 Wright (1986; 543-546) provides a good summary of the data on this
missile.
46 Wright (1986; 547-555).
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Raketnyy Voysk- -Zenith Rocket Troops, ZRV) were incorporated in 1956 as
the leading branch of the VPVOS. 47 Despite the advent of SAMs the VPVOS
maintained approximately 10,000 large-calibre AAA pieces through the late
19-Hr:* 8
At the end of the war Soviet radar technology lagged that of the
Vest but through strong indigenous efforts, (aided by captured German
equipment and US lend-lease radars) , they soon acquired a significant
radar capability. 9 The Soviets attempted to develop and deploy a reli-
able radar system covering all likely enemy approach routes. The Warsaw
Pact nations were added to the VPVOS warning system, extending its bound-
ary far to the west. ° During this period the Radiotechnical troops (RTV)
were formed from the old VNOS branch. *
By the end of the 1950s the VPVOS had taken on the basic form and
structure that continued through the late 1970s. A large interceptor
force, backed by a strong SAM force for point defense and an extensive
radar network. The size of the commitment to the development of the VPVOS
is reflected in the total manpower of approximately 500,000, second only
to the army. *
47 Soviet sources do not give an exact date for the formation of the SAM
Troops but the first Commander of the Moscow Air Defense District SAM
forces was appointed in 1956, suggesting the formation of the branch in
that year. See Konstantinov (1981; 192).
48 Batitskiy (1968; 358-359), Lee (1959; 125).
49 Lee (1959; 121-3, 126-7) and Stockwell (1959) emphasize the importance
of German technology. Batitskiy (1968; 365-366) of course emphasizes
Soviet contributions. A comprehensive discussion of Soviet radar develop-
ment may be found in Lobanov (1982). For pre-war work on radar see Erick-
son (1972).
50 Kilmarx (1963; 267).
51 Batitskiy (1968; 365).
52 Jones (1977; 40).
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The organizational structure of the VPVOS also was finalized during
the 1950s, and remained stable through 1980. This structure emphasized
centralized control of all VPVOS forces. While the exact details of the
VPVOS organization are not vary clasr, most authors agree that there were
a total of 16 air defense districts , 6 to the Wareaw gMJwflflp J3»o major
C O
identified in the Soviet or open Western literature. JJ Since the number
of Air Defense Districts is less than the number of military districts, it
is not likely that they share the same boundaries or that the military
districts commanders had control over VPVOS forces. Within the air
53 See Menaul (1980; 53), Jones (1978; 80). Department of Defense (1981;
65) . Jones points out that the Commander in Chief of the VPVOS was not
publicly identified as the Commander of Warsaw Pact air defenses until
April 1969. The six Warsaw fact districts correspond to national bound-
aries rather than groups of forces . One may speculate on the locations of
the other 8 Air Defense Districts in the Soviet Union. Obviously the Far
East (Vladivostok) area and the Kola peninsula are likely locations.
Leningrad may be included in a Kola Air Defense District, or may be sepa-
rate (including the Baltic republics). A defensive system for the Western
approaches to the Ukraine is also likely, perhaps based in Kiev. If
Siberia is not included in the Far East area it may also have had a sepa-
rate command. Other districts could augment the Baku Air Defense Dis-
trict's coverage in the Central Asian area, and perhaps cover the area be-
tween the Moscow Air Defense District and Western Siberia. Lee (1959;
125) suggests that there are 20 regional PVO commands "under an Army or
Air Force General" spread over the USSR. This may again indicate a 1960s
reorganization, or Lee may be referring to Aviation and Artillery officers
(of the VPVOS) controlling the regions. It is also possible that Lee is
referring to the structure existing before the reorganization of 1953.
Lee lists the commands and their corresponding regions. In the North:
Murmansk, Taimyr peninsula, Kolymsk peninsula, Kamchatka. Regional com-
mands near Leningrad, Moscow, in the Crimea, Baku, Astrakhan, Omsk,
Stalinabad, Alma Ata. In the Eastern areas: Ayan, Komsomolsk, and
Vladivostok.
54 Garthoff (1959; 184) claims that during a war the PVO forces in the
military districts would be controlled by the military district commander
and staff. Furthermore, Garthoff (1959; 178) indicates that the Commander
of IA PVO was simultaneously a Deputy Commander in Chief of the Air Force.
It is possible that Garthoff was referring to the pre-1954 organization
discussed above. Other authors agree that the VPVOS (before 1981)
bypassed the military district command structure and exercised direct op-
erational control over all PVO forces. See Scott and Scott (1981; 108-
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defense districts the forces are organized into VPVOS armies (or possibly
corps) composed of VPVOS divisions, regiments, and squadrons. 5
Despite these immense efforts the efficacy of the system was open to
doubt. Western analysts, viewing this massive air defense system tended
Sf* — SA
to be skeptical of its effectiveness . JO Indeed, Curtis Lemay, the Com-
mander of SAC, has recently stated that during the 1950s SAC could have
attacked the Soviet Union with almost no losses. ' Documents from the
(continued)
109, 148). Lee (1959; 126) in the same book as Garthoff suggests this,
although not very clearly or explicitly. If Garthoff 's claims are cor-
rect, it appears that a further reorganization may have taken place in the
1960s, fully subordinating IA forces to the PVO and increasing centralized
control.
Garthoff s claim is repeated in a 1980 work by Air Vice-Marshal Menaul,
who asserts that IA forces are administratively subordinate to the Air
Force, while they are operationally subordinate to the VPVOS. Menaul also
asserts that VPVOS forces were directly controlled by the VPVOS head-
quarters
,
independent of military district control. Menaul (1980; 51,-
53). Note, however, that Menaul refers to the subordination of IA PVO to
the Soviet Air Force in the past tense, so it may have changed. Manaul
also claim* that AAA fore** constitute a branch of the VPVOS, although
other Was tern sourcea d» oot lift them, and Soviet sources imply that they
vara superseded by the SAM troops. In short, the claims of Menaul and
Garthoff do not seem to be sufficiently clear or well-documented to alter
the description set out above. See Scott and Scott, cited above and
Batitskiy (1968; 365).
55 Suvorov (1984; 78-80). Although some of Suvorov's statements on pre-
war organization appear to be incorrect, his description of organiza-
tional structure seems plausible. Suvorov also states that the Moscow and
Baku Air Defense Districts would become PVO Fronts during wartime.
Petersen (1979; 35) also notes that the air defense districts are really
PVO armies.
56 For example, in 1963 Kilmarx concluded that "Russia has been unable to
provide adequate defense against a large-scale attack by Strategic Air
Command," and argued that the problems involved in creating an adequate
defense were almost insurmountable. See Kilmarx (1963; 267). Lee, while
noting the many deficiencies in VPVOS forces, was somewhat more optimistic
noting that the VPVOS "could do well" against the U.S. and UK bomber
forces but that it was unlikely to prevent the catastrophic destruction of
the USSR. See Lee (1959; 129).
57 Kohn and Harahan (1988; 86-87). Lemay refers vaguely to attacking in
the 1950s and is not specific on whether his comments apply to the entire
decade but General Catton, another participant in the interview, asserts
that this held true throughout the 1950s.
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mid-1950s also indicate that SAC expected ftf, low Iomm to Soviet air
defenses . °
By the end of the 1950s ve sees to have a paradox. The USSR had
spent enormous amounts of money to develop an air defense system that most
Western experts (and particularly SAC) considered ineffective. How are we
to explain this paradox? Several factors appear to have been at work.
First, the new military doctrine with its stress on nuclear war placed a
premium on defense against nuclear attack. Second, there was a strong
belief shared by both the civilian and military leadership that a highly
effective air defense was possible. Third, leaving Soviet territory "un-
defended" would have been a politically, militarily, and psychologically
difficult position to support. These factors, and especially the Soviet
estimates of possible PVO effectiveness, contributed to an attitude that
such a defense was both desirable and possible. Why did the Soviets con-
sider the VPVOS highly effective and how did this perception contribute to
the decisions concerning the VPVOS buildup?
It is in the area of estimating effectiveness that organizational
biases and distortions appear to have been introduced into the decision-
making process. Instead of basing estimates of effectiveness on realistic
testing and exercises the VPVOS created an incentive structure that
fostered the overestimation of effectiveness at all levels. This over-
58 Rosenberg (1981-2; 24-5). Conversely, though, SAC estimated that the
Soviets executing a first strike against the U.S. would suffer from 0-30*
attrition due to U.S. air defenses. This suggests either a rather higher
regard for the Air Defense Command or a higher degree of uncertainty in
air defense effectiveness than usually acknowledged. See Rosenberg (1981-
2; 26).
77.
estimation, combined with Khrushchev ' s belief in the power of rockets
(SAMs) appears to have resulted in both the military and civilian leader-
ship far overestimating the effectiveness of the VPVOS. In World War II
air defense systems achieved a 21 attrition rate, but the Soviet leader-
ship seems to have expected an attrition rat* of over 50X, more than a
twenty- fold increase. 9 The reasons for this optimism are examined below.
4.3.3 Effectiveness Inflation
Military services are bureaucracies in the truest sense of the word,
for if they are successful in deterring attack the services they provide
will never be tested "in the market" and there will be little feedback to
the organization concerning their effectiveness. During peacetime milita-
ry services develop and field weapons based on their estimates of the
enemy threat and their own estimates of weapons effectiveness. But these
estimates are not wholly scientific, rational or objective. Instead, they
are the product of (usually) educated guesses, preconceived notions, sub-
jective opinions, selective history and potentially biased research and
testing, leavened with a bit of data about real performance and the over-
all nature of the threat. Until a weapon is tested in combat, its real
effectiveness ia not known, and it is only through field testing and ex-
ercises that a rough pre -battle estimate of effectiveness can be
determined. In the development of any weapon system there are
bureaucratic and organizational factors that influence the assessment of
weapons, and these are also to be expected in the case of the Soviet armed
59 Rosenberg (1981-82; 24), Hastings (1979; 413-14)
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services. Furthermore, even if weapons are well tested before their com-
bat use, the overall combat performance of the integrated forces against a
capable enemy Bay differ substantially from that achieved cm the test
ranges . In the case of the VPVOS the problem was accentuated by the
deployment of completely new and untested weapon systems based on new
technologies.
While overestimation of weapons effectiveness may be found in many
armed forces
,
60 it may be particularly prevalent in the Soviet armed
forces. The reasons for this may be found in both culture and organiza-
tional structure and incentives.
Soviet culture has always had a strong streak of technological op-
timism and utopianism. As in U.S. culture, there is often a tendency to
look for a technological fix to problems , and to view new technology in
the best possible light. This was particularly true in the late 1950s,
early 1960s when Soviet technology was scoring a series of triumphs in
space and even the U.S. was seriously concerned about losing its tech-
nological lead.
There are also important organizational factors at work in the as-
sessment of weapons effectiveness. Detailed specifications for military
systems are set out by the services (after program approval by the General
Staff) and these specifications -mist be met by the design bureaus
(OKBs). * The incentive structure at work here Is somewhat different from
60 For example, Momyer (1978; 135-136) notes that some observers inter-
preted U.S. SAM exercises as proof that tactical aircraft couldn't pene-
trate SAM defenses.
61 Alexander (1978-9; 31-35).
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that in the U.S., in that the design bureaus do not have to sell their
products to the services. Certainly, if a design bureau does not have any
of its work accepted by the services it will be disbanded or reassigned,
but there is less competitiveness amongst the design bureaus than among
U.S. defense contractors. Furthermore, there is a disincentive to high
technology, state-of-the-art weapons, for these increase the design
bureau's risk, and design bureau performance is judged on meeting the pro-
ject milestones and output indicators. 2 Thus, there is likely to be some
"technology pull" on the part of the services with the design bureaus at-
tempting to moderate, and then meet, the demands upon them. While the
military is ultimately responsible for the approval and acceptance of the
weapon, the joint interests of the service and the design bureau may mili-
tate against a truly critical review of weapons performance. J The ser-
vice may prefer to deploy a new system and work out the bugs in it during
deployment, rather than delay deployment in the hopes of obtaining a per-
fect product.
In the design and approval stages, then, there may be a tendency to
aim for, and achieve, moderate to high performance goals. While the mili-
tary representatives at factories enforce high manufacturing quality, less
is known about weapons testing before they are accepted into the services.
Both the design bureaus and the services appear to have incentives for
62 Alexander (1978/79; 24, 29-35). For a good discussion of the role of
designers and the defense industry in Soviet defense policy see Almquist
(1987).
63 See Firdman (1985; 88-89) for an example of some of the distortions
that may take place in the acceptance and review process.
64 Alexander (1978-9; 33-34).
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maximizing the effectiveness of the weapons, and given the difficulty of
testing weapons under conditions close to combat there may be a strong
tendency to relax the testing conditions, trading to overestimates of ef-
fectiveness. 5
Once weapons reach combat units a different set of incentives takes
over. In operational units the incentive structure is very similar to
that found in the Soviet economy as a whole. Unit performance is
evaluated by a complex of output measures, and the unit itself is awarded
the title of "outstanding", "good", "satisfactory" and "unsatisfactory".
The pressure is on unit commanders to achieve the highest level and to do
this they have to achieve high output indicators. ' Chief among these in-
dicators is combat readiness and performance on exercises. VFVOS articles
throughout the twenty year period stress the importance of exercises, par-
es
ticularly those involving live firing of SAMs. But along with this em-
phasis on exercises there is continual criticism of "routine approaches",
65 This is a common problem in U.S. weapons testing. For an extensive
discussion see Stockfisch (1973; 202-244).
66 This system is implied in many articles. The four levels are men-
tioned explicitly in Chesnokov (1984; 27) in a discussion of AAA fire
scoring. Note that the vast majority of units are in the "outstanding" or
"good" categories. Koldunov (1971; 23) states that all of the units in the
Baku air defense district are good or outstanding. Batitskiy (1972c; 8)
notes that half of all personnel are "outstanding" while Bobylev (1978a;
6) points out that 95Z of all personnel have a class rating (there are
several classes indicating different skill levels) and 1/3 of all VPVOS
troops were outstanding. The discrepancy between the latter two figures
is unusual, as numbers of "outstanding" troops are usually quite stable.
The Batitskiy number may have been inflated in honor of the Lenin jubilee.
Also note that these numbers are couched in inaccurate terms ("every third
troop" or "every third troop" so there may be substantial rounding error.
67 Good anecdotal reports on this stress on meeting the "norms" may be
found in Suvorov (1988; 53-60, passim), and Belenko (1980; 83-85).
68 See, for example, Gurinov (1976; 34-36) and the Batitskiy articles
listed above.
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"stereotyped exercises", and oversimplification of training and exercises.
The gist of these complaints is clear, and is sometimes made explicit: in
order to achieve high output indicators commanders oversimplify their ex-
ercises so that their crews perform well and receive scores of "outstand-
ing," thereby contributing to the overall high rating of the unit and of
the commander . 9 Examples include having the target drone fly a straight
line by the SAM launchers with no evasive action, and generally creating a
situation much simpler than that expected in real combat. ° This problem
has been recognized by the high command of the VPVOS , but the continual
flow of articles deploring routine and stereotyping suggests that the
problem has not been eliminated and continues to be widespread. "* This is
due to its being "hardwired" into the basic incentive structure of the
service. It cannot be any more easily eliminated by new slogans or
campaigns than can the chronic "overfulfillment" of meaningless goals in
the civilian economy.
While these dynamics may be present in the militaries of many coun-
tries, in the Soviet Union they are compounded by tight secrecy and com-
partmentalization, and the absence of any outside criticism of military
69 See in particular Batitskiy's harsh criticism of "hollow indicators"
in Batitskiy (1974; 5-6) and his warnings about "academic" training rather
than realistic training in Batitsi iy (1971; 12). Other criticisms along
these lines may be found in Grishkov (1972; 4), Batitskiy (1975; 8).
70 For a recent example see Teteyev (1988; 1).
71 See Pavlov and Novoselov (1987), Yurasov (1985), Gorokhov (1983). It
should be noted that this problem is endemic to the Soviet military, not
just to the VPVOS. Nor, for that matter is it limited to the Soviet mil-
itary, for many examples of this type of problem could be found throughout
modern military history, such as the development of the "cult of the of-
fensive" and the tardily- abandoned belief in the efficacy of obsolete
weapons such as the horse cavalry and battleships
.
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performance. There are no Congressional committees to delve into the
details of system performance, no protective laws for whistle-blowers, or
investigative journalists hunting for a big story of military waste and
fraud. Thus there are no checks or balances , and the military officers
have no recourse to outside forums- -they must play the game or leave the
service altogether.
Given this incentive structure, one should expect a type of "effec-
tiveness inflation" within the service. Basic, but high, standards are
set by the upper levels and the units proceed to "fulfill" them superfi-
cially. Thus, the expectations of the high command may be met, generating
over time a false impression of high effectiveness. In the absence of
real combat to test both weapons and troops, estimates of effectiveness
may increase over time based on both good- condition testing ground evalua-
tions and the efforts of unit commanders to always fulfill their plans.
If the high command was originally healthily skeptical of the effective-
ness of their systems the good results coming up from below, combined with
the need to defend the systems to the political leadership, may reinforce
their belief in the effectiveness of the system. Even if the leadership
does discount the data coming from the units, they still may tend to over-
estimate effectiveness and are deprived of any accurate information.
The VPVOS began the transition from AAA to SAMs , and all-weather in-
terceptors in the late 1950s, early 1960s giving the forces an all-weather
and almost all-altitude capability. In several articles by top-ranking
VPVOS officers there is a strong implication that these new weapons and
technologies would dramatically raise the effectiveness of the VPVOS.
^
72 Biryuzov (1961), Zimin (1965), Batitskiy (1967c)
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Gaps in the defense could now be filled: no longer would bombers have an
easier ride at night or in bad weather than during the daytime.
This effectiveness inflation appears to have been particularly
strong with the SAM Troops. Upon their formation the SAM Troops were ac-
claimed as the basic combat means of the VFVOS and was given pride of
place in the VPVOS protocol ordering. SAMs held out hope for attaining an
all-weather capability for the VPVOS and raising its effectiveness
dramatically. The evidence suggests that during the early 1960s that the
VPVOS had developed estimates of SAM effectiveness much higher than cur-
rently believed, perhaps on the order of 60-80X effectiveness per missile
(SSPK-0.8 to 0.9). 73 The conversion of units to SAMs required extensive
retraining and reequipping of old AAA units and high performance was ex-
pected as reflected in the newly developed stress on destroying the target
with the "fir«t rocket." While this slogan may appear to be superficial •
propaganda, it does capture the emphasis on high accuracy and effective-
ness . One article pointed out that whereas AAA required thousands of
rounds to hit a target, SAMs could destroy the target on the first shot.
VPVOS forces were routinely being touted as able to destroy all enemy air-
craft and cruise missiles. While this is obviously an exaggeration, it
corroborates other VPVOS comments on the need for an "impenetrable"
73 The measure of effectiveness used here is the probability of hitting
the target with one missile (SSPK--Single Shot Probability of Kill).
While this is not the same as an overall attrition rate, a very high SSPK
would imply a high overall attrition given that all penetrating targets
were observed and there were sufficient missiles to fire at them. The
evidence indicates that the Soviets believed that both of these conditions
would be met.
74 Golikov (1966; 13).
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defense against nuclear weapons and suggests pressure to achieve high, if
misleading, levels of effectiveness. 5 Clearly, the system was expected
to be highly effective, with the SAM Troops playing the main role.
Other indirect indications of SAM effectiveness also support the
argument that very high accuracy was expected. Thus, Isby reports that
the Yugoslavs upon buying SA-2s from the Soviets were advised that they
were 801 effective. 76 A book published in 1960 by VPVOS authors also
cited Western sources (without criticism) claiming that accuracies of up
to 65X could be expected. '
These estimates of high SAM effectiveness were extended to estimates
of overall air defense effectiveness, as indicated by several Soviet
sources
.
The views of the top VPVOS leadership seem to have reflected these
estimates of high effectiveness, as indicated in a 1961 article by the
Commander in Chief of the VPVOS, Marshal S.S. Biryuzov. 78 Biryuzov exam-
ined the history of strategic bombing and air defense during World War II




' Of these great importance was attached to the development of
radar and the attainment of an all-weather capability. In the past the
75 Biryuzov (1961) and Zimin (1965).
76 Isby (1981; 247).
77 Ashkerov (1960; 95).
78 Marshal Biryuzov had headed the VPVOS since 1955 after the death of
its first Commander in Chief, General Govorov. A commander of wide experi'
ence and close connections with Khrushchev, Biryuzov later went on to be-
come Commander in Chief of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) , and sub-
sequently Chief of the General Staff. See Akhromeyev (1986; 81), Wolfe
(1964; 44).
79 Although this article appeared in 1961 it seems to reflect VPVOS
thinking about air defense in the 1950s as well.
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response of the offense to a strong PVO was to go to night attacks or bad
weather attacks , for while these degraded the offense ' s accuracy they
degraded that of the defense even more. With an all-weather defense capa-
bility, however, all means of avoidance would be sealed off- -radar guided
aircraft and SAMs would be able to intercept and destroy targets under all
conditions. w Against this capability is ranged the possibility of enemy
electronic counterneasures (ECM) , but while Biryuzov notes this problem he
does not attach an effectiveness to it. 1
Nowhere does Biryuzov explicitly indicate the likely effectiveness
of the overall VPVOS system, but he does provide some interesting hints.
First, in a discussion of the U.K. defense against the V-l cruise missile
Biryuzov notes that the British achieved attrition rates of over 502 , in-
dicating that defense against unpiloted vehicles may be ten times more ef-
fective than against piloted vehicles. * This indicates that Biryuzov was
not impressed by the U.S. cruise missile program of the time. 83 Second,
Biryuzov notes that with the appearance of nuclear weapons, "There arose
the necessity of sharply increasing the effectiveness of PVO. Now one
cannot be content with destroying 5-10X of the aircraft flying." 8^
Biryuzov thetr »tr«s«e«r the flMtffbr" an Impenetrable PVO, but doesn't indi-







83 For details on early cruise missile development see Werrell (1985; 79-
134).
84 Biryuzov (1961; 26). It should be pointed out that such high attri-
tion rates were rarely achieved in World War II, although some Soviet
sources claim rates this high for certain air battles.
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Thus , we see the Commander in Chief of thft S^7QS -4«plyj^| •Jh*t Che
VPVOS had to attain much greater effectiveness than during the previous
war. The new technology was assumed to produce this increase in defense
effectiveness, and we may extrapolate that Biryuzov was expecting attri-
tion rates closer to those achieved by the British against Che V-l against
manned bombers, and even higher rates against cruise missiles and stand-
off weapons.
These high estimates were reiterated, and even elaborated upon in
articles by lower-ranking officers. One particularly explicit comment to
this effect came in a review of a book on U.S. air defense systems, where
the reviewer implied that a 20Z overall effectiveness was insufficient for
strategic air defense. 00 The only explicit estimate of PVO effectiveness
against strategic bombers comes in 1967, in an article in which the author
stresses the difficulty of penetrating tactical air defenses. After des-
cribing the air war in Vietnam the author notes that "As concerns
strategic aviation, it is Che opinion of Che military leadership of Che
U.S.A. Chat less than 502 of Che aircrafc involved in a raid could pene-
trate chrough a modern air defense screen." 87 Unlike most of Che ocher
assertions in this article, Chough, no Western source is given for this
figure, and it seems far higher than most Western estimates.
Confirming evidence of Soviet expectations of high PVO effectiveness
come from Khrushchev himself. As noted above, in several places in his
85 A similar argument was made several years later in Military Thought by
the First Deputy Commander (FDC) of Che VPVOS. See Zimin (1965).
86 Zabelok (1967; 94). Note Chat this figure for U.S. air defense effec-
tiveness does not appear in the book being reviewed. (See Krysenko 1966)
.
87 Orlov (1967; 128).
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memoirs he notes that Western air defenses were considered very strong,
particularly in relation to the Soviet Tu-95 bomber. 88 As if to further
the confidence in the effectiveness of SAMs , Khrushchev announced that
Powers 's U-2 was destroyed by the first SAM. " While this may have been
Khrushchevian bluster this claim suggests both that such a feat was not
incredible and that Khrushchev may have believed it himself. ° The U-2
incident may have confirmed official belief in the high effectiveness of
SAMs and the overall VPVOS system. Even if, as reported by Penkovskiy,
fourteen missiles were required to destroy the U-2 this was a far better
performance than previous air defense weapons. In addition, this success
of the SA-2s prevented any further incursions by the U-2. x
Khrushchev also notes that "Subsequent evidence in Vietnam and the
Middle East have shown us that perhaps we overestimated the effectiveness
of surface-to-air missiles and underestimated the effectiveness of low
altitude fighter -bombers.
"
9 ^ Khrushchev then goes on to note that in the
future the effectiveness of SAMs will be increased so as to destroy even
low altitude penetrators. Thus, in addition to the implicit arguments of
the military leaders, there is good evidence from the political leadership
that the effectiveness of these weapons was overestimated.
88 See Khrushchev (1974; 40-41, 43).
89 Penkovskiy claims that it required 14 SA- 2a to destroy the U-2, and
that in the process a Soviet MiG was alao ahot down. Penkovskiy (1965;
371-2).
90 Khrushchev (1972; 444-45) repeats this claim in his memoirs and while
he may again be engaging in bluster his general attitude towards the new
military technology suggests that he was likely to believe such a report.
91 Khrushchev (1972; 449).
92 Khrushchev (1974; 54).
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All these data points, taken together, point towards the conclusion
that the Soviet military and political leadership were convinced of the
high effectiveness of SAMs and of the VPVOS system overall. v ^ This
misestimation was the result of organizational biases and incentive struc
tures, coupled with technological optimism. It was one of the crucial
factors in the decision to create a massive air defense system against




4.4 Overview: Decisionmaking and the VPVOS
^
.
Many factors went into the decision to create massive strategic air
defenses during the 1950s: the U.S. bomber threat, outrage at U
flights, political maneuvers and personal opinions, doctrinal change, and
the inflated estimates of weapons effectiveness. How did all these fac-
tors come together and what does this tell us about the decisionmaking
process?
First, there was a clear U.S. threat. The increasing U.S. stockpile
and the doctrine of "massive retaliation" enunciated in January 1954
served notice that nuclear weapons were a key element in the U.S. arsenal
and would be used in a major conflict. While not a new concept, this
emphasized the role of nuclear weapons in war planning. Simultaneously
the continued probing and overflights of Soviet territory were a constant
reminder to the Soviet leadership of U.S. capabilities.
93 The only data relevant to IA performance suggests (from Western
sources) that IA might be up to 351 effective, again a very high estimate.
See Krysenko (1966; 170).
94 Freedman (1983; 81-88).
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Second, the changes taking place in the Soviet political and milita-
ry leadership, along with doctrinal changes, provided an opportunity to
develop new forces and strategy. The increased recognition of the role of
surprise and the need to blunt any U.S. nuclear attack both pointed in the
direction of strategic defense. Furthermore, given the high effectiveness
expected from the new generation of weapons there was hope for successful-
ly carrying out such a defense.
Third, there were historical and institutional factors at work. The
PVO structures that the Soviets had experimented with during the Great
Patriotic War provided the basis for creating a new, independent service
modeled after that existing in 1942. Conversely, there was no strategic
bombing tradition- -the efforts of Soviet long-range bombers during the
Great Patriotic War had been relatively small and in the early period of
the war they had suffered extremely high losses due to their obsolete air-
craft. 95 Hence no powerful, experienced organization such as SAC existed
to counterbalance the estimates of PVO effectiveness. Soviet Long Range
Aviation was in fact limited in size due to the assumption that air
defense systems had ended the effectiveness of bombers, as well as the
technological difficulties encountered in building long-range strategic
bombers
.
Thus, in 1954 a confluence of factors resulted in the creation of
the VPVOS. The upgrading of the VPVOS to a full service was a clear
recognition of its great importance within the overall context of Soviet
95 See Hardesty (192; 26-27, 85-86)
96 Khrushchev (1974; 39).
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strategy. To a certain extent it appears to be a rational response to the
threat presented by the U.S., and thus a good example of the rational
actor- -action/reaction model. Such an explanation misses, however, much
of the richness that can be gained from a more detailed consideration of
the factors examined above.
In this case there is a clear convergence of interests between all
of the levels of the decisionmaking structure. The VPVOS, through its
estimates of force effectiveness, appears to have convinced both the
political leadership (level 1) and the military leadership (level 2) of
the feasibility and desirability, indeed even the necessity of strategic
air defense. Thus influence was exerted upon the decisionmaking process
by the service indirectly, through effectiveness inflation, rather than by
open advocacy. The internal characteristics and incentive structures of
the service thus had a significant effect on levels much higher than oper-
ational art, even when the overall decision was based on the threat and
other factors. This consensus between the various decisionmaking levels
on the need for a strong air defense system appears to have held sway
throughout the 1950s and into the early 1960s.
If the decision to create a massive PVO system was rational provided
that one accepted the inflated effectiveness estimates: would different
estimates have produced different outcomes? This question is, of course,
impossible to answer authoritatively but we may speculate on what the "ra-
:
tional" decisionmaker might have dona with more realistic aatimates of
VPVOS effectiveness. First, a major shift of resources into the area of
strategic offensive forces, such as bombers, might have been an option.
Such a shift would emphasize a more deterrent than defensive strategy, and
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given the reduced estimate of air defense estimates would be rational. '
Second, if air defenses were to be created a more modest, "warning" system
might have been developed that stressed providing defense of air bases and
strategic offensive assets, allowing offensive forces to be launched under
attack. Third, a thick border defense to deal with overflights might have
been created, with interior areas left less defended. Finally, without
the great stress on SAMs by Khrushchev the actual force structure might
have been significantly different, with a larger IA component or some
other mix of forces.
In short, both organizational (effectiveness inflation), historical
(lack of a strategic bombing tradition), and personal (Khrushchev's con-
fidence in new technology) factors influenced the decisionmaking process
.
In the absence of the organizational influence of the VPVOS significantly
different outcomes might have occurred, such as greater emphasis on
strategic bombers. The decision actually made was not "irrational" but it
was the product of a number of factors and considerations that are not
well explained by a simple action-reaction or rational actor model. Here,
the integrated model provides a richer and more detailed explanation of
the VPVOS 's creation and buildup.
As new technologies developed the VPVOS found its threats and
eventually its missions changing In unexpected ways that took it further
away from its original objectives. These developments are examined in the
next chapter.
97 This was the position argued by SAC- -it vas better to hit the Soviets




THE VPVOS IN THE 1960s
5.1 Introduction
The 1960s saw the rise of a qualitatively new threat to the VPVOS:
the ICBM. In addition, strategic bomber tactics and equipment changed and
further complicated the work of the VPVOS. The response of the VPVOS to
this changing threat, along with changing Soviet doctrine and strategy is
examined in this chapter. In the area of operational art and weapons de-
velopment the VPVOS exhibited many of the characteristics predicted by the
organizational politics model: conservatism, incrementalism, and a
tendency to interpret the developing threat in accord with its own percep-
tions. These traits led to the deployment of weapons optimized for
threats that never materialized, and a slow adaptation to the newly devel-
oping threat of low-altitude penetration.
The VPVOS responded to the ICBM threat by developing and advocating
the deployment of an anti-ballistic missile system. In this case, how-
ever, the issue of deployment involved several levels of the decisionmak-
ing structure and engendered a great deal of controversy. Despite the ad-
vocacy attempts by the VPVOS the system was not deployed and negotiations
with the U.S. eventually produced the ABM treaty.
While in some respects separate, the air and missile defense issues
were quite closely coupled, for they formed the basis of the VPVOS ' s role
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and mission definition. In the sections that follow the issues at stake
and the decisionmaking process are examined in more detail.
5.2 The Changing Strategic Environment
Several factors, both internal and external, influenced the evolu-
tion of the VPVOS during the 1960s. In this section the changing environ-
ment and its impact on the VPVOS is examined.
5.2.1 The U.S. Threat
Having developed a massive PVO system in the 1950s, in the 1960s the
VPVOS faced the prospect of a U.S. end- run around it with the Minuteman
and Polaris missile forces. As the new missiles were deployed and older
bombers were retired the proportion of the U.S. striking force on bombers
began to decline. It did not wither away, though, and neither did the
VPVOS
.
The U.S. bomber force, in response to Soviet development of SAMs and
high altitude interceptors also changed its tactics, shifting to low
altitude penetration during the late 1950s and early 1960s. In addition
to this low altitude threat, SAC was pushing the development of the B-58
Hustler supersonic bomber and the even more advanced B-70 Valkyrie, a high
speed (Mach 3) high altitude bomber intended to overfly and out- run Soviet
air defenses. 2 Thus the VPVOS faced a multi-pronged threat: ICBMs, SLBHs
,
low altitude bomber attack, high altitude bomber attack, bomber launched
1 See Norris, Arkin and Cochran (1987).
2 Kotz (1988; 57).
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air-to-surface missiles, some primitive cruise missiles, nuclear-capable
carrier aircraft and tactical fighter -bombers in Europe.
The VPVOS did have one success to its credit: reconnaissance over-
flights of the Soviet Union had ceased because the U.S. now considered the
U-2 vulnerable. But this advantage was partly offset by the advent of
reconnaissance satellites, a development that was initially condemned by
the USSR but later accepted. The military use of space did become a con-
cern of the VPVOS later in the decade as the anti-satellite
(protivokosmicheskaya oborona- -PKO) mission was developed by the VPVOS.
5.2.2 Changing Doctrine and Leadership
While the 1960s started with the revolution in military affairs in
full swing, by the end of the decade Soviet doctrine had swung back to a
more balanced position between nuclear and conventional warfare. This
shift was partly in response to NATO's 1967 adoption of the strategy of
flexible response, but to an even greater extent it reflected internal
Soviet considerations.
The late 1950s-early 1960s saw a great emphasis on nuclear weapons,
with the creation at the end of 1959 of the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)
as the premier Soviet service, ranking above the ground forces. The SRF
was entrusted with the development and deployment of Soviet ICBMs and
IRBMs (intermediate -range ballistic missiles). This move reflected both
3 On the U.S. efforts to develop cruise missiles and air- to- surface mis-
siles see Werrell (1985; Chapter IV). A critical view of the B-70 is pre-
sented in Enthoven and Smith (1971; 243-251).




Khrushchev's emphasis on missiles and nuclear weapons and his penchant for
showmanship, for despite the creation of the service it was not until the
mid-1960s that the USSR developed a significant ICBM force.
The removal of Khrushchev in October 1964 also removed the chief
proponent of the revolution in military affairs and ushered in an era
where the military would have greater say in its own affairs with less
meddling in them by reform-minded civilians.
Beginning in the mid to late 1960s the Soviets began to reappraise
the primacy of nuclear weapons and began to assign a greater role to con-
ventional weapons and the more traditional military services such as the
ground forces. The ground forces high command, which had been dissolved
by Khrushchev in 1964 was reinstated in 1967, and the former Chief of the
General Staff M. V. Zakharov, whom Khrushchev had replaced for his
resistance to the new views, was reappointed to the position after
Biryuzov's death in October 1964.
The Brezhnev policy of "stability of cadres" was to have significant
effects on the military, increasing the length of service of the top of-
ficers and eliminating Khrushchev's habit of swapping officers amongst
services. This resulted in an environment of greater stability for all
levels of the military leadership and in combination with the return of
prestige and authority to the military it seems to have set the stage for
the further development of, and debates over, military science and weapons
development.
6 See Meyer (1985), Warner (1977; 98-100).
7 Warner (1977; 99-100), Akhromeyev (1986; 721).
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Before its cadres stabilized the VPVOS went through several person-
nel shuffles. While these changes do not appear to have caused major
changes in VPVOS operational- art or force structure they do seem to have
been intertwined with the debate over VPVOS performance and the project to
develop an effective anti-missile defense (protivorAkecnsya oborona -- PRO )
The first change was the transfer of Marshal Biryuzov from his posi-
tion of Commander in Chief VPVOS to Commander in Chief SRF in April 1962,
a
some months before the Cuban Missile Crisis. Biryuzov appears to have
been entrusted with the emplacement of the missiles in Cuba, and despite
the failure of that gamble in March 1963 he was appointed Chief of the
General Staff. Biryuzov retained this post until his death on October
19, 1964 in a plane crash in Yugoslavia just 5 days after Khrushchev's
ouster. ° During his tenure at the VPVOS Biryuzov appears to have devel-
oped a close relationship with Khrushchev that may also have helped the
institutional fortunes of the VPVOS during the 1950s and early 1960s.
Furthermore, Biryuzov may have remained sympathetic to the VPVOS 's goals
even after becoming Chief of the General Staff.
Marshal Sudets replaced Biryuzov as Commander in Chief VPVOS in
April 1962. Sudets was an unlikely candidate to head the VPVOS, for al-
though he was a career aviation officer, Sudets 's assignments had primari-
8 Scott and Scott (1984; 145-47). Khrushchev has little to say about
Biryuzov, despite the latter 's key role in the crisis and Soviet military
policy. Khrushchev (1972; 15-16) does harshly criticize the behavior in
1957 (at the time of Zhukov's removal) of K.S. Moskalenko who went on to
become CinC SRF before Biryuzov replaced him. Unfortunately, Khrushchev
does not provide any insight into why he entrusted Moskalenko, whom he
considered "mentally unbalanced" with the most important service command
of the Soviet armed forces.
9 Scott and Scott (1984; 145).
10 "Marshal Sovetskogo Soyuza S.S. Biryuzov" (1984).
•97-
ly been in bomber aviation (dal'naya aviatsiya- -long range aviation- -DA)
rather than in air defense. 1 Perhaps Khrushchev felt that the VPVOS
could profit by learning from the bomber forces, or more likely, Sudets
had succeeded in ingratiating himself with Khrushchev.
Sudets did not last very long in the post, and in July 1966 he was
replaced by Marshal P. F. Batitskiy, an officer of wide experience. Al-
though a ground forces commander during the Great Patriotic War, in the
post-war period Batitskiy served in various posts in the Soviet Air Force
and later the VPVOS. From 1954 to 1965 Batitskiy was Commander of the
Moscow Air Defense District, the highest operational command after the
Commander in Chief and First Deputy Chief of the VPVOS. 12 In 1965
Batitskiy was promoted to First Deputy Chief of the General Staff and
Erickson suggests that he was chosen in order to put in place a younger
officer with more experience with modern weapons systems. J This explana-
tion seems plausible and Batitskiy' s experience in both the Ground Forces
and VPVOS would have given him a wide and varied perspective.
When Batitskiy returned to the VPVOS he had experience in both the
VPVOS and in the central apparatus of the General Staff. Batitskiy ap-
pears to have been given a mandate to clean house in the VPVOS, for he re-
placed several top ranking VPVOS officers with new appointees.
11 Akhromeyev (1986; 717), Scott (1984; 79).
12 Scott and Scott (1984; 81-82), also see Batitskiy's obituary in Kras-
naya zvezda, February 19, 1984 p. 3.
13 Erickson (1971; 17).
14 Thus Colonel General G. Zimin was replaced as First Deputy Commander
by Army General Shcheglov, formerly commander of the Baku Air Defense Dis-
trict. Zimin was sent to head the VPVOS ' s military command academy. This
removal suggests that the performance of the top VPVOS leadership was un-
satisfactory and that Batitskiy wanted to choose his own team. However,
Zimin appears to have maintained a fairly influential position and clearly
was not completely disgraced. Zimin' s demotion at least kept him within
the VPVOS in a fairly important position, while being shipped out to the
General Inspectorate (as Sudets was) would have taken him out of the
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After all these changes in the VPVOS top leadership the policy of
stability of cadres took over, and there were only routine changes until
1978 when Batitskiy was replaced.
One other important aspect of Soviet military policy must be men-
tioned: the gradual increase in defense budgets beginning in the mid-
1960s. ^ The budgeting allowed sufficient funding for both the buildup of
conventional and strategic nuclear forces.
Overall, then, the VPVOS was dealing with a very rapidly changing
environment, both in terms of the U.S. threat and in terms of Soviet
leadership and doctrine. Within this context the VPVOS had to define its
roles and missions and develop forces to meet the changing threat.
5.3 VPVOS Responses to the Changing Environment
The VPVOS response to the new developments in technology and doc-
trine took two rather different paths. In the case of air defense the de-
velopment and deployment programs seem to have followed the trends begun
in the 1950s, particularly the rapid buildup of SAM forces. But the new
ICBM threat could not be dealt with using old air defense technology: it
presented a major challenge to the VPVOS. The VPVOS ' s goal was to prevent
(continued)
policymaking loop completely. Other personnel changes included moving
Marshal of Aviation Ye. Savitskiy from chief of IA to a Deputy Commander
position, replacing him with General Lieutenant of Aviation V. L.
Kadomtsev in his place. The timing of these changes is somewhat unclear.
Savitskiy is listed as a Deputy Commander from 1966 in Akhromeyev (1986;
650) , but the identification of Kadomtsev as in charge of IA VPVOS is only
from the end of 1967 (Erickson 1971; 20). His obituary (Krasnaya zvezda
April 30, 1969 p. 4) does not shed any light on the timing of his appoint-
ment.
15 CIA (1978; 1-2).
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the destruction of the Soviet civilian and military infrastructure, and to
accomplish this goal ICBMs had to be countered as well as bombers. In the
sections below VPVOS responses to both the air and missile threats are ex-
amined. As we shall see, while the air defense mission was marked by a
fairly clear definition of goals and means the missile defense mission was
characterized by technological uncertainty and controversy. Both of these
cases reveal different aspects of the Soviet defense decisionmaking pro-
cess and are worth examining in some detail.
5.3.1 VPVOS Operational Art in the 1960s
Soviet sources from this period provide us with some insight into
the principles of creating and deploying a nationwide air defense system
for urban- industrial defense. Indeed, discussions in the historical lit-
erature provided a forum for addressing contemporary issues. From this
literature we may distill both the basic principles of VPVOS operational
art but also the concerns and problems they foresaw in conducting
defensive operations.
VPVOS operational art was created during the Great Patriotic War and
reflects the artillery heritage of the AAA forces. Indeed, its principles
are closely tied to those of Soviet military science as a whole. The
basic principles are:
--The importance of combat readiness 1 '
--Circular, deeply echeloned defenses around objectives with streng-
thening in the most likely directions of attack.
16 Rumer (1988; 40-60).
17 Biryuzov (1961; 17), Zimin (1965; 113).
18 Desnitskiy (1959; 40-41), Yerofeyev (1961; 63-4)
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--Defense of entire zones, as well as point defense. 9
-•massine of troops and their concentration along major axes of at-
tack.^
--maneuver of forces to concentrate them, evade enemy attacks and
support mobile forces. ^
--close interaction of branches (IA and AAA or SAMs) 22
--centralized control of all forces and means. J
Taken together, these principles comprise the basis for the anti-air
operation that the VPVOS presents as a single coordinated battle over a
wide area and long time against enemy air attacks. The anti-air opera-
tion is elaborated in even more detail later in the decade and becomes the
centerpiece of VPVOS operational art. The core concept of the anti-air
operation is the centralized control of VPVOS forces over a very wide ex-
panse with every aspect of the operation controlled by a high-level com-
mand post, with lower level command posts only responsible for tactical
execution. Instead of a decentralized system, dealing with threats as
they arise , the intent is to develop a highly centralized system that can
divine the enemy's strategic plans and intentions, and deploy and assign
forces in the most effective manner to thwart them. 25
The classic example of the anti-air operation, and of the defense of
a large city, is the defense of Moscow in Autumn 1941. While this battle
19 Biryuzov (1961; 20)
.
20 Desnitskiy (1959; 50).
21 Yerofeyev (1961; 64).
22 Yerofeyev (1961; 64).
23 Yerofeyev (1961; 63-64).
24 Biryuzov (1961; 20).
25 Batitskiy (1968; 356)
.
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is featured in almost all works on VPVOS history the most extensive and
informative analysis of the battle appeared during the heyday of city
defense in 1959. 26
Written by Major General of Artillery G. Desnitskiy, the article
reflects the basic principles of VPVOS operational art. The defenses are
described as circular and echeloned in depth, with the most probable
directions of attack strengthened. Both AAA and IA units were con-
centrated around the capital, producing an air defense system that Des-
nitskiy claims was stronger than that of any other capital in World War
II. 28
While Desnitskiy presents a favorable picture of the Moscow PVO , he
does note some tactical problems. But Desnitskiy argues that the ex-
perience of Moscow confirmed the basic principles of PVO operation worked
out before the war: massing of troops, deep echeloning, and circular corn-
er)bat formations around the defended objective. u He also observes that IA
proved to be a highly maneuverable means of PVO, as well as being used for
ground support during the Moscow counteroffensive
.
Desnitskiy' s article sets the stage for many later discussions of
the air defense of Moscow, but unlike them .it gives a large number of
26 Desnitskiy (1959). Other articles on the defense of Moscow include:
Svetlishin (1966), Mikhaylenko (1977), Mikhaylenko (1979), Koldunov,
(1981). A number of other articles also discuss the defense of Moscow in
passing.
27 Desnitskiy (1959; 40).
28 Desnitskiy (1959; 41).
29 There are sharp criticisms of the effectiveness of AAA barrage fire,
barrage balloons, the lack of modern PVO equipment at the beginning of the
war and the shortage of transportation. See Desnitskiy (1959; 38-41, 51,
52).
30 Desnitskiy (1959; 50)
.
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statistics on damage sustained as well as bombers shot down, and is more
even-handed and critical than celebratory. x For example, Desnitskiy ad-
mits that German bombing did have an effect on civilian morale, a very
rare admission. 32 Desnitskiy ' s main |»i«t1Iif .^ar^fn^cw^arison to London




ing substantially, essentially making Moscow the only wartime European
capital to escape serious damage. J Although Desnitskiy does not give an
overall penetration figure, his damage statistics suggest a fairly low
one, and his data indicate a kill rate approaching 10X--very high for
World War II. (See Table 3.1). Even so, these numbers are somewhat less
optimistic than the standard figures adopted in later VPVOS literature,
that claim a 2-3X overall penetration. These penetration rates are ex-
tremely low by Western standards, and suggest either innovative counting
35
methods or an extremely strong defense. J
31 Desnitskiy (1959; 50-51).
32 Desnitskiy (1959; 46). No other Soviet article on the defense of Mos-
cow has admitted that the bombing lowered the morale of the population.
33 Desnitskiy (1959; 49-50).
34 See Table 3.1 and Batitskiy (1972a; 17). Note that this figure seems
to be based on the standard Soviet history of the Great Patriotic War.
Attrition is the percentage of the attacking bombers that are actually
shot down. The penetration rate is a measure of the number of attacking
bombers actually making it to the target. The two are usually com-
plimentary (i.e. penetration rate - 1-attrition rate) but may not be if
many aircraft turn back without being destroyed, either due to damage,
poor navigation, or breaking off the attack. The great difference between
attrition and penetration rates for Moscow suggests that the latter was a
very important phenomenon.
35 It is most likely, though, that the Soviets are measuring "penetra-
tion" as the number of aircraft reaching the center of the city out of the
number entering the entire Moscow PVO corps region. Thus, even if air-
craft were not headed for downtown Moscow they might have been counted as
"averted" if they appeared in the Corps region. Finally, it should also
be noted that even post-war Soviet figures are subject to exaggeration,
perhaps by as much as factors of 2-3,.,
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Moscow is thus presented as a classic example of successful air
defense. It is held out as proof of both the correctness of VPVOS opera-
tional art and, by implication, of the feasibility of city defense as a
whole. Certainly, if attrition rates of 102 and very low penetration
rates could be accomplished with the relatively unsophisticated equipment
of 1941 then some 20 years later the new technology could be expected to
produce substantially greater results. Furthermore, Desnitskiy's article
suggests that the key to successful PVO lies as much as anything in the
organization and control of the defenses.
In contrast, an article describing the air defense of Berlin illumi-
nates a number of important issues in its criticism of those defenses.
37Colonel T. YerofeyevJ/ critically examines the Berlin defenses, noting a
number of deficiencies and implicitly comparing the defenses with those of
Moscow. Yerofeyev's criticisms are particularly interesting as most West-
ern authors consider the German air defense system the most sophisticated
JO
deployed during the war. °
Yerofeyev criticizes the absence of centralized control and circular
defenses as lowering the effectiveness of the defenses. Yerofeyev also
points out the fact that Berlin had little in the way of mobile defenses,
36 Yerofeyev (1961) . This is one of very few articles on the air defense
of a non- Soviet objective.
37 Yerofeyev became a prolific historian of the VPVOS, although most of
his articles were published in Vestnik protivovozdushnoy oborony rather
than Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal.
38 See Faber (1977; 243-251), Hastings (1979; 266-276). In terms of arms
(the Germans had higher-caliber, hence higher altitude, AAA), radar equip-
ment, and night fighters the Germans established a very capable system,
far more sophisticated than that deployed around Moscow.
39 Yerofeyev (1961; 63-4).
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and thus could not maneuver forces or easily concentrate them. ° Particu-
lar importance is also placed on the interaction between IA and AAA, and
their interaction in one zone, which Yerofeyev notes has special sig-
nificance for the present. ^ Concerning effectiveness, Yerofeyev states
that the attrition rate of Berlin's AAA ranged from 2-3X to 5-72, a level
that he considers not very effective. IA forces are credited with an at-
trition rate of 4 percent in 1943-44. 2 These attrition rates are con-
sistent with Western estimates, if perhaps a bit high, and may be intended
for comparison to the higher rates attributed to the Moscow air defenses
by Desnitskiy.
Yerofeyev may be responding to arguments that if even the Germans
were unable to attain high attrition rates, how could the VPVOS hope to do
so? The answer is clear: the Germans did not properly structure and con-
trol their air defense forces and therefore did not achieve their full
potential. Thus, Yerofeyev criticizes the Germans for not incorporating
many of the principles of VPVOS operational art. By implication, the
proper organization and control of modern VPVOS forces (as specified by
VPVOS operational art) can maximize the performance of the new weapons and
achieve even higher effectiveness.
The historical literature thus provides some important insights into
VPVOS operational art and planning: it outlines the principles of con-
40 Yerofeyev (1961; 64).
41 Yerofeyev (1961; 64).
42 For the period from 1943 to March 1944, there were 15 mass flights and
28 flights of smaller groups of bombers on Berlin, a total of 3900
sorties .against which the Germans launched 1466 fighter sorties, on aver-
age 100 sorties versus each flight. German fighters destroyed 155 bomb-
ers, for 9.5 sorties per destroyed aircraft. While no comparative numbers
are given, the per sortie kill rate seems to be quite high. See Yerofeyev
(1961; 56).
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struction of PVO systems and indicates the great weight given to the
proper organization of their command and control. Furthermore, these
basic principles can provide a guide for examining and understanding VPVOS
force structure and deployments, as is done below.
,
5.3.2 VPVOS Modernization and Force Structure
During the 1960s the VPVOS continued a program of modernization and
weapon development. Initially there appears to have been a strong empha-
sis on SAMs
,
possibly due to Khrushchev's stress on this weapon, but by
the early 1970s SAM deployments began to slow and stabilize while fighter-
interceptors began another round of modernization.
The 1960s saw a gradual decrease in the number of interceptors from
about 4000 in 1960 to 3300 in 1970. A3 (See Figures 5 . 1 and 5 . 2
.
) But
while the quantity declined quality increased as the older MiG-19 and Yak-
25 aircraft were replaced with MIG-21 and Yak- 28 interceptors with in-
creased speed and improved all-weather capabilities. In the late
1960 's a new round of modernization started, drawing down the number of
interceptors to approximately 2600 by the mid-1970s. ^
In the area of SAMs, the Soviets pursued a fairly aggressive deploy-
ment program through the early 1970s, as shown in Figure 5.3. The chief
aspect of this program was the deployment of the SA-2' high-altitude SAM
43 Kilmarx (1963; 266-7), Berman (1977; 16). The latter gives a 1960
figure of about 5,000 fighters.
44 Berman (1977; 15-17).
45 This second modernization replaced the MiG-21 and Su-9/11 with more
modem MiG-25, Mig-23 and Su-15/21 aircraft. See Berman (1977; 16-18),
Erickson (1976; 43-45). On Figure 5.1 this modernization is represented
under the heading "Total Modern Interceptors .
"
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and the SA-3.^° The SA-3 was designed to intercept low altitude aircraft,
thus countering attempts to fly under the SAM screen. Most of these mis-
siles were deployed around urban centers (particularly Moscow) in the
Western USSR and military targets. Some sources also indicate that the
SAMs are deployed in bands, like echelons, with particularly dense con-
centrations in the North and West border areas, and with some bands across
the European USSR. ICBM and military airfields may also have concentra-
tions of SAMs for point defense. ' Such a deployment would be consistent
with the VPVOS emphasis on in-depth echeloned defenses, as well as the
need to provide for interception of bombers as far forward as possible be-
fore they could launch air- to- surface missiles.
In the late 1960s the SA-5 was deployed. s As will be discussed
later, the SA-5 caused a controversy in the West over its possible ABM ca-
pabilities, as the missile was designed to intercept high speed, high
altitude aircraft which the West did not deploy. By the early 1970s SAM
deployment had stabilized at approximately 10,000 launchers, although the
number of rails continued to increase as 2 -rail SA-3 launchers were re-
A Q
placed with 4-rail launchers.
46 See Wright (1986; 551-53, 559-61) on force levels for these missiles.
Note that there is a gradual drawdown of SA-2s after 1969 while SA-3 and
SA-5 deployments continue. It has been suggested that the SA-2s were
being replaced by the new SA-3s.
47 Wright (1986; 553, 561), Erickson (1976; 45), Berman (1977; 19). Un-
fortunately relatively little is known about the details of SAM deploy-
ment, with the notable exception of the Kola peninsula (thanks to commer-
cial satellite photographs). See Ries (1984).
48 Wright (1986; 572-74).
49 A rail is a missile position, while the launcher is the unit that
holds and aims the rails. Doubling the number of rails per launcher is a
cheap means of increasing firepower as it requires no extra personnel and
can make use of existing reloads. Whether it makes an appreciable dif-




The Radiotechnical troops continued to upgrade their radar systems
and a notable step forward was the deployment of their first airborne ear-
ly warning (AEW) aircraft, the Tu-126 Moss. While often referred to as
the Soviet AWACS , there is little doubt that the capabilities of the Moss
were greatly inferior, and less than a dozen were deployed. °
But despite this impressive buildup and modernization of forces, the
VPVOS force structure still had serious weaknesses and in some respects
the 1960s buildup did not seem to be optimized against the developing
threat.
First, there was the problem of low-altitude penetration. In
response to the development of high-altitude SAMs and improved radar and
interceptors SAC had started low-altitude flight training in the late
1950s. 51 Thus, as the VPVOS deployed the SA-2, SAC was circumventing it
by flying at altitudes where the SA-2 was ineffective. The SA-3, designed
for low-altitude defense, was intended to plug this gap, but as the expe-
rience of the 1973 Mid- East war and limited use in Vietnam showed, it was
not very effective. Nonetheless, the VPVOS continued to deploy new SA-3
launchers until 1976, as well as increasing the number of rails per
CO
launcher. Ji-
Fighter aviation forces seemed somewhat better prepared to deal with
the low altitude threat, but their effectiveness was still questionable.
The (second) generation of aircraft introduced in the mid-1960s were not
equipped with radars capable of tracking even large bombers at low
50 See Hirst (1983; 145-53). For an overview of Soviet assessments of
Western work in the field of AEW see Lepingwell (1986; Chapter 4).
51 See Berman (1977; 16)
.
52 Wright (1986; 560).
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altitude- -Soviet technology seems to have been incapable of developing
such systems. Furthermore, some of the new aircraft (particularly the Su-
15) .had been designed during the Khrushchev years (when the primacy of the
CO
air-to-air missile was espoused) and were not equipped with cannon. J
This omission, while common to many fighter aircraft of the 1960s, meant
that the aircraft had to rely exclusively on their air-to-air missiles --
weapons that had not been fully combat tested. As many U.S. pilots dis-
covered over Vietnam, these weapons were often quite unreliable. Since
the missiles were least effective at low altitudes (due to ground clutter
for both infrared and radar-guided missiles) the lack of cannon was a
serious omission. While later modifications of these aircraft and the
subsequent third generation aircraft were equipped with cannon, the
deployment of these new aircraft may actually have decreased the effec-
tiveness of the IA force due to the lack of cannon and to the decreased
maneuverability at low-altitude. ^
The other attack option available to pilots was ramming- -a much-
celebrated tactic used in the Great Patriotic War and even in modern con-
53 See Panyalev (1977a, b,c) for a description of some of the modern air-
craft.
54 Fallows (1982; 55, 99). While part of the problem was the lack of
effective IFF (identification friend or foe) the lack of cannon seriously
hampered the air combat capability of U.S. aircraft. See also Nordeen
(1985; 16-17, 42-45).
55 See Berman (1977; 45-54) for a discussion of Soviet aircraft design
and parameters affecting maneuverability. My conclusion is primarily
based on Berman' s wing- loading data. It is true that the new aircraft had
greater thrust-to-weight ratios and were designed for missile intercepts,
but for the reasons outlined above these advantages were probably can-
celled out by the lower maneuverability. Berman does, however, point out
that later models of the Su-15/21 featured improved low-altitude per-
formance. Cockburn (1984; 229-31) also cites some Israeli and U.S. pilots
on the superiority of the older MiG-21 to the MiG-23 for air combat.
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ditions. Given the high value of a nuclear -armed strategic bomber this
tactic presents a good trade-off and has been explicitly endorsed in the
VPVOS press, but ramming requires flying skill at least as great as that
for gun attacks and. would be unlikely to greatly increase VPVOS effective-
ness .
The conclusion of most Western analysts is that the VPVOS did not
present a very effective defense against low altitude penetration during
the 1960s and 1970s. ° But low-altitude penetration was clearly not the
only threat concerning the VPVOS.
The second threat of concern to VPVOS officers was the development
of high-altitude, high-speed aircraft such as the B-70 Valkyrie. But even
though the B-70 was canceled in 1967, the VPVOS continued to deploy
weapons some years afterwards that appear to have been designed to combat
CO
it. These weapons were thus deployed to counter a threat that did not
56 Hardesty (1981; 27-30), Belenko (1988; 96,98), "Bditel'nost i
reshitel'nost--chest' i doblest' voina PVO" (1987; 3-4).
57 For an authoritative comment on the application of ramming tactics to
modern warfare see Pokryshkin (1983; 66-67). Note that if from the start
the aircraft were vectored head-on the pilot might stand a good chance of
a successful (if fatal) ramming, but from other attack positions against a
maneuvering target the problem might be very difficult.
58 Berman (1977; 18-20) reaches this conclusion, and also cites a Joint
Chiefs of Staff estimate indicating that 70-801 of U.S. bombers could pen-
etrate to their targets. This estimate of penetration seems rather low,
as it requires attrition rates some 5-10 times higher than those usually
experienced in modern air combat. Quanbeck and Wood (1976) present a
detailed study of air defense effectiveness in the 1970s that concludes
that Soviet PVO forces are unlikely to be highly effective (see p. 83-84).
Erickson (1976; 43) does not give any quantitative estimates but also
notes the VPVOS ' s "inability to cope with the low-altitude bomber."
59 On the reasons behind this decision and the proposed missions of the
B-70 see Enthoven and Smith (1971; 243-51). Some of the early history of
the B-70/RS-70 is recounted in Hunter (1973). The B-70/RS-70 proved re-
markably resilient and resisted final cancellation for several years, so
it is perhaps not surprising if the VPVOS did not consider it finally and
irrevocably cancelled.
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exist and were of little use against the weapons that did exist. The
deployment of these weapons, the SA-5 SAM and the MiG-25 Foxbat inter-
ceptor, have often been presented as examples of Soviet "bureaucratic in-
ertia" and conservatism. ° Are they in fact examples of bureaucratic in-
ertia, and if so how can we explain such apparently gross irrationality?
As with most such cases, the development of the MiG-25 and the SA-5
are combinations of rationality, rationalization, and organizational in-
terests. Let us examine their development chronologically.
In the late 1950s- -early 1960s the future of airpower was believed
by many to lie in high-altitude high-speed flight. * All the past trends
in aviation emphasized flying higher and faster, and it was believed by
many that this was also the best means to penetrate enemy air defenses.
Indeed, SAC's transition to low-altitude penetration almost appears to
have been a temporary measure until the B-70 was available. The U-2
shootdown demonstrated to many, however, that high- altitude was not an ef-
fective means of evading air defenses, and that high speed would not pro-
vide much more protection. °* Despite SAC's pressure for the B-70, it was
shelved by Defense Secretary McNamara in 1962-63, and permanently canceled
in 1967. 63 Thus, by the early 1960s the B-70 threat was diminishing.
But while the B-70 was being canceled, the VPVOS could see other
threats being developed in the U.S. One was the B-58 Hustler medium range
bomber created for both high and low altitude supersonic flight. But the
B-58 suffered from poor range and overall performance and it was phased
60 Cockburn (1984; 355-56, 361-62), Alexander (1978/9; 34).
61 Kravchenko (1966; 45-46).
62 Enthoven and Smith (1971; 243-45).
63 Hunter (1973; 193-94).
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out of the SAC inventory during the 1960s. The other threat was the SR-71
strategic reconnaissance aircraft. The SR-71 shared many attributes with
the B-70, flying at approximately 3000 Mph at altitudes of 100,000 feet,
far beyond the reach of interceptors and SAMs . While the U.S. DoD and SAC
considered the SR-71 only a reconnaissance aircraft, as with the U-2, the
VPVOS may have perceived it somewhat differently. Again, there was no
reason why the reconnaissance payload could not have been stripped out and
the aircraft modified to carry nuclear weapons. Such a modification
would perhaps take several weeks or months , but this would be a much
shorter period than that required to create a high-altitude PVO system on
the Soviet side. Even though only a small number of SR-71s were built, in
the mid-1960s the extent of the production run was probably not known to
the Soviets and the possibility of greatly increased production could not
have been ruled out.
These fears concerning the SR-71 do not appear to be well-founded in
light of the development of the program, but they may have been factored
into the VPVOS decisionmaking process. Indeed, in the mid-1960s forecast-
ing future trends in the development of aviation was more difficult than
it appears in hindsight. While Western analysts may dismiss the SR-71 in
retrospect, to the Soviets it presented a very real and significant
threat. 66 In addition to the SR-71 threat, SAC B-52s were being armed
64 Beschloss (1986; 393-94) indicates that the SR-71 may have had a capa-
bility to carry light nuclear weapons without modification. "Light" in
this context, however, could mean several hundred kilotons.
65 Soviet concern with the SR-71 is noted in Barron (1981; 100-101).
66 The SR-71 apparently has never operated over Soviet territory, but it
has operated very close to Soviet airspace and has conducted deep over-
flights over the PRC. Beschloss (1986; 393-94) suggests that either SR-
71s or drones launched from them may have penetrated Soviet airspace in
the 1960s, while Hersh (1986; 221) notes that an official decision forbid-
ding all penetrations of Soviet airspace was not made until 1970. This
suggests that at least shallow penetrations by drones may have been con-
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with the Hound Dog air- to -surface missile during the 1960s, and the SA-5
has sometimes been explained by those opposed to the "bureaucratic in-
ertia" explanation as designed to destroy these missiles (and later the B-
52 's short-range attack missiles- -SRAMs)
.
In the early and mid-1960s, then, the VPVOS faced an unclear threat
picture that could include a high-speed, high-altitude component. Under
these circumstances the continued development of the SA-5 (probably
started in the late 1950s- -early 1960s) may have seemed a prudent hedge
against a nebulous threat. Since deployment of the SA-5 appears to have
begun in 1966 or 1967 the deployment decision was probably made in 1965 or
earlier. But in 1965 the fate of the B-70 was not sealed, and the other
threats listed above were still extant. In addition to these threats ele-
ments of VPVOS operational art must also have figured in the decision, in
particular the desire to intercept bombers equipped with air-to-surface
missiles before the missiles could be launched. Combined with this was
the operational art principle of ensuring all-altitude coverage. Finally,
there may have been some interest in deploying the SA-5 as a precursor for
CO
an eventual ABM system. °
All these factors point towards a semi -rational decisionmaking pro-
cess concerning the SA-5. At its inception the missile was intended for a
certain set of targets, but by the time the SA-5 was ready the threat pic-
ture had changed and it was assigned to less clearly defined missions.
(continued)
ducted up to 1970.
67 Wright (1986; 572-73)
68 It was this possible rationale that caused much debate in the U.S. in-
telligence community, as described in the next section. See Stevens
(1984; 204-209), Freedman (1986; 90-94).
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The deployment of the SA-5 was not an irrational decision as it met VPVOS
needs to counter any possible high-altitude U.S. "breakout", it might have
had some utility against the Hound Dog, and it might have been able to
destroy some bombers before air-to-surface missile launch. Although any
one of these reasons would not be sufficient to require the development
and deployment of the SA-5, the combination of them, together with an ex-
isting system with high sunk costs, appears to have tipped the scale in
favor of deployment.
The deployment of the SA-5 was a result of shifting threats and mis-
sion definitions, and is simultaneously a rational decision and a product
of bureaucratic inertia. Indeed, this process of developing a weapon to
counter one threat only to divert it to another when it is finally ready
is well known in the U.S. military and has acquired a special name, "the
boxcar effect. "° The decisionmaking process may be broadly rational, but
we must take into consideration the changing threats, missions and values
of the organization, as well as its sensitivity to sunk costs. Once the
deployment of the SA-5 system was begun, organizational and bureaucratic
inertia may well have taken over and continued the program even after the
threat became more clearly defined.
Much the same argument may be made for the MiG-25, although since
its deployment started several years later (in 1970), the threat picture
should have been clarified. ' In this case the arguments for the aircraft
may have differed somewhat. The MiG-25 embodied some useful concepts,
69 Weissinger-Baylon (1986; 49-50). This phenomenon is discussed in the
context of the garbage can model with its emphasis on shifting goals and
values over time
.
70 Gunston (1981; 268)
.
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such as high speed to make the intercept at long range and might have been
consistent with the VPVOS ' s tactic of interception before air-to-surface
missile launch, but it lacked the look-down shoot-down capability that
would have enabled it to be effective against low-altitude targets. 1
While the aircraft might have been deployed order to make use of its good
current qualities, with a view to future upgrades to increase its low-
altitude capability, the MiG-25 appears to have almost no capability
against strategic or tactical targets. * Indeed, to produce a potentially
useful aircraft from the MiG-25 airframe required a major modification of
the aircraft, resulting in the M1G-31. J
Once again, the VPVOS appears to have deployed a weapon that had
been developed to counter a threat that had disappeared by the time the
response was ready. In the case of the MiG-25 there is even less
justification than for the SA-5. It did appear to be an impressive air-
craft on paper, and was consistent with Soviet preconceptions concerning
the proper engineering of high-performance aircraft (high altitude, high
speed). Against the main target of the VPVOS, low altitude penetration
71 U.S. plans to deploy a similar, but higher-performance aircraft with
look-down, shoot-down capability based on an airframe similar to that of
the SR-71 were cancelled well before the MiG-25 deployment. See Knaack
(1978; 330-31, 333-34).
72 Ironically the MiG-25 threat was one of the arguments used by the USAF
to justify the development of _he F-15 fighter that has become one of the
chief threats to Soviet aviation. See Gunston (1981; 252).
73 On the MiG-31 see Department of Defense (1987; 60). There was also an
intermediate upgrade, the MiG-25E, see Department of Defense (1984; 37).
74 These were also reflected in the biases of the aircraft design
bureaus, most notably that of Mikoyan and Gurevich, whose motto was "speed
and altitude." See Alexander (1978/9; 34). Barron (1981; 177-182) also
notes that the MiG-25 was designed to counter the B-70 and was not in-
tended to engage in air combat. Despite this he argues that it was a
highly capable and successful aircraft.
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by B-52s or FB-llls the MiG-25 would have been almost entirely ineffec-
tive. In this case the organizational biases of the VPVOS , combined with
the uncertain threat picture combined to produce an ineffective aircraft.
In the cases of the MiG-25 and the SA-5, we see the effects of in-
ternal organizational behavior as the primary factors involved in the de-
cisionmaking process. Unlike some portrayals of a mindless bureaucratic
process, however, the integrated model and the factors considered above,
indicate that there was a broad rationality at work in the deployment pro-
cess. While many of the weapons specifications and threat forecasts were
developed by the VPVOS, approval of the General Staff would have been re-
quired for final deployment. Such approval could not have been forthcom-
ing without some reasonable missions for these weapons to fulfill. As
argued above, there were missions that these systems could plausibly ful-
fill, and these appear to have been sufficient to tip the scale in favor
of deployment. While the decisionmaking process in this case appears to
have taken place largely at the service level, it was consistent with
Soviet strategy and was approved by the General Staff level. Hence, we
see the organizational politics aspect of organizational behavior most
strongly at this, the operational art level of decisionmaking.
In the case of anti-missile defense, examined below, the decision-
making process was very different, with all levels engaged in the debate
over deployment. First the VPVOS position on missile defense is examined,
then the similarities and differences between the air and missile defense
cases are discussed.
5.4 The VPVOS and Anti-Missile Defense
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The response to the development of ballistic missiles on the part of
the VPVOS and the Soviet military and political leadership was quite dif-
ferent from that of the United States for a number of historical, organi-
zational, and military reasons. In this section the decisionmaking pro-
cesses that led to the changing soviet positions on anti-missile defense
(PRO) are examined. It will be seen that the changing positions, like
many of the others described above, had their roots in a basically ra-
tional policy that was colored and to some degree distorted by organiza-
tional interests.
5.4.1 The VPVOS and Missile Defense
VPVOS interest in, and development of, anti-missile (PRO) systems
began in the early 1950s when the great potential of ballistic missiles
became clear. By the early 1960s work had progressed to the initial
deployment stage. Indeed, it is likely that much of the early research
and development work on PRO systems was based on SAM research. 5 In the
early 1960s the revolution in military affairs was still in full swing,
with Khrushchev as its chief proponent, and it was Khrushchev himself who
made the first explicit public comments on the subject of PRO, including
his famous statement that the USSR "can hit a fly in outer space." The
public pronouncements of both Khrushchev and Chief of the General Staff
Biryuzov evinced strong support for the PRO program, and they were
repeated by Marshal Sudets. ' The idea of defense against nuclear attack
75 Stevens (1984; 194-7).
76 Quoted in Wolfe (1964; 190).
77 Wolfe (1964; 190). It should be noted that in his memoirs Khrushchev
(1972; 533-34) decrys the ABM race as an example of "how idiotic the arms
race is." But his description of the developments in the program is su-
perficial since many of them took place after his removal. In this case,
Khrushchev seems to be arguing a fashionable position, or engaging in
hindsight, and does not mention his apparently large role in early ABM
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had already been accepted by both the military and political leadership,
as illustrated by the rapid growth of the VPVOS during the 1950s. In the
late 1950s, early 1960s, this agreement carried over to PRO.
From the perspective of the VPVOS, PRO was not only an integral part
of its overall mission, it also represented the key to the future develop-
ment of the service and the continued viability of the air defense com-
ponent. VPVOS leaders were doubtless aware (particularly in the early
1960s) of Western debates over the futility of air defense without a
defense against ballistic missiles and may have been concerned that such
arguments would be used in the USSR. Furthermore, it is most likely that
professional "defenders" such as Batitskiy would have wholeheartedly, not
just cynically, believed in the necessity for creating a strong PRO
defense, rather than relying upon deterring the "Imperialists."
There is good evidence that the development of PRO systems was
strongly endorsed by the VPVOS. For example, Biryuzov in 1961 observed
that in the near future there would be a transition from anti-aircraft to
7 R
anti-missile defense. These comments were echoed in later pronounce-
ments by VPVOS leaders such as Colonel General Zimin, Marshal Sudets , and
later Marshal Batitskiy. 79
Whether there was any intra- service dissent on this stress on PRO is
unclear. Certainly the IA branch had little to gain from increased fund-
(continued)
work.
78 Biryuzov (1961; 26).
79 Zimin (1965; 115), Batitskiy (1967a; 26). Sudets did not write very
much during his brief tenure and produced no comprehensive article outlin-
ing his view of the VPVOS and the role of PRO within it. Wolfe (1964;
190-91) reports on Sudets's positive views towards PRO.
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ing for PRO, except perhaps for continued viability of the air defense
mission as a whole. For the SAM Troops troops the issue is less clear.
If a separate. PRO branch was established it would represent significant
competition for the SAM Troops in both funding and personnel. ® If a PRO
branch was not created, the SAM Troops may have attempted to capture the
mission, thereby raising its institutional status still further. Finally,
the Radiotechnical Troops may have remained neutral, as the expansion of
either PRO or anti-aircraft activities would have required radar support
by the RTV.
Within the VPVOS , then, it is unlikely that there was strong opposi-
tion to the PRO concept, particularly if the funding were obtained at the
expense of the other services (particularly the Ground Forces and Soviet
Navy), which in fact appears to have been the case in the 1960s. 81
The organizational politics model suggests that the VPVOS should
have been a strong advocate of the PRO mission, and as the evidence below
indicates, this seems to have been the case. Equally important, though,
is the process by which the overall issue of PRO development was debated
and the impact of the outcome on Soviet strategy and VPVOS operational
art. Other authors have studied this debate in some detail, and their
work will be used as a background for this more focussed study on VPVOS
organizational response to the PRO issue. °*
80 Some authors (Ghebhardt (1975; 40)) claim that a PRO branch was. estab-
lished in the late 1950s or early 1960s but there is no Soviet source for
this information and no authoritative Western statements based on in-
telligence data to support this assertion.
81 CIA (1978; 5-6).
82 See the analyses by Hoist (1969), Wolfe (1970), Ghebhardt (1975),
Deane (1980), Stevens (1984), Garthoff (1984) and Parrott (1987). Many of
these authors implicitly use a bureaucratic politics model, and Alexander
Ghebhardt uses it explicitly. Ghebhardt tends to extrapolate too far from
the available evidence and includes some unfounded assumptions and asser-
tions but overall presents a good overview. Deane (1980) presents a dis-
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5.4.2 The Soviet PRO Program
In 1961 U.S. intelligence detected signs near Leningrad of the prep-
aration of sites, and later . limited deployment, of a potential PRO rais-
sile, code-named the Griffon. OJ Although this missile was displayed at
the November 7 parade in 1963, construction was halted and the existing
sites were dismantled that year. At about the same time construction work
started on new sites near Tallinn as well as some of the old Leningrad
sites. These sites caused great controversy in the U.S. over their pos-
sible PRO capability, particularly after the SA-5 was deployed there. J
In addition to work on the Tallinn system, in October 1962 construc-
tion work on the Moscow ABM system appears to have begun. But the work
was sporadic and did not progress rapidly until 1965, with a further ac-
celeration in work in the second half of 1966. The Galosh exoatmospheric
interceptor missile was displayed in November 1964, further confirming
Soviet development of PRO capabilities. ° In 1967 work on two of the in-
(continued)
cussion based on Soviet sources, arguing against the position that
bureaucratic politics played an important role in PRO decisionmaking.
83 Freedman (1977; 91), Prados (1982; 152-1555).
84 Freedman (1977; 91) states that work halted in 1962 was reorganized,
and then in 1963 stopped completely and dismantling began. Prados (1982;
155) is unclear as to the relative timing of the cessation of work on the
Leningrad system and the start of work on the Tallinn system.
85 Prados (155-157, 164-171), Freedman (1977; 90-94). There is some
doubt as to whether the Griffon displayed at the parade and the SA-5 later
deployed were the same. Prados implies that they were the same but
Stevens (1984; 205) notes that "The SA-5 missile appeared to have some re-
lationship with the Griffon interceptor used by the Leningrad system."
Thus, the Griffon may have been intended for PRO use, while the SA-5 was a
version developed for air defense. In any case, the similarity of the two
systems combined with the high performance of the SA-5 gave rise to much
concern over the possible upgrading of the SA-5 to PRO capability.
86 Freedman (1986; 88-89).
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terceptor complexes was stopped or put on hold while other construction
continued, and in 1968 work on another two interceptor complexes was
halted. Instead of the originally planned 128 interceptors, only 64
were actually deployed. Thus there is evidence that Soviet leaders were
having doubts about either the effectiveness or cost of the Galosh system
at this time.**** By 1970 or 1971 the system probably became operational.
5.4.3 The PRO Debate
The real debate over PRO did not begin until the Brezhnev-Kosygin
regime had settled into power and begun a reappraisal of Khrushchevian
strategy and doctrine. The PRO program was apparently one of the chief
items to be examined. One impetus for this growing concern was the rising
cost of the Moscow ABM system. While specific cost data for this project
is not available, CIA defense budget data for the period 1967-1970 shows
VPVOS funding growing at a rate significantly greater than that of the
defense budget as a whole, and after the ABM treaty growing at a much
lower rate. u This data suggests that the Moscow ABM system was very ex-
pensive, a factor that must have raised its visibility. If the Moscow ABM
system was costly the possible expense of a nationwide PRO system would
have been extremely high. Although no other PRO sites were under develop-
ment, the VPVOS ' s concept of territorial defense would call for a nation-
87 Freedman (1986; 88-90).
88 For a more detailed discussion of Soviet views on PRO see Hoist (1969)
and the other sources cited above.
89 Freedman (1986; 88)
.
90 CIA (1978; 5-6).
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wide (or at least European-USSR wide) defense. Given the potential cost
of such a program a critical reappraisal of the program seems logical.
Before Batitskiy acceded to the post of Commander in Chief VPVOS the
battle lines on PRO had already been drawn. In addition to the comments
of Biryuzov and Zimin noted above, a debate on PRO had started in the
pages of Vestnik PVO and Military Thought. The opening shot was fired by
Lt. Col. V. Aleksandrov in an article published just four months after
91
Zimin' s 1965 endorsement of PRO. ^ While the article ostensibly reviews
American work on ABM systems it presents a number of arguments that apply
equally well to Soviet systems. The gist of the article is simple: an im-
penetrable PRO system cannot be built and PRO systems are not cost-
effective because the offense can add decoys, radar homing RVs and other
penetration aids at a cost much less than that of upgrading the PRO sys-
tem. 2 Aleksandrov also presents a harsh criticism of the older Nike-Zeus
system developed in the U.S. and is very skeptical of the capabilities of
the newer Nike-X system. Since the Nike-Zeus (and to some extent the
Nike-X) system was similar in many respects to that being deployed around
Moscow, these comments may have been aimed at that system more than at the
U.S. system. Furthermore, Aleksandrov singles out the problem of dis-
criminating RVs from decoys and clutter as one of the major problems with
91 Aleksandrov (1965).
92 Aleksandrov (1965; 19-20).
93 Aleksandrov (1965; 13-14, 17-19)
94 Interestingly, a similar critique of the Nike-Zeus system was pub-
lished in Vestnik protivovozdushnoy oborony in 1963, although it suggested
that the Nike-X program would solve many of these problems. Unfortunate-
ly, the article is the only one available from 1963-64, and it is there-




PRO and argued that there was no solution to this problem in sight. Alek-
sandrov even ventures into political analysis by asserting that there are
only relatively small political advantages to be gained over the enemy by
deploying the system. 5 Thus Aleksandrov' s argument suggests that there
are no military or political benefits to the deployment of a PRO system.
Aleksandrov' s critique was addressed in an article appearing a year
later in Vestnik PVO , again in the context of a discussion of U.S. pro-
grams. Using the same Western sources, Plyachenko comes to significant-
ly different conclusions. While noting the impossibility of creating an
impenetrable PRO system, Plyachenko argues that one can develop a PRO sys-
Q7
tern that demands enormous expenses to penetrate it. PRO is presented as
difficult but not impossible, and the ongoing work in the U.S. in this
area is presented relatively non-critically . While noting that dis-
crimination is difficult, Plyachenko notes much work on this problem is
being conducted and that terminal defenses suffer less from this problem
than exoatmospheric interceptors. ° It is also interesting to note that
Plyachenko mentions without criticism the U.S. search for a less expensive
Q Q
PRO system that could be used for defense against a small attack.
Plyachenko does not address Aleksandrov' s political comments, but this is
not surprising given the sensitive nature of the political issues and the
95 Aleksandrov (1965; 19).
96 Plyachenko (1966).
97 Plyachenko (1966; 86). Note that Plyachenko cites the same Western
source, Hertzfeld of DARPA, as does Aleksandrov, but presents a diametri-
cally opposed interpretation.
98 Plyachenko (1966; 87).
99 Plyachenko (1966; 86) The system described appears to be a variant of
the Nike-X.
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placement of the article in the usually technically-oriented "In Foreign
Armies" section.
These two articles stake out the two poles of the debate quite
clearly. The main point of contention is the cost-effectiveness of the
system. The VPVOS author accepted that an impenetrable PRO system was im-
possible, but argued that the cost advantage favored the defense over the
offense, with Aleksandrov asserting the opposite. To a large extent these
differing views were based on assessments of the difficulty of dis-
criminating targets from decoys.
The articles discussed above move beyond the pronouncements "debate"
of Malinovskiy and Sudets: the issue is not whether all or many missiles
will be stopped, but rather how cost effective the PRO system might be
when faced with a technologically sophisticated opponent. 01 Thus, the
argument was couched in military- technical terms of effectiveness, rather
than in terms of arms race or crisis stability. This is characteristic of
the restricted purview, and the shared assumptions, of the military
leadership. Aleksandrov' s article is one of the few exceptions that ac-
tually ventures into the real of political assessment, and even then he
predicates his conclusions on the preceding technical argument.
At the beginning of the PRO debate Sudets was removed from his post,
100 There were a number of technical analyses of PRO systems. On the
whole, those appearing in the VPVOb press presented some criticisms but
tended to be optimistic that the difficulties could be overcome. See, for
example, Bragin and Kubarev (1966; 3-4, 13-18), Baryshev (1967), Fayenov
(1968), Popov (1968), Baryshev and Kubarev (1970), Ignat'yev and Er-
listratov (1971), and Kryakvin (1974).
101 Deane (1980; 34-41) also argues that differing cost-effectiveness
estimates were important, but does not see a real bureaucratic politics
debate on this point.
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having held it for only 4 years. ° 2 It is most likely that Sudets was
removed because of his performance, or lack thereof. Scott suggests that
Sudets was removed because of the poor showing of SAM systems in Vietnam
while Hoist argues that Sudets was too outspoken an advocate of PRO after
a decision had already been taken to concentrate instead on strategic of-
fensive forces. ^ While VPVOS weapons did not do well in Vietnam this
explanation seems unlikely. First, the commander of the SAM Troops with
direct responsibility for the forces was not removed. Second, most of the
development of SAMs had taken place during Biryuzov's tenure in the job.
Thus, while Vietnam might have been one factor in the decision, it is ian-
likely to have been the main consideration.
The argument that Sudets was too outspoken an advocate of PRO is
largely predicated on an exchange in April 1966 when Minister of Defense
Malinovskiy asserted that Soviet PVO could intercept all aircraft but only
"many rockets" while Marshal Sudets criticized Soviet efforts in the
field of PRO as insufficient. This exchange came shortly before
102 Sudets was not particularly old at the time and lived until 1981,
suggesting that he was not particularly ill or disabled. Akhromevev
(1986; 717).
103 Scott (1984; 79), Hoist (1969; 152).
104 Malinovskiy ' s article was published in Pravda on April 16, 1966 (p.
2), while Sudets 's reply appeared in Sovetskaya Rossiya on April 19, 1966.
See Garthoff (1984; 298) for a brief discussion of this exchange. One in-
dication of Sudets 's interest in PRO is the attention given to the subject
under a special PRO rubric in the journal Vescnik PVO. In 1963 it fea-
tured 6 articles but the rubric disappeared in 1964 while the number of
articles remained relatively constant at 4 in 1964 and 5 in 1965. There
seems to have been continuing strong interest in the topic (although the
disappearance of the separate rubric may imply a slight downgrading in im-
portance), but does not suggest particularly strong advocacy. See the an-
nual indexes in Vestnik protivovozdushnoy oborony
,
(1963; 80), (1964; 80),
(1965; 80). These figures include articles on early warning radar systems
and PKO issues. Unfortunately, only the December issues with articles are




Sudets's removal, but if Sudets had been overly aggressive in his promo-
tion of PRO, his removal does not seem to have dealt the program a major
blow, as construction of the Moscow ABM system accelerated in mid-1966,
after Sudets's departure. 5 It appears most likely that Sudets was
removed because of his advocacy (bordering on insubordination) and the
relatively poor PVO showing in Vietnam.
After Batitskiy's appointment in 1966 the debate entered a new phase
in 1967 as Batitskiy clarified and enunciated VPVOS views on PRO.
Batitskiy was probably well acquainted with the construction (and possibly
planning) of the Moscow ABM system as he had previously commanded the Mos-
cow Air Defense District.
Batitskiy's appointment to the VPVOS put in place a capable officer
with a strong VPVOS background who became a strong advocate of the expan-
sion of the service's role to include PRO and anti-satellite activities.
This advocacy is clearly reflected in the emphasis given to the concept of
"aerospace defense" (vozdushnaya-kosmicheskaya oborona) as opposed to tra-
ditional air defense.
Unlike Sudets, who published no articles in the major military jour-
nals, Batitskiy published regularly, giving us greater insight into VPVOS
positions and interests. Batitskiy also seems to have been interested in
changing and improving the VPVOS ' s operational art, and military
-
105 Freedman (1986; 88).
106 It is unclear if Batitskiy had any direct responsibility for the Mos-
cow ABM system when he was in the Moscow ADD. It is possible that con-
struction of the ABM system was not being carried out through the Moscow
ADD (an operational command) but instead either through the central appa-
ratus of the VPVOS or a special PRO branch or administration. Thus if
work on the ABM system was going poorly it might not have reflected badly
on Batitskiy's performance.
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historical writings provided both the basis for, and the opportunity to
promulgate, these changes. But while the articles of this period are
analytical, they lack the scholarly quality and sharpness of earlier arti-
cles. To a large extent this appears to be due to the general clampdown on
free scholarship and critical examination of history in the post-
Khrushchev years
.
In his first editorial in Vestnik PVO, Batitskiy did not directly
call for the development of PRO systems, but instead noted that troop con-
trol needed to be carried out in the most complex vozdushnoye-
kosmicheskoye (air-space) situations. u ' This hint at an expansion of the
VPVOS to incorporate both air and space (anti-satellite- -PKO) missions was
substantiated and elaborated upon in two articles, one in Voyenno-
istoricheskiy zhurnal
,
and one in Military Thought.
In his 1967 Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal article Batitskiy presents
a fairly standard overview of VPVOS history, but in his closing comments
on the post-war situation he suggests that the tasks and role of the VPVOS
have grown to incorporate "repelling the air-cosmic (aerospace) nuclear
attack of the enemy" and ensuring the survivability of the nation. To do
this the PVO must be deployed throughout the depth of the nation and it
must qualitatively increase its combat effectiveness to become im-
1 ORpenetrable. ° This formulation appears to argue for the joint develop-
ment of air, space, and missile defense forces while not specifically
mentioning PRO.
107 Batitskiy (1967a; 6).
108 Batitskiy (1967a; 26).
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But while Batitskiy was hinting at the integration of aerospace
forces in his public statements, in his classified arguments he was very
direct about his plans. These arguments are presented in his 1967 Milita-
ry Thought article that sets the stage and the agenda for the rest of the
pre-ABM treaty period.
The first part of Batitskiy' s article is a largely non-critical
story of the development of PVO, from World War I to the present. The
description of the Great Patriotic War emphasizes the development of the
anti-air operation, noting that the defense of Moscow showed the charac-
i no
teristics of such an operation. Batitskiy points out that the opera-
tional art developed during the Great Patriotic War was maintained during
the 1950s as the basic PVO means had not changed. LU However, the ap-
pearance of new weapons, such as the ICBM, has demanded further develop-
ment of operational art:
Such operations (such a concept is introduced by us as a
definition) will be characterized by a spatial sweep [sic] the
participation of a considerable number of troops, the decisiveness
of objectives, high tension [intensity], fluidity and aggressive-
ness of combat actions, and the broad application of operational
maneuvering. They would consist of separate operations, attacks
and battles of the troops of the antiaircraft, antimissile and
anti- space defense. Along with the operations and in the inter-
vals between them the PVO troops would carry out daily combat ac-
tions. 111
The aerospace defensive operation is presented as the modern
counterpart to the Great Patriotic War's anti-air operation, and is clear-
ly an extrapolation from it. Batitskiy' s article unequivocally places the
109 Batitskiy (1967; 33).
110 Batitskiy (1967; 38).
111 Batitskiy (1967; 39).
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integration air, space, and missile defenses at the top of the priority
list of the VPV0S.H2 as ^n his Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal article, it
is clear that the viability of the defensive operation can only be ensured
by combining all PVO elements, and deploying them nationwide with central-
ized command and control. Thus, within a year after assuming the leader-
ship of the VPVOS, Batitskiy had staked out a strongly pro-PRO position
and placed the aerospace defensive operation at the heart of the VPVOS '
s
operational art. Rather than introducing a new concept, though, Batitskiy
emphasized the link to the anti-air operation, portraying the aerospace
defense mission as a logical extension required by new technology rather
than a departure in a new direction. This suggests incrementalism in the
development in operational art, as well as an attempt to sell the program
as an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, development in armaments.
The introduction of aerospace doctrine in Military Thought was
echoed by the introduction of the new catch phrase "aerospace" (or air-
space) on the editorial pages of Vestnik PVO. After Batitskiy' s first use
of the phrase, editorials began to refer not just to air attack but to
air-space means of attack, with the obvious corollary that the VPVOS must
be able to defend against them. This phraseology continued throughout
1967 and 1968.
Batitskiy' s enunciation of the aerospace defense operation was taken
up by Colonel Ye. Kalugin in the January 1968 issue of Military
Thought. iJ Kalugin describes the aerospace defense operation in detail,
112 Batitskiy' s article appeared while the Moscow ABM system was under
construction, apparently just after an acceleration in work on the system




noting that while the basic principles developed in the Great Patriotic
War still hold, nuclear weapons have greatly complicated the defense's
job. Particular areas of overlap between the Great Patriotic War and the
nuclear era are the importance of surprise and first strikes, massing of
forces, and concentration of efforts against the most important objec-
tives. The differences from the Great Patriotic War are the increased
range of offensive weapons, threatening the entire country, and the empha-
sis on strategic targets rather than ground support. ^
The greatest threat is during the first few hours of the war, when
phased attacks by ballistic missiles and aircraft are expected, with sub-
sequent attacks by remaining forces. 1 -1 In terms of attrition require-
ments Kalugin presents the rather unusual argument:
On the whole, the effectiveness of combat operations must be
extremely high because at least all the carriers of nuclear
weapons must be destroyed in order to repulse a strike of the
aerial enemy against defended objectives. In the period of World
War II it was sufficient to shoot down or damage 20-25 percent of
the attacking aircraft in order to achieve this. 16
This amDiguous statement is worth examining. First, it seems to im-
ply that all nuclear carriers must be destroyed, and second it suggests
that 20-25Z attrition rate was sufficient to repel a strike. Judging from
other VPVOS comments along these lines, Kalugin appears to be arguing that
a 20-251 attrition rate is coo lot. under modern conditions and that rates






47) . This work is only available in translation and
it is possible that much of the ambiguity is due to the quality of trans-
lation.
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even rates of 20-25X are much higher than usually achieved in the Great
Patriotic War and are even higher than most other VPVOS estimates of the
attrition achieved during that war. ^ This suggests that Kalugin was
endorsing a lower "floor" on the effectiveness of the VPVOS or perhaps
arguing that at this rate the attacking force would break off the opera-
tion. As Kalugin seems to admit, however, such a response seems unlikely
in modern conditions. Furthermore, in the case of ICBM RVs there is no
"breaking off" of the attack, so Kalugin' s article also sets a minimum re-
quirement for PRO effectiveness as well.
PRO is discussed extensively by Kalugin, particularly the various
technical aspects of interception and systems for accomplishing the task.
Although he makes no comments about its potential effectiveness the tone
of this section is rather optimistic. On the question of PRO command
and control, Kalugin argues that a single command post must coordinate the
actions of all services and branches participating in the aerospace
defense operation. iy However, the need for a partial decentralization of
control is also recognized, as events might move too rapidly for central-
ized control (even highly automated) to react, or in the event that com-
1 OA
munications are disrupted. i ^ u
Kalugin' s article is one of the most detailed and comprehensive out-
lines of the aerospace defense operation. It clearly represents a step
forward in VPVOS operational art, although the influence of historical ex-
perience and principles is clear.









These articles, when combined with past VPVOS work on operational
art, outline an operational concept for the VPVOS oriented towards an in-
tegrated air and space defense employing PVO, anti- satellite and PRO
forces. But Batitskiy's advocacy did not win the day. During the 1967-68
period other top military officers expressed their opposition to the PRO
program in veiled terms. Thus the Commander in Chief of the SRF, and the
Commander of the Civil Defense program both made statements critical of
PRO, as did the new Minister of Defense, Marshal Grechko. *1 While the
opposition's public arguments were not as explicit or detailed as those of
the VPVOS the main point of the debate again appears to have been the ex-
pected effectiveness of the PRO system. "
The decision to engage in arms talks with the U.S., announced in
June 1968 appears to have signalled the end of the debate over PRO by in-
dicating Soviet willingness to negotiate on defensive as well as offensive
arms. iiJ At about the same time construction work at two Moscow ABM sites
121 Warner (1977; 152), Garthoff (1984; 298-99). Deane (1980; 34-41)
argues that there was not a debate, but rather that the limited effective-
ness of PRO was recognized by all parties and that the implication was
that it would have to be used in conjunction with a first strike and civil
defense. While the latter is a reasonable conclusion, Deane 's argument on
the former is rather obscure, resting on the fact that some earlier state-
ments had also expressed reservations about PRO effectiveness. This could
just mean that the debate over effectiveness started before 1967, as is
indicated in the Aleksandrov- -Plyachenko exchange examined above.
122 One aspect of this debate that has not been examined in detail is
different ways of attaining damage limitation- -SRF first strike versus
VPVOS defense. On this topic it is interesting to note that I . I . Anureyev
published an article in Military Thought in 1967, that presents a simple
strategic forces model that incorporates both counterforce against EMT
targets and some provisions for defensive attrition. Such a model would
provide for modeling of the tradeoffs between defensive and offensive
damage limitation. See Anureyev (1967) and for a detailed examination and
application of the model see Meyer (1983-4; 38-44).
123 Garthoff (1984; 299).
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was halted. 124
Garthoff notes that the decision to engage in talks was accompanied
by a decrease in references .to PRO in 1968 and that the 1968 November pa-
rade omitted for the first time a reference to PRO missiles, and such
references haven't been made since. ^ J Batitskiy's editorials also began
to omit references to PRO or aerospace defense. 2 ° Indeed, after Novem-
ber 1967 explicit references to Soviet PRO systems in Vescnik PVO dis-
appears until one or two brief comments in the early 1970s. z '
During the years leading up to the ABM Treaty, and shortly there-
after, there were continuing signs of VPVOS displeasure with the decision
to negotiate on PRO. First, while explicit references to PRO were ex-
punged from the editorials in Vestnik PVO, authors continued to refer to
aerospace means of attack, even though they only discussed defense against
air attacks. Thus, the threat of missile attack was recognized while the
limitation of the VPVOS to only defending against air targets was subtly
alluded to. 128 This pattern continued throughout 1968 and into early 1969
with occasional references also appearing in articles on ideological
themes.^ In early 1969, however, the use of the phrase again changes,
with some authors noting that the VPVOS has the capability to both observe
and defend against aerospace attacks . JW By mid- 1969 these references
124 Freedman (1986; 90).
125 Garthoff (1984; 300). Ghebhardt also notes a disappearance of dis-
cussion of PRO. Ghebhardt (1975; 108).
126 Batitskiy (1970), (1971), (1972c), (1974), (1975b).
127 "Partiya--nash rulevoy" . (1967; 6).
128 See the unattributed editorials in the February and April 1968 issues
of Vescnik PVO, "Pyatdesyat geroicheskikh let" (1968) and "Byf
bditel'nymi" and Grishkov (1968a; 4).
129 See Golubitskiy (1968; 8), Yakushkin (1968; 12).
130 Golikov (1969; 11), Vestnik PVO (1969; 6).
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disappear and the only (with one interesting exception) use of the term
i ii
aerospace occurs in a July editorial by Batitskiy.
What is the significance of these changes in phraseology? The most
reasonable explanation is that the term "aerospace" was directly linked to
the concept of the aerospace defense operation, incorporating PRO and
anti- satellite missions. By using this phrase, the VPVOS leadership could
continue to maintain its position in favor of PRO and anti-satellite mis-
sions by emphasizing that the threat was aerospace while the response was
being limited to air defense. The disappearance of this phrase from regu-
lar use in 1969 suggests two possibilities: either the VPVOS leadership
was ordered to cease using it in order to end their continuing expression
of dissent or to placate the U.S. in its negotiations. It is unlikely
that it was done to placate the U.S. as the latter was more concerned with
ABM construction than VPVOS phraseology, suggesting that the General Staff
or the civilian leadership clamped down on open VPVOS advocacy. Neverthe-
less, the VPVOS managed to make its position known, and the phrase even
reappears in the unclassified literature briefly in 1971.
Several articles published in the early 1970s provide the clearest
evidence of VPVOS concern about the ABM Treaty. First, as Deane points
out, at approximately the same time (March 1971) as the USSR proposed its
draft treaty on ABM limitations two articles featuring the banished phrase
"aerospace defense" appeared in Vestnik PVO.* In the lead (unsigned)
editorial celebrating the upcoming Party Congress it is noted that the
VPVOS, together with the other services and Warsaw Pact forces has the
131 Batitskiy (1969; 11).
132 Deane (1980; 52-55).
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task of reliably protecting the socialist countries from nuclear strikes
and all means of air-space attack of the aggressor. 33 In the very same
issue, though, in a quasi-editorial Batitskiy ignores the question of PRO
and air-space attack, instead stressing the danger of surprise attack, and
referring to the need to preserve the impregnability of the Soviet air
borders and to carry out the assigned tasks. 3
A third article in the March 1971 issue of Vestnik PVO also makes an
argument for PRO. Lieutenant General G. S. Legasov, in an article examin-
ing the contributions of Soviet science and technology to the national
defense, again notes that the VPVOS role is to defend against air-space
means of attack. Continuing, Legasov claims that the VPVOS "has today"
arms able to observe, track and destroy air-space targets. This state-
ment goes much further than any other in the VPVOS press during this time
period. It may be intended as an indication that the Moscow ABM system
had just become operational, but such an explicit indication would be very
unusual for the Soviet press. Rather, it is more likely that Legasov is
pointing out that the technology for PRO is ready, and that it is other
(i.e. political) considerations that are preventing its full exploitation.
This cluster of articles in one issue of Vestnik PVO is rather un-
usual and certainly was not a coincidence. It would appear a last-minute
effort to stake out the PRO issue for the VPVOS. It is surprising that
133 "Pod rukhovodstvom partii--k novym pobedami ! " (1971a; 5).
134 Batitskiy (1971; 8, 11, 14). The article is a "quasi-editorial" in
that it has the content and format of an editorial but appears just after
the "official" editorial.
135 Legasov (1971; 79). Legasov's position is not known, but he does ap-
pear in an obituary of a VPVOS officer associated with the Sary Shagan PRO
test site, suggesting that he may have had direct ties to the PRO program.
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Batitskiy avoided the issue in his article, but the issue might have been
too sensitive (since it had already been decided) for a top-ranking of-
ficer to address. Even though the unsigned editorial would have been ap-
proved by Batitskiy the etiquette of advocacy might have precluded a pub-
lic challenge to a Party decision and the risk of a charge of "fac-
tionalism. "
The second major indication of VPVOS discontent is an article by
Zimin, at the time head of the VPVOS command academy. 3 ° Zimin's article
was published in the "In Foreign Armies" section of Vescnik PVO in August
1971, when a tentative agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on
ABMs had already been reached. Not only is it unusual for a high-
ranking officer to write an article in this section, but its length and
topic are also unusual. Zimin presents an overview of the development of
air defense (PVO) in the postwar period, stressing PRO equally as much as
antiaircraft defense. The implication is that PVO should include both air
and space defense, and Zimin explicitly refers to aerospace means of at-
tack. Furthermore, in concluding his article Zimin makes a strong argu-
ment for future work in PVO including defense against aerospace attack,
and suggests that the importance of PVO is increasing rather than decreas-
ing. 138
The strength and nature of Zimin's arguments indicates why the arti-
cle was placed under the "In Foreign Armies" section: such a strong argu-
ment could not be presented in a discussion of Soviet policy where even
136 Zimin (1971).
137 Garthoff (1985; 146-7).
138 Zimin (1971; 82).
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the use of the phrase aerospace was disallowed. By placing the argumei
in terms of U.S. actions and intentions, coupled with general objective
trends in air defense, Zimin was able to make his point without directly
139
contradicting Party and government policies. ±J
Other indications of concern with the imminent ABM treaty appeared
in the military press. In May 1972 (the same month the ABM treaty was
signed), a review of a book on PRO by I.I. Anureyev, a prominent officer
at the General Staff Academy, appeared in Military Thought. While
Anureyev' s book is generally pessimistic about the current feasibility of
PRO, and is particularly critical of its cost-effectiveness, the reviewer,
Major General Provorov, instead emphasizes the importance of aerospace
defense, playing up the positive aspects of PRO while passing over the
problems. ° The author ends by noting Brezhnev's comments on the need to
respond to attempts to gain military superiority over the USSR. ^ This
very pro-PRO review is one of the last clear arguments presented in favor
of PRO. Conversely, the review of Anureyev' s book in Vestnik PVO is bland
and non-critical, as the reviewer studiously avoids the use of the term
aerospace or any endorsement of PRO. ^ This reversal of roles between
Military Thought and Vestnik PVO is consistent with the clampdown on pub-
139 Zimin was promoted to Marshal in 1973, so his advocacy does not seem
to have signifcantly harmed him personally. See Akhromeyev (1986; 277).
140 Provorov (1972; 124), Anureyev (1971; 117-126, 193-99). Provorov's
position is unknown. He may be the same person who co-authored the
Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya (1976; 255-56) entry on military-
educational institutions, indicating either a General Staff position over-
seeing academies or a position in one of the academies. Provorov also
signs an obituary for G.S. Fedorenko (Krasnaya zvezda March 14, 1969, p.
4) but since Fedorenko was associated with both the General Staff Academy
and the VPVOS this can't determine Provorov's position unambiguously.
141 Provorov (1972; 125).
142 Gorbatenko (1971; 94-95).
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lie advocacy of PRO development. It appears that it was decided to keep
explicit discussion of PRO at a classified level. Certainly, the most
significant pronouncements and debates took place in Military Thought,
reflecting its high-level and all-service nature.
Further evidence that the VPVOS had not abandoned plans for
aerospace defense is found in an article by Batitskiy published in Milita-
ry Thought in late 1973. By this time the ABM Treaty was an accepted
reality, but in looking at future trends Batitskiy noted that "We can ex-
pect... air defense troops will become firmly established as aerospace
defense troops (missile defense, defense against space weapons, and
antiaircraft defense)." 1 -* This reiteration of the aerospace defense con-
cept suggests that it was not renounced in 1969, but that it was not to be
discussed in the open literature. Batitskiy went on to examine the role
of PRO more explicitly, noting that MIRVs will increase the offensive
potential of ICBMs but that PRO development would have to be qualitative
and limited to the capital due to the ABM treaty. Thus, Batitskiy ap-
pears to have accepted the ABM Treaty limitations while still maintaining
his argument that the VPVOS would develop PRO and anti-satellite missions.
To some extent this path was followed as anti-satellite development con-
tinued, albeit slowly, during the 1970s and the Moscow system was sub-
jected to the "qualitative development" noted by Batitskiy. -*
After the early 1970s all references to PRO and aerospace defense
disappear from Vestnik PVO
,
and Military Thought is unavailable after
143 Batitskiy (1973b; 42).
144 Batitskiy (1973; 42-43).
145 Department of Defense (1987; 46-51)
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1973. All indications are that the VPVOS continued to develop PRO tech-
nology, as well as maintaining and upgrading the Moscow ABM system. How-
ever, no discussions of the desirability of defense appeared until the
early 1980s, when U.S. proposals for defense of MX, and later the SDI pro-
gram, forced the issue back onto the public agenda. VPVOS reactions to
these developments are discussed in a later chapter.
While the VPVOS suffered a setback in the debate over PRO there was
some compensation in the anti-satellite field. The decision to seek an
agreement limiting PRO systems did not mean an end to Soviet interest in
the military use of space, nor the total abandonment of the VPVOS ' s con-
cept of aerospace defense. In late 1968 two apparently successful tests
were conducted of a satellite interceptor (anti-satellite- -ASAT) , the
first in a series of tests that was to continue off and on until 1981.
5.4.4 Analyzing the PRO Debate
There are several important features of the PRO debate that provide
insight into the Soviet defense decisionmaking process. Unlike the devel-
opment and deployment of more traditional weapons like the MiG-25 and SA-
5, the PRO system raised questions that transcended the narrow
responsibilities of the VPVOS. Issues of strategy and doctrine were af-
fected by the PRO deployment decision, and accordingly the decisionmaking
process involved all levels of the political and military leadership.
This case therefore provides a good opportunity for assessing the interac-
tion between the levels.
146 Satellite data is in Freedman (1977; 19), Berman and Baker (1982;
150-153). For an overview of ASAT development and negotiations see Hafner
(1980/81).
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At the level of the political leadership there appears to have been
serious debate over the advisability of PRO in the politburo. ^' While
the details of coalitions and decisionmaking at this level are not clear,
it is clear that the earlier strong endorsement of PRO under Khrushchev
had disappeared. The decision to engage in negotiations on the limitation
of both offensive and defensive weapons indicates that a high-level deci-
sion was taken in 1968 to pursue ABM limitations. ^ 8 As noted above, the
great expense associated with the construction of a nation-wide PRO system
must have been a major contributing factor to the urgency of the debate.
The lack of consensus at level 1 appears to have provided the op-
portunity for debates at the lower levels of the decisionmaking structure.
During the advocacy and agenda- setting phase the various services and the
General Staff presented their views in a public debate, but once the
Politburo decision was made in 1960 the public debate disappeared. Imple-
mentation of this decision took two directions. First, there was the in-
itiation of the SALT talks, which fell outside the purview of the VPVOS
.
Second was the decision to complete and maintain the Moscow ABM system.
This part of the implementation the VPVOS appears to have carried out suc-
cessfully. As we have seen, though, the issue of PRO did not completely
disappear, and VPVOS advocacy appeared for some time after the decision,
although either in surrogate arguments or classified publications. The
VPVOS thus appears to have been unwilling to allow the PRO issue to com-
pletely disappear from the defense agenda, as the 1973 comments by
Batitskiy and the later upgrades to the Moscow ABM system indicate.
147 See Parrott (1987; 24-25), Garthoff (1984; 295-300)
148 Gartnoff (1984; 299-300).
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Let us consider the constellation of views and opinions at level
2. It appears that as the technical limitations of the ABM system be-
came clearer (particularly in comparison with U.S. systems) and its
resource-allocation impact on the other services mounted, that opposition
to PRO from the other services increased. -* As outlined in the previous
section there was considerable disagreement amongst high-level military
officers over the value and feasibility of PRO. The debate was not over
whether PRO would contribute to deterrence, but rather whether it would be
effective and cost-effective. Had a highly effective defense been pos-
sible at a reasonable cost it is most likely that the military leadership
would have supported it.
This dissent amongst the military leadership at level 2 devalued the
military monopoly on defense information as the lack of a consensus on PRO
effectiveness presented the political leadership with varying assessments
and information, rather than an agreed-upon military position. The key to
this split is the fact that both the Strategic Rocket Forces and VPVOS had
extensive experience in assessing PRO systems: the SRF in planning future
systems to penetrate proposed U.S. systems, and the VPVOS in planning its
own. The existence of strong advocates of offense and defense schools
within the Soviet military produced varying estimates of PRO effective-
ness, and provided General Staff analysts and the political leadership
with a great deal of additional information and opinions.
149 This material on the various positions of institutional players is
drawn from the analyses of Hoist (1969), Wolfe (1970), Ghebhardt (1975),
Stevens (1984), Garthoff (1984) and Parrott (1987). The analysis present-
ed here differs in that I emphasize the interaction between levels and the
importance of VPVOS institutional interests and operational art in estab-
lishing its bureaucratic position.
150 This is reflected in the 1968 debate described above.
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In addition to the competition between services, there was a great
debate raging in U.S. military, industrial, and academic circles concern-
ing the effectiveness of ABM systems. This debate would have been dif-
ficult to ignore even for the advocates of PRO, and some commentators sug-
gest that the Pugwash conferences involving Western academics and some
Soviet military representatives may have contributed to growing Soviet
doubts about PRO. 151
Differing assessments and estimates of PRO effectiveness were there-
fore available to the civilian and military leadership from both Soviet
military sources and Western civilian and military sources. These assess-
ments both resulted from, and contributed to, the relatively open debate
over the value of PRO. Without such an open information flow the range of
information and ideas available to both the General Staff and the
civilian leadership might have been much more restricted and the pos-
sibility for organizational biases and influences might have increased.
Another element that should be considered in examining of the debate
over PRO is the impact of the Vietnam war. While superficially unrelated
and separate, the war appears to have acted in an unexpected way on the
decisionmaking process. While the Vietnam war might have been expected to
strengthen the hand of those opposed to any negotiations with the U.S. it
had a greater countervailing impact on the VPVOS ' s institutional
credibility. As shown in the next chapter, the performance of SAMs in
Vietnam did not live up to the expectations of the VPVOS. This failure to
accurately assess the capability of a new PVO technology must have
151 Garthoff (1984; 293-4,308) notes the participation of Col. Gen. Gryz-




reflected poorly upon the VPVOS ' s assessments of PRO technology, which was
even less tested than the SAMs . By discrediting the VPVOS 's assessments,
therefore, the poor SAM performance may have weakened the VPVOS ' s argu-
ments for PRO addressed to the military and political leadership. Fur-
thermore, the ongoing measure -countermeasure game in Vietnam between the
PVO and the USAF may have served as a strong reminder of the continual
struggle between defense and offense, a struggle that could prove quite
costly.
Finally, at the service level (Level III) we find both advocacy and
incrementalism. In developing the concept of aerospace defense, the VPVOS
resorted to the typical organizational approach of incremental innova-
tion. 52 Rather than presenting PRO as a new activity with new demands on
operational art and tactics, the old concept of the anti-air operation was
stretched to fit the new technology. Both Batitskiy's and Kalugin's arti-
cles treat nuclear warfare in a framework derived from the Great Patriotic
War, considering massed, phased attacks, with prolonged combat and ex-
tensive use of maneuver. There is little explicit attention given to the
great difficulties and peculiarities of operation in a nuclear environ-
ment, and the entire conceptual framework is drawn from conventional oper-
ations. For example, the comment that at a certain attrition rate the at-
tacker may break off the attack seems tied to the old concepts of forma-
tion flying and bombing and seems ill-suited to a nuclear war where the
attacking crews may well realize the importance of their mission, the fact
that there are no second chances, and the possibility that they may have
nothing left to go back to. Even if very high attrition rates of 20-252
152 See the discussion in Chapter 2.
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could be achieved causing some forces to break off the attack for an over-
all penetration rate of only 50X , the question arises whether this attri-
tion level is sufficient to make a substantial difference to the damage
inflicted on the Soviet urban- industrial structure.
These questions are not even hinted at in either Batitskiy's or
Kalugin's article, both of which implicitly assume that defense is feasi-
ble and that the war will continue past the first volleys of missiles. In
this case then, we see military officers looking at the conduct of nuclear
war in a manner quite different from that of Western civilian analysts. 53
The enunciation of the aerospace defense operation is representative of
this extension of conventional concepts to deal with nuclear war. But the
aerospace defense operation also had a political significance by allowing
the VPVOS to argue for continued PRO support as part of an integrated mis-
sion plan. This is not to say that the aerospace defensive operation was
a fiction designed to impress the political or military leadership, but it
allowed the consolidation of all VPVOS missions into one package that
demonstrated their synergy.
The PRO debate involved wide disagreement over the proper evaluation
of the effectiveness of the system, and the differing assessments had very
broad policy implications. The military consensus emerging in the late
1960s (excepting the VPVOS) did oppose the extensive development of PRO.
This came about in spite of the advocacy of the VPVOS, and was an impor-
tant element in the decision to start the SALT negotiations. But while
153 Deane (1980) makes this point throughout his monograph, but makes it
too strongly and does not seem to allow for differences between the mili-
tary and political leadership on the desirability of deterrence as opposed
to active defense.
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the VPVOS engaged in advocacy in accord with the organizational politics
model, this case also indicates the limitations of the organizational
politics model. Thus, the issue was elevated to the top political leader-
ship and decided there, not at the intermediate levels of the structure.
At level 1 the main decisionmaking dynamic was largely unrelated to the
advocacy of the VPVOS: once the arguments for and against PRO had been
made the decisive factor was the political power of the factions. While
the strong military opposition to PRO on the part of the other services
and the General Staff was a necessary condition for entering negotiations
it was not sufficient, for the decision lay with the political leadership.
Taken together, the factors listed above point strongly to the deci-
sion to prevent the development of a PRO race. The prospective cost and
low effectiveness seem to have combined with military considerations to
create a strongly majority opposed to the program in both the military and
political leaderships. In this debate the VPVOS clearly lost, but at
least the prospect of continued research programs and future potential for
deployment was offered as a consolation prize. -^
5
. 5 Summary
During the period surveyed here we can see good evidence of the ap-
plicability of the organizational politics model and its limitations. In
describing the internal behavior of the VPVOS the model appears to fit
quite well.
154 Parrott (1987; 32-33)
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First, the VPVOS appears to have continued to overestimate the ef-
fectiveness of its forces until at least the late 1960s when data from
Vietnam began to come in. Even then, however, there were hints of over-
estimation of their forces when used in a strategic defense role by Soviet
soldiers
.
Second, many of the weapons delivered to the VPVOS do not seem to
have been well-optimized to meet the threats they were facing. While the
SA-5 and MiG-25 may have been designed according to a "rational analysis"
of the threat, this analysis was premised on inaccurate assumptions con-
cerning the future direction of the air threat. Once these weapons were
under development and deployment the VPVOS, instead of redesigning or can-
celing them, appears to have assigned them new missions to which they were
less well suited, but which served to justify their use and opened up the
possibility of further improvement.
Third, in the case of PRO there are clear indications of organiza-
tional interests, advocacy, and incremental innovation. These manifested
themselves in the VPVOS positions on the cost-effectiveness of PRO systems
and in the expansion of old concepts such as the anti-air operation to in-
corporate the new technology and threat. Overall then, the evidence indi-
cates that an organizational politics model provides more insight into
VPVOS behavior during this period than a more restricted rational actor
model
.
The limitations of the organizational politics model are also clear,
for despite the fact that the VPVOS engaged in advocacy for its interests,
the decision rendered was unfavorable. Thus, we run into the real limits
of the model: the service's power is constrained by that of the General
-146-
Staff and the political leadership- -the service may advocate its positions
but this advocacy may only be undertaken before the decision is made, and
may be severely restricted both before and after the decision stage. In
contrast to services in the U.S. the Soviet services are unable to choose
the forum for debate or to continue strong protests after a decision has
been rendered. The most they can hope for is to maintain the issue on the
agenda* and hope that an opportunity to re-examine the issue arises at a
time more favorable to their interests.
While the VPVOS increased the capability of its forces during the
1960s and branched into PRO and anti-satellite missions, by the end of the
decade its ability to carry out its missions was in doubt. Despite the
large investments in air defense equipment the consensus of most Western
analysts was that the VPVOS could do relatively little to blunt a U.S.
bomber attack and certainly could not save the USSR from destruction.
Furthermore, as discussed in the following chapter, Vietnam and the 1967
Arab- Israeli war had demonstrated even to the Soviets that their air
defenses might not be as strong as they had expected. Given these devel-
opments the loss of the PRO mission must have cast serious doubt on the
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THE 1970S: REDEFINING THE VPVOS
6.1 Introduction
The signing of the ABM treaty was an important turning point for the
VPVOS, as well as for Soviet defense policy as a whole. For the VPVOS as
an organization the ABM treaty presented a number of problems. Prior to
tut treaty the possibility still existed that a workable PRO system would
be developed and deployed to create a complete strategic defense system.
The denial of this possibility left the VPVOS with its air defense (PVO)
and anti-satellite missions but weakened the rationale for these mis-
sions. While the U.S. bomber force remained a formidable opponent and
carried a significant fraction of U.S. total warheads and equivalent
megatonnage (EMT) , the lack of an ability to defend against the other
threats raised the issue of whether a defense against bombers was a
sensible and cost-effective use of resources. Furthermore, the relatively
poor performance of VPVOS equipment and tactics in Vietnam (particularly
during the Christmas bombing of 1972) raised questions about the
feasibility of effective strategic air defense.
In the context of a slowly changing military strategy, renewed em-
phasis on conventional warfare, and with its main mission hampered by the
lack of PRO, the VPVOS and the General Staff re -evaluated the VPVOS '
s
roles and missions. The results of this reappraisal, conducted in the
early 1970s, was a new emphasis on PVO under conditions of conventional
-151-
warfare, and particularly defense of Warsaw Pact lines of communication
(LOCs , e.g. railroads, bridges, transfer points). This reorientation al-
lowed the VPVOS to maintain its primary mission of homeland defense while
committing its forces to a mission in support of the conventional warfare
plans being drafted by the General Staff.
At the same time the VPVOS was trying to absorb the lessons of com-
bat experience in Vietnam and the Middle East in order to further develop
its tactics and operational art for theater warfare in Europe. In as-
similating these lessons, however, the VPVOS revealed a number of organi-
zational preconceptions and biases that hampered its learning behavior.
Overall, the 1970s were a period of adjustment for the VPVOS as the
PRO mission disappeared and as resources were shifted to conventional war-
fare programs and away from the VPVOS. Nevertheless, the VPVOS retained a
large force and sustained a large modernization program.
6.2 VPVOS Reaction to the ABM Treaty
The VPVOS reaction to the signing of the ABM treaty was rather
muted. The only official comment in Vestnik PVO was an editorial by Gen-
eral Lieutenant N. Grishkov, the Deputy Commander for Combat Readiness,
entitled "Strengthen the Might of the PVO." 1 This editorial is an unusual
mix of politics and exhortation to greater efforts at training. Grishkov
first notes that the VPVOS plays an important and growing role in the
defense of the nation, then proceeds to paint a harsh picture of the im-
perialist threat. Brezhnev is cited to the effect that the USSR requires
a reliable defense and increased defense capacity. After pointing out the
1 Grishkov (1972) .
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aggressiveness of the enemy, Grishkov goes on to endorse the May 1972
plenum (at which Brezhnev's foreign policy and the prospective treaties
were discussed) and the agreements reached between the U.S. and USSR.
But the endorsements are rather formalistic, and Grishkov does not even
mention the names of the agreements, let alone their contents. Nowhere is
it mentioned that limitations were placed on PRO deployment or on of-
fensive strategic arms. This omission was not due to security concerns,
for the agreements were published on the front page of Krasnaya zvezda.
When put in the context of the opening of the article, Grishkov' s state-
ment seems almost a pro forma endorsement of the treaty, combined with an
argument that the defenses of the USSR must be retained and strengthened.
From his discussion of politics Grishkov moves to the need for
greater training and higher combat readiness. Here too, he raises some
new and important issues. Grishkov notes that the criteria of combat
readiness have essentially changed and then cites Minister of Defense
Grechko to the effect that: "the Soviet Armed Forces must be able under
all conditions to thwart the surprise attack of an aggressor using either
nuclear or conventional weapons." This explicit comment about the need
to prepare for both conventional and nuclear conflict is unprecedented in
Vestnik PVO and marks an official turning point from a nuclear to a mixed
nuclear and conventional role for the VPVOS
.
The rest of Grishkov' s editorial is devoted to training problems,
emphasizing that the VPVOS must increase its efforts in this field in or-
2 Grishkov (1972; 2-3).
3 The text of the two agreements is given in Krasnaya zvezda May 28, 1972
PP- 1,3.
4 Grishkov (1972; 4).
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der to strengthen the PVO overall. While Grishkov's discussion of the
problems in the training process is quite open and critical, the material
is not very new or significant.
What kind of missions would the VPVOS fulfill in the course of a
conventional war? The answer to this question was given in a two-part
Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal series by Batitskiy on the VPVOS during the
Great Patriotic War. While these articles contain no great surprises
they do stress the role of the VPVOS in LOC defense, particularly during
the first period of the war. Batitskiy points out that the defense of
LOCs and objects in the rear of the fronts was "no less important" a mis-
sion than the defense of administrative-political centers, which seems to
accord this mission a greater priority than other authors. Furthermore,
in his opening definition of the roles and missions of the VPVOS during
the Great Patriotic War, Batitskiy notes that "in cooperation with the
front air forces and troop PVO, [the VPVOS] successfully defended from air
5 Most of the other services appear to have ignored the summit meeting
and the agreements, devoting most of their editorial space to the upcoming
50th anniversary of the (first) Soviet constitution. Perhaps the VPVOS
felt required to respond to the agreement since it directly concerned the
service and its missions. Only in Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal were the
agreements mentioned, in a December editorial by Minister of Defense
Grechko. Grechko endorses the agreements fairly strongly, noting that
they lessened the threat of nuclear war, and limited the arms that are the
most destructive and the most expensive. See Grechko (1972; 12). In com-
parison to the passing mention of the agreements in Vestnik PVO, Grechko 's
endorsement is much stronger and clearer. (This is based on a scanning of
the service journal editorials and quasi-editorials from April 1972 to De-
cember 1972. In particular, Voyenniy vescnik, Aviatsiya i kosmonavtika
,
Morskoy sbornik (issues 5, 8, 11 --the only ones available), and Military
Thought issues 6, 8, 11, 12.)
6 Batitskiy (1972a, b).
7 Compare the treatment of the first period presented in Batitskiy
(1972a) to that of Batitskiy (1967).
8 Batitskiy (1972a; 17), (1972b; 28).
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strike important administrative -political centers, industrial regions,
frontal objectives and communications."' While this definition of roles
and missions is not a great departure from previous statements, it does
place the two missions on equal footing, and the prominence of the state-
ment indicates that it is not an offhand comment. °
Batitskiy finished the year with an article in Vestnik PVO on the
occasion of the 50th anniversary of the creation of the Soviet State. *
The broad topic of this article gave Batitskiy the opportunity to discuss
the international situation, as well as the need to increase combat readi-
ness within the VPVOS . Batitskiy delivered a fairly harsh attack against
the West, stating that the current lessening in tensions does not mean
that the threat of imperialism has been averted. The SALT agreements are
ignored and the image of a tough, aggressive adversary is presented.^-
But despite a general call to strengthen the VPVOS, Batitskiy did not make
any new comments or suggestions as to the roles and missions of the VPVOS.
The most authoritative statement on the changing role of the VPVOS
was published in Vestnik PVO in April 1973 by General Kulikov, the Chief
of the General Staff. Kulikov' s article is extremely unusual: it is the
only instance of a General Staff (or any other Ministry of Defense) offi-
cial writing an editorial in Vestnik PVO in the twenty year period exam-
ined. 3 Kulikov' s editorial thus marks a major departure from the norm,
9 Batitskiy (1972a; 14).
10 For comparison see Yerofeyev (1970; 20), (1971; 93). Note however
that these articles may even reflect the beginning of the new stress on
LOC defense. The Voyenno- istoricheskij zhurnal articles appear to be the
first time Batitskiy explicitly accorded these two missions equal status.
11 Batitskiy (1972c)
.
12 Batitskiy (1972c; 7-8).
13 The only similar occurrence was an editorial by the Politburo member
and General Secretary of the Moscow City Party Committee, Grishin in 1970,
marking the twenty- fifth anniversary of the end of the Great Patriotic
War. Grishin' s article, in contrast to Kulikov' s, barely mentioned the
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and its title, "PVO in the System of Defense of the Soviet State" also in-
dicates a higher- level view of the roles and missions of the VPVOS
.
Kulikov's editorial treads a fine line between praising the arms
control accomplishments of the Brezhnev regime and presenting an imminent
imperialist threat. In so doing he stresses the need for a strong defense
as well as efforts to reduce international tensions. Turning to the
VPVOS, Kulikov defines its role in several ways. First, he notes the need
to protect the national territory: cities, important economic centers,
population centers and groups of forces and the fleet. -" The VPVOS is
charged with executing this mission, and Kulikov notes that it has a
strategic significance. In referring to the VPVOS mission, however,
Kulikov states that the VPVOS is to provide warning of air and rocket
nuclear strikes while repelling the air opponent. ° Thus, the limitations
of the ABM treaty are explicitly recognized and Kulikov also seems to sug-
gest that some protection against missile attack is possible through a
combination of warning of missile attack (and, presumably civil defense)
and interception of bomber attacks.
(continued)
VPVOS and was largely devoted to generalities concerning the Party's sup-
port for the armed forces during the war.
14 Kulikov (1973; 2-3).
15 Kulikov (1973; 4).
16 Kulikov (1973; 4). Note that Garthoff (1984; 313) misinterprets this
statement as a reference to the need for PRO, but his interpretation ap-
pears to be the result of a mistranslation of preduprezhdeniye as "protec-
tion" rather than "warning" which is indicated by the context and other
VPVOS statements along these lines. Furthermore, Kulikov clearly dis-
tinguishes between air and "rocket-nuclear" means of attack. This phras-
ing is important, as in this section of the editorial Kulikov is arguing
that the survivability of the country can be achieved without PRO and sug-
gesting that warning can be used for civil defense purposes.
17 Kulikov (1973; 4). Note that the Soviet Civil Defense Troops were up-
graded to a service-level position (their Chief became a Deputy Minister
of Defense) in October 1972. See Scott and Scott (1984; 262-63). This
suggests an effort to counterbalance the renunciation of active defense
with an increased emphasis on passive defense.
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Kulikov also suggests a broader role for the VPVOS
,
giving greater
weight to the defense of troops and groups of forces. While noting that
the VPVOS is a defensive service, Kulikov states that the VPVOS is neces-
sary to support the other services in their combat operations, particular-
ly supporting their deployment. 8 While not explicitly stating it,
Kulikov thereby emphasizes the theater and LOC defense missions.
Kulikov also hints at the role of the VPVOS in defending the
homeland against conventional air attacks, pointing out that under all
conditions of war, hostilities will rapidly spread to embrace the entire
1 Q
TVD on an enormous scale. 7 Further, all previous wars began with air
strikes to surprise the enemy and disrupt his armed forces and seize the
initiative. By not specifying a nuclear war, and through his comments
on the undetermined character of the war, Kulikov strongly suggests that
in either a nuclear or conventional war the VPVOS must be ready to fend
off surprise attacks throughout the TVD, even including the homeland.
Having defined the role of the VPVOS, Kulikov goes on to issue fair-
ly standard calls for high combat readiness and effective use of
weapons. x Kulikov also calls for the VPVOS to increase its low altitude
capabilities, suggesting that the threat of low altitude penetration was
recognized and the VPVOS was explicitly being tasked to solve the prob-
18 Kulikov (1973; 4)
.
19 The TVD is a theater of military actions, often translated as a
theater of strategic military actions.
20 Kulikov (1973; 4-5).
21 Kulikov (1973; 5-7).
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lem. ^ Similarly, there are calls for more work on radioelectronic c om-
bat, coordination between VPVOS branches, and troop control. * All of
these were (and to some extent remain) problem areas for the VPVOS and
Kulikov's calls to action, closely reflect existing VPVOS concerns and
problems
.
Overall, Kulikov's article endorses a conventional and theater role
for the VPVOS, while at the same time retaining its more traditional role
of defense against strategic nuclear attack. One of its undercurrents is
that the VPVOS occupies an important position in the armed forces struc-
ture, and can be expected to retain such a position. To some extent the
Kulikov editorial is a reassurance that the VPVOS would remain an impor-
tant component of the Soviet Armed Forces.
Further confirmation and elaboration of the new roles and missions
of the VPVOS came later in 1973 in a two-part Military Thought series by
Batitskiy
.
The first article surveys air defense in World War II in a manner
very similar, and at times almost identical, to that of Biryuzov, while
the discussion of the Great Patriotic War is similar to Batitskiy' s pre-
vious Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal articles. Batitskiy refers to
defense of LOCs as the second most important task of the VPVOS, noting
that VPVOS forces defended LOCs to a depth of 300-500 km from the front. 25
22 Kulikov (1973; 7).
23 Kulikov (1973; 7-8).
24 Since Military Thought is not available in Russian it is difficult to
determine whether some passages are in fact identical. See, for example,
Batitskiy (1973; 41-42)
.
25 Batitskiy (1973a; 47). Note that here Batitskiy seems to be relegat-
ing LOC defense to a second place status, if the translation is accurate.
Nevertheless, this mission is still accorded high priority.
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In the second article Batitskiy raises interesting questions con-
cerning both strategic and tactical air defense. Batitskiy claims that
U.S. "doctrine" calls for the use of offensive air capability in a nuclear
world war, limited nuclear war, or conventional war. U.S. forces are also
claimed to be such that they could be used against the USSR without
mobilization. In a conventional war Batitskiy claims the main U.S. attack
force would be tactical and naval aircraft, along with tactical missiles.
He then goes on to claim that "Missile-armed strategic bombers can in this
case be employed to attack deep targets."* Aircraft would be used on a
mass basis, concentrated to create maximum density in the target area,
just as in World War II and Vietnam. Batitskiy then reinvokes his concept
of aerospace defense, suggesting that these offensive forces will be used
throughout the depth of the battlefield and rear areas. ' Thus, Batitskiy
presents a clear and immediate threat of conventional strategic bombing
during a conventional war.
To bolster his claims for the importance of air defense, Batitskiy
appeals to "foreign military leaders" who purportedly claim that air
defense during war may tip the balance in favor of the nation with ade-
quate protection. While Batitskiy demurs and suggests that such views
are too extreme, it is clear that he is endorsing them and arguing strong-
ly for the importance of air defenses. This, he points out is
Oft
demonstrated by the cases of Korea, the Middle East, and Vietnam.
26 Batitskiy (1973b; 32,43).
27 Batitskiy (1973b; 32).
28 Statements by unnamed "foreign military leaders" are a standard Soviet
method of putting forward ideas too extreme or controversial to be stated
outright. In this case Batitskiy might have found it difficult to find
real foreign leaders who would support this statement.
29 Batitskiy (1973b; 33)
.
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Batitskiy claims that Vietnamese PVO destroyed over 4200 U.S. air-
craft over North Vietnam and in the Linebacker II operation destroyed over
80. ° As discussed later, these figures are inflated by a factor of two
to three. Batitskiy further claims that the Vietnamese PVO system was
highly effective, although he stops short of claiming that the PVO forced
11
the U.S. to break off the bombing. * In an indication of the significance
of Vietnam and Egyptian PVO, Batitskiy observes that they allowed the ob-
jective determination of the capabilities of the PVO and test the COrreCt-
ness of the organization and conduct of the PVO. c The fact that the ef-
fectiveness of the Vietnamese PVO system was less than 22 (or 62 by the
more optimistic Vietnamese numbers) , is not addressed by Batitskiy nor is
the relevance of this effectiveness to the operational employment of the
VPVOS examined.
After alluding to the effectiveness of the Vietnamese PVO forces
,
Batitskiy goes on to discuss the impact of nuclear weapons on modern PVO.
Batitskiy points out that the problem of small numbers of penetrators is
now serious, because of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons, and states
that if in the past a 101 attrition rate was sufficient, it is no
longer. Having raised the question of effectiveness, Batitskiy indi-
cates the importance of high combat readiness, training, swiftness of ac-
tion, survivability and stability of the PVO, and organizational struc-










fectiveness , but no indication is given of how to integrate them into an
assessment of effectiveness.
The U.S. threat is also portrayed as highly reactive, and Batitskiy
notes low altitude penetration and the development of cruise missiles as
serious problems for the air defense. Even though new systems such as
airborne radar are becoming available, the problem remains a difficult
one. 35
Thus Batitskiy clearly defines a need for extremely high effective-
ness in order to thwart a nuclear armed attack, but the very examples he
cites seem to demonstrate the impossibility of such an accomplishment.
The measures Batitskiy does suggest are nothing more than the same routine
exhortations that are recycled annually in the VPVOS literature.
Even though his article was written well after the ABM treaty,
Batitskiy reaffirms his earlier claim that air defense troops will become
aerospace defense troops. Having noted this, he discusses some trends in
ICBM development, most notably the deployment of MIRVs . At the end of the
discussion, Batitskiy observes that the ABM Treaty limits ABM forces to
the capital, and that future development will only be qualitative. °
Batitskiy' s mention of the ABM treaty is almost offhand, and suggests that
he was not enthusiastic about it. Indeed, the ABM treaty almost con-
tradicts Batitskiy' s assertion that air defense troops will become
aerospace defense troops, and limiting the possibility for the development
of the aerospace defense operation.
34 Batitskiy (1973b; 35-36, 45-6).
35 Batitskiy (1973b; 37-8). For a discussion of Soviet assessments of
airborne early warning (AEW) see Lepingwell (1986; 49-64).
36 Batitskiy (1973b; 42-43).
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Overall, this article appears to be an argument for continued strong
support for the VPVOS even in light of Soviet doctrinal changes and the
ABM treaty. The aerospace defense theme is more muted than in earlier
works, and there is a great deal more attention to defense against conven-
tionally armed aircraft. The article further suggests a strong interest
in defending strategic (homeland) targets against conventionally armed
strategic bombers and in LOC defense, especially in a conventional en-
vironment.
This new interest in the defense of LOCs is reflected in an article
by Svetlishin in Military Thought, the last article on the VPVOS in the
unclassified collection. Statistics are presented to demonstrate that the
majority of actions by the VPVOS were taken against aircraft in frontal
areas. ' Svetlishin thus establishes that strategic bombing was not a
large threat, clearly implying that defense of targets in the frontal
areas was particularly important for the VPVOS. In terms of manpower,
Svetlishin states that no less than half of the VPVOS forces defended LOCs
and other field installations, while if VPVOS forces in centers close to
the front are counted, the proportion increases to 75-881.° These
statistics are different in emphasis from those usually presented, and
tend to emphasize the importance of the VPVOS in the defense of the fron-
tal rear. 39
The articles cited above indicate that by the end of 1973 the VPVOS






45), Zimin (1965; 105), Svetlishin (1965; 24-25).
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its roles and missions. In the years following this period particular at-
tention was paid to maneuver of forces from the rear, PVO support for of-
fensive operations, and interaction between VPVOS branches and other ser-
vices. This is not to say that the mission of defending important
administrative -political sites within the country was abandoned. Homeland
defense retained its primary importance, as reflected in both deployments,
weapons and writings, but it was supplemented by the new mission of LOC
and frontal defense.
Where the impetus for change came from, the General Staff or the
VPVOS? Two simple alternative are possible: 1) the General Staff imposed
the new mission on the VPVOS as a result of its study of the VPVOS in the
post-ABM era, or 2) the VPVOS seized on the LOC defense mission as a
justification for its continued existence. In appears that the decision
to add the LOC mission was a mixture of he two. As has already been
pointed out, during this period an overall reevaluation of Soviet strategy
and forces was being conducted as the prospect of a conventional phase in
a war became more likely. Under such circumstances both the VPVOS Main
Staff and the General Staff must have conducted studies on the use of
VPVOS forces for conventional missions. While the VPVOS may have
preferred to stick to its original mission- -homeland defense, in the post-
ABM treaty era a new use for its forces must have seemed a military and
political necessity. Similarly, the General Staff in evaluating the prob-
lems likely to be encountered in a rapid conventional offensive would have
required strong LOC defense to counter NATO interdiction efforts. Since
the LOC defense mission had a long tradition in the VPVOS, and could be
combined with a homeland defense against both conventional and nuclear at-
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tacks, this mission may have been the optimal solution for both the Gener-
al Staff and the VPVOS . In this case there do not appear to have been any
conflicting interests.
Thus the mission profile of the VPVOS may have been arrived at
through a consensus process. The VPVOS would retain forces for homeland
defense against both conventional and nuclear forces, and it would also be
assigned a LOC defense mission in the European theater. The continuation
of the VPVOS and its forces in the post-ABM period is therefore not com-
pletely due to bureaucratic inertia: the roles and missions of the service
shifted so that it maintained some relevance to the overall strategy for-
mulated by the General Staff.
6.3 Operational Art in the Post-ABM Treaty Era
Several factors contributed to the need to reassess VPVOS opera-
tional art: the lessons of "local wars" (Vietnam, the 1967 Arab-Israeli
war, the Canal War and the 1973 Arab-Israeli war), the shift to a more
conventionally oriented strategy, and new developments in the U.S. threat.
In this section all of these factors and their impact on VPVOS operational
art will be examined. The VPVOS 's reaction appears to be well represented
by the organizational politics model, which provides significant insights
into VPVOS learning behavior and the process of development of operational
art.
6.3.1 Learning from Local Wars: Vietnam
While the first lessons of Vietnam began to be learned in the mid-
1960s during the U.S. bombing of North Vietnam, VPVOS response to these
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developments appears to have been rather slow, and detailed discussions of
Vietnam only begin to appear in Vestnik PVO in the 1970s. Hence, there is
reason to believe that most of the lessons of Vietnam were only assimi-
lated and acted upon during the 1970s. Of the lessons of Vietnam the most
important pertains to the SAMs . This was their first use in combat, and
the results appear to have come as a surprise to the VFVOS
.
How well did Soviet SAMs perform in Vietnam? Here we run into the
problem of assessing military effectiveness, not an easy task even when
dealing with historical events. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile examining
this case in order to understand both the "objective facts" and their in-
terpretation by the VPVOS
.
The data pertaining to SAM performance in the Vietnam war is pre-
sented in Appendix A. While SAMs did present a serious obstacle to U.S.
tactical aircraft they did not produce attrition rates significantly
greater than those in World War II (1-2Z), even if one accepts the greatly
inflated North Vietnam figures. Indeed, AAA forces in Vietnam scored
more kills than the SAM forces. This result appears to have come as a
surprise to the VPVOS, which was expecting significantly higher kill rates
from the SAMs. 41
One exception to the silence on Vietnam during the war years is an
article published in early 1967 by Colonel A.S. Orlov. 2 Orlov examines
40 For a tactical air defense where multiple sorties must be made through
the air defense (and hence the effectiveness is compounded) the difference
between say 21 and 6X is very significant. But for strategic defenses
where only one sortie will be made the difference is quite small.
41 See Chapter 4.
42 Orlov (1967). Colonel Orlov has written on a number of historical is-
sues, particularly the use of the V-l cruise missile in World War II, and
his articles often have direct relevance to contemporary issues.
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U.S. means of penetrating and suppressing the North Vietnamese (DRV--
Democratic Republic of Vietnam) PVO system, as well as giving western
estimates on probability of survival of both tactical and strategic air-
craft.
Orlov notes that the high effectiveness of PVO systems has forced
the U.S. to use very low altitude penetration. Citing a Western magazine,
Orlov claims that U.S. tests have shown that the probability of survival
of an aircraft at altitudes of 200-300 m is "not over 0.25-0.5" while
flight at altitudes less than 50 m raises the effectiveness of AAA and the
danger of hitting the ground, thus keeping the overall probability of sur-
vival at less than 0.5. Thus, the optimum penetration altitude is between
50 and 90 m altitude giving a probability of survival of greater than
0.75. 3 Orlov thus provides real estimates of PVO effectiveness clearly
indicating that in many altitude regimes the PVO is extremely effective.
The implication is that the low altitude attack is the main problem to be
solved.
Orlov' s article includes a fairly detailed discussion of U.S. pene-
tration tactics in North Vietnam, including defense suppression missions.
His conclusion is that the Vietnamese PVO system was causing heavy losses
of U.S. aircraft- -up to 100 aircraft per month. Furthermore, Orlov claims
a 501 effectiveness for air defenses against strategic bombers immediately
after giving figures that indicate a 4X effectiveness in Vietnam, with no
indication or explanation of why the strategic air defense should be over
ten times more effective. Orlov' s attrition rate figures also appear to
43 Orlov (1967; 125).
44 Orlov (1967; 125).
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be inflated by almost an order of magnitude over those later admitted by
the U.S.^ The discrepancy between PVO performance in Vietnam and the re-
quirements for VPVOS defense against a massive strategic nuclear attack
was clear, even if explicit conclusions were not drawn from it. Indeed,
Orlov's comment about strategic defenses seems to be a deliberate infla-
tion of effectiveness in reaction to the generally poor showing of the
SAMs in Vietnam, to counter possible arguments that Soviet air defenses
would not be very effective.
The performance of the Vietnamese PVO was discussed in a con-
temporaneous article in Military Thought. Written not by a PVO officer,
but by Col. Nikinorov, a specialist on the Vietnam War, the article in-
directly raises some important questions concerning PVO effectiveness.
Nikinorov notes that the introduction of SAMs forced a change in U.S. tac-
tics to low altitude attacks in small groups, while at medium and high
altitudes the U.S. suffered "significant losses" from SAMs. ° The Viet-
namese PVO system is portrayed as fairly effective. ' But Nikinorov also
cites statistics on the air war, claiming that U.S. figures indicate a
loss of 3.2 aircraft per 1000 sorties (.321 attrition rate), although he
claims that this statistic includes South Vietnam operations and must be
doubled or tripled to get the true effectiveness of the Vietnamese
45 Orlov seems to underestimate the total number of U.S. sorties per
month, and overestimates the number of aircraft lost, giving a high attri-
tion rate.
46 Nikinorov (1967; 75).
47 Nikinorov (1967; 76) even quotes a U.S. aircraft carrier commander to
the effect that a SAM could destroy a U.S. Skyraider aircraft in 4 seconds
if the SAM wasn't detected. Nikinorov fails to point out that the
Skyraider was an old turboprop aircraft primarily used in South Vietnam
and search and rescue in North Vietnam.
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defenses. ^° This "fudge factor" raises the effectiveness to approximately
10 aircraft lost per 1000, but as Nikinorov points out in World War II the
U.S. suffered 9 and in Korea 3.5 losses for every thousand sorties. *
Thus, U.S. losses in North Vietnam were not significantly higher than
those in previous wars, a point that Nikinorov clearly indicates by his
presentation of the data. Again, however, explicit conclusions concerning
the effectiveness of strategic PVO systems are not drawn from this data.
During the first phase of the air war there appears to have been
some doubt concerning the effectiveness of SAMs in general and possibly
also the overall VPVOS system. These doubts are most clearly revealed in
the Nikinorov article. Indeed, Orlov's assertion of 50X effectiveness for
strategic air defenses also suggests that the VPVOS recognized that the
performance achieved in Vietnam fell far short of what would be necessary
for strategic defenses. The neglect of the Vietnam war in the pages of
Vescnik protivovozdushnoy oborony
,
particularly the "In Foreign Armies"
section, suggests that the VPVOS was not interested in examining the les-
sons of the war in public. ° This could be both to avoid admitting the
weaknesses of the Vietnamese defenses, and to avoid hinting at possible
Soviet countermeasures to the new U.S. tactics.
48 Nikinorov (1967; 77). In a subsequent passage Nikinorov suggests that
losses in North Vietnam were up to 5 times higher than in South Vietnam,
which appears to be a reasonable estimate. Even with this increased fudge
factor the attrition rate is only 501 higher than in World War II. How-
ever this estimate is not borne out by the later U.S. statistics.
49 Nikinorov (1967; 77).
50 The articles that did appear tended to fall into one of three categor-
ies: stories of the heroic defenders of North Vietnam (Ivanov (1968)),
diatribes against the barbaric air war of the U.S. (Ignat'yev (1971)), and
some narrowly focused technical articles on equipment like remotely
piloted vehicles (RPVs--see Plyachenko (1971)).
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After the Vietnam war there is a sudden increase in interest in the
lessons of Vietnam. Analyses of the Vietnam experience pointed out four
critical areas: low altitude penetration, the widespread use of electronic
countermeasures (ECM) , defense suppression, and the appearance of what
might be called "virtual attrition." 51 These issues are stressed differ-
ently by different authors, but all acknowledge their importance.
The most detailed and interesting of the articles on Vietnam was
published in Vestnik protivovozdushnoy oborony by Major Ye. Dzhugashvili,
under the title "Combat with Low Altitude Targets." This article is in-
triguing for its direct and critical opening:
Many foreign specialists in their time considered that with
the creation of surface-to-air missiles [SAMs] the problem of com-
bat with means of air attack would be successfully resolved.
Certain of them even foretold the "death" of the aircraft as a
combat arm because of the inescapability of its destruction by
SAMs. However they were convinced of the mistakenness of this
opinion when in the summer of 1959 a strategic bomber of the Amer-
ican air force transited all of North America from east to west at
an altitude of 150 m without being observed by even one radar sta-
tion of the air defense [PVO].
The given experiment convincingly showed that prognoses of
the "death" of the aircraft were before their time. Apart from
that, it revealed serious deficiencies of the air defense [PVO]--
the inability to conduct effective combat with low flying
targets. 2
This opening statement raises a number of questions. First, if the
experiment was conducted in 1959, why was it "news" in 1972? Second, have
the deficiencies in PVO coverage at low altitudes been corrected? Third,
who are the "foreign specialists" and might this not be a not very veiled
reference to Soviet experts, and even Khrushchev? All of these questions,
51 Virtual attrition is the reduction in the effectiveness of the attack-
ing force due to the need to assign forces to support and suppression
measures because of the air defense.
52 Dzhugashvili (1972; 84).
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as well as the extensive discussion of the Vietnam experience, point
towards the article having important implications for the modern VPVOS
.
Thus, the attack on "foreign specialists" is an example of the common
Soviet tactic of using foreigners as surrogates in arguments concerning
internal Soviet matters. The reference to Khrushchev is also fairly
clear, as he was the primary advocate of the dominance of the missile. It
is also clearly implied that the advent of SAMs was expected to greatly
raise the effectiveness of the PVO. Finally, the problem of low altitude
coverage was a real and pressing one for the Soviets at this time. The
SA-2 had been found wanting in combat, and while the SA-3 low altitude
missile had been deployed its capabilities may have regarded with some
skepticism.
Dzhugashvili notes the use of very low altitude attacks by both the
U.S. in Vietnam and the Israelis in the 1967 war, and observes that at low
altitudes and high speed the effectiveness of SAMs is reduced to between
CO
15-20X. J But as we have seen, this estimate is still ten times greater
than that achieved in the Vietnam war against aircraft operating at medium
altitudes and lower speeds. Despite Dzhugashvili' s critical comments
about overestimating the effectiveness of SAMs, he seems to be engaging in
53 Dzhugashvili (1972; 84). Note that high speed is described as above
Mach 1. Most aircraft, both then and now, are not designed to exceed Mach
1 at low levels for any great length of time. Even if they do so, the
consumption of fuel increases greatly limiting their radius of action.
Thus, Dzhugashvili is describing a worse- than-expected threat. There is
also some uncertainty as to how extensively low altitude penetration was
used by U.S. aircraft, for most attacks in North Vietnam were conducted at
moderate altitude in order to avoid the AAA fire, even though this in-
creased vulnerability to SAMs. Special defense suppression missions may
have made wider use of very low altitude penetration. See Momyer (1978;
136) for a discussion of optimum operating altitudes.
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1. 54the same game.
While low altitude penetration reduces SAM effectiveness, it also
reduces the effectiveness of the attacking aircraft. Dzhugashvili points
out that low altitude attacks cause problems of navigation, make maneuver-
ing very difficult, increase vulnerability to AAA fire, and reduce bomb
loads to 30-402 of maximum capacity in order for the aircraft to engage in
anti-SAM maneuvers. Overall, the capabilities of the attacking aircraft
are estimated to be decreased by 40-502 over what they would be flying
against an undefended target. 5 On top of this, there is the need to send
in support and escort flights to protect against SAM and MiG threats, as
well as special defense suppression missions. Dzhugashvili claims that
the actual strike group comprised only about 102 of the total flight at-
tacking the target. 6 Thus, there is very significant virtual attrition
caused by the PVO system, decreasing the number of attacking aircraft by
902 and reducing their effectiveness by a further 502, reducing the effec-
tiveness to about 52 of what it would be in the absence of defenses. In
tactical use, then, PVO systems appear to exact a very high price from the
attacker in terms of lost capability and effectiveness. This price is
much higher than that exacted in terms of enemy aircraft lost.
Even though Dzhugashvili stresses the virtual attrition aspect of
PVO, his numbers are too optimistic. In particular, the 102 number for
the actual strike force is much too low. U.S. authors, and even other
54 He may be referring to SAMs designed for low altitude interception,
rather than a SA-2 type, but even here the results seem optimistic at
best.
55 Dzhugashvili (1972; 85).
56 Dzhugashvili (1972; 85). The strike group is the force actually car-
rying bombs to drop on the target.
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Soviet authors note that the strike group comprised approximately 40-50X
of each attack force. Even counting all the separate defense suppres-
sion missions the total is unlikely to be reduced to 101 of all sorties.
Furthermore, the number for the effectiveness of SAMs again appears to be
inflated, particularly as it is presented as a degraded effectiveness.
While criticizing those who presented the SAM as a wonder weapon,
Dzhugashvili still presents overly optimistic assessments of effective-
ness, suggesting a willful misinterpretation of the available data.
The description of the problems of combating low altitude targets is
followed by a discussion of new foreign SAM systems designed to combat the
threat. The advantages of short range, fast reaction time, highly mobile
SAMs are noted and radar warning aircraft are presented as the means of
co
gaining good long-range radar coverage at low altitudes. Despite the
seriousness of the threat, then, it can be countered by new technologies
and systems.
In sum, Dzhugashvili 's article presents a mixed message: previous
estimates of SAM (and PVO) effectiveness were too optimistic but the de-
velopment of new technologies will plug the gaps and raise the effective-
ness. Even though PVO effectiveness was lower than expected, it still
greatly reduced the effectiveness of the attacking aircraft. Here the
argument is one that later fine.-, great currency in the VPVOS , that the
57 See the diagram in Momyer (1978; 128) and the discussion on pages 222'
226. For a Soviet source citing this number see Shelekhov (1974; 50).
58 Dzhugashvili (1972; 85-86). The use of "mines" placed along possible
attack routes fused to detonate when an aircraft flies overhead is also
mentioned as one way to destroy very low altitude aircraft. This rather
odd approach also appears in several articles in the late- 1970s- -early
1980s concerning the cruise missile threat, but this appears to be the
first reference.
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number of aircraft destroyed (attrition) is a less important indicator
than the damage prevented to the target. Repelling or reducing the ac-
curacy of an attack can thus be considered a success even if all the air-
craft are not destroyed. This theme becomes all the more important as the
VPVOS became more concerned with defense against conventionally armed air-
craft in the 1970s.
After the Dzhugashvili article a number of articles appeared in
Vestnik protivovozdushnoy oborony examining U.S. tactics in Vietnam and
Israeli tactics in the various Arab- Israeli wars. 7 While these articles
stressed various aspects of the war, they tended to follow the conclusions
of the Dzhugashvili article and appear intended to inform VPVOS officers
about enemy tactics and equipment. One article stands out because of its
length, detail, and the prominence of the author.
In 1977 General Lieutenant A. Khyupenen, then Deputy Commander of
the SAM Troops (and later the Commander) wrote a lengthy article on the
performance of the Vietnamese PVO. While this article presents a detailed
review of U.S. tactics, it is the portrayal of PVO effectiveness that is
of most interest.
Generally, Khyupenen presents the Vietnamese PVO as highly effec-
tive, destroying over 3250 aircraft by the end of 1968, and over 4000 by
the end of 1973. These numbers are inflated by a factor of 2 to 3 and
were probably supplied by Vietnamese sources. 1 Khyupenen emphasizes the
59 See Deryabin and Boychenko (1973), Shelekhov (1974), Neupokoyev
(1974), Khyupenen (1977).
60 Khyupenen (1977; 85).
61 The comparable U.S. figure is 922 aircraft lost to hostile action from
1961-1968. The number lost by the end of 1973 is not readily available.
The only major post- 1968 operation against North Vietnam was undertaken in
December 1972 (Linebacker 2), in which approximately 18 aircraft were
destroyed (Momyer (1978; 123). Overall U.S. losses due to hostile action
were probably below 1400, although operational losses may increase this
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performance of SAMs , claiming that they raised PVO effectiveness sig-
nificantly and destroyed a total of over 1000 aircraft, an overestimate by
a factor of 1
.
No specific data is presented on MiG kills, but
Khyupenen makes the claim that one unit scored over 100 kills against
U.S. aircraft. 63
These figures are supplemented by the claim that PVO effectiveness
did not decline even though the U.S. developed more effective ECM and
defense suppression techniques. Khyupenen argues that the more effective
deployment of forces and the improvement in tactics and knowledge of the
enemy allowed the Vietnamese PVO to sustain high attrition rates through-
out the combat and that U.S. losses increased over time. It is implied
that the November 1968 cessation of bombing was due to the high effective-
ness of the PVO. In an even more interesting interpretation of history,
Khyupenen argues that the Vietnamese PVO caused the breakoff of the 1972
bombing of Hanoi (Linebacker 2) and forced U.S. acceptance of the Paris
peace accords.
Khyupenen' s article presents a detailed, interesting, but very
biased picture of the air war in Vietnam. The success of the Vietnamese
PVO is inflated, while the effectiveness of SAMs is clearly overstated.
This article therefore presents a misleading interpretation of the war
(continued)
number to 2000 or more.
62 Khyupenen (1977; 85), for U.S. estimates of SAM kills see Table A.l in
Appendix A.
63 Khyupenen (1977; 85).
64 Khyupenen (1977; 84-85). Many Western sources argue the opposite-
-
that the bombing forced North Vietnam to accept the accords. For this
counter-view see Momyer (1978; 236-243).
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that is intended to bolster the VPVOS's accomplishments, and particularly
those of the SAM Troops. To what extent these figures were actually
believed and acted upon by the VPVOS or General Staff leadership is un-
clear. It is likely, however, that the broad outlines of Khyupenen's ar-
ticle were accepted by the VPVOS: U.S. losses were significant and in-
creased over time , and SAMs did score a fairly high proportion of the
kills.
One important lesson emerges clearly from the Vietnam war: PVO sys-
tems were not, and could not be, impenetrable. While losses sustained by
the U.S. were significant they were not near the level originally expected
by the VPVOS. Although SAMs proved quite effective against tactical air-
craft making repeated attacks against the same targets their overall per-
formance fell far below that needed to provide an effective defense
against strategic bombers in a nuclear war. As noted in the previous
chapter, the discovery that SAM effectiveness had been greatly over-
estimated may have had a serious impact on the credibility of the VPVOS's
estimates of PRO performance.
The VPVOS had the opportunity to learn a number of operational and
tactical lessons from the Vietnam war. Some of these lessons appear to
have been readily understood and acted upon but others were misinterpreted
or ignored, resulting in inaction or delayed action. The organizational
politics model suggests that those lessons most compatible with the exist-
ing organizational views and structure will be those most readily assimi-
lated, while those presenting the most significant discrepancies may be
reinterpreted or brushed aside.
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What were the lessons of Vietnam? First, SAM effectiveness was much
lower than expected, even at medium altitudes. Second, low altitude pene-
tration of the PVO system presented a serious problem. ^ Third, the rapid
development and introduction of U.S. ECM and defense suppression measures
further reduced the effectiveness of PVO forces (or at least did not allow
PVO effectiveness to be greatly increased). Fourth, close in air combat
between fighters, called dogfighting, was not obsolete, despite the impor-
tance of ground-controlled intercepts and air-to-air guided missiles.
Fifth, a determined attacker could successfully penetrate very dense air
defenses, and do so repeatedly.
In addition to these rather disappointing lessons, there were some
more heartening confirmations of Soviet tactics and operational art.
First, the creation of a dense radar net around Hanoi allowed good ground-
controlled intercepts and redundant radars for hand-offs to SAM sites. °
Second, the maneuver, massing, and concentration of forces around certain
targets allowed the most effective use of existing forces, confirming a
basic tenet of PVO operational art. Third, ambush techniques proved ef-
fective, as they had during the Great Patriotic War. Fourth, some experi-
ence was gained in coordinating SAM and IA under real combat conditions.
How did the Soviets react to these lessons? To the bad news the
reactions were relatively mild. On the first point, as we have seen,
65 The SA-2 was clearly limited in dealing with these threats and the
Vietnamese were not provided with the SA-3 low altitude missile until late
in the war. (Isby (1981; 254)). Even had the SA-3 been provided it is un-
likely that it would have raised overall effectiveness significantly as it
performed poorly in the 1970 canal air combat and in the 1973 war. Fur-
thermore, the dense network of AAA fire was probably about as effective as
the SA-3 would have been.
66 Momyer (1978; 118-9).
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VPVOS estimates of SAM effectiveness seem to have remained unreasonably
optimistic. The low altitude penetration problem was noted, but there do
not appear to have been any major changes in weapons or tactics to com-
pensate for this weakness. The SA-3 had already been deployed in the
USSR, as had the Tu-126 Moss early warning aircraft, but neither of these
systems was adequate to deal with the U.S. threat. In 1975 4-rail launch-
ers for the SA-3 began to be deployed, increasing the number of missiles
available and allowing more to be fired at one time. But the SA-3 was a
fairly old missile and had performed relatively poorly in combat and this
quantitative increase was unlikely to offset its qualitative deficiencies.
The SA-6 low altitude missile that performed respectably in the 1973 Arab-
Israeli war was never deployed by the VPVOS, despite its good character-
istics and high mobility. It is possible that this was in part due to the
"not invented here" syndrome- -the SA-6 had been designed to PVO SV speci-
fications and not for the VPVOS. But in addition to this the VPVOS had
already invested substantially in the SA-3 program and in a period of
budget stringency the increase in SA-3 rails would have appeared the
cheapest means of increasing SAM firepower.
In the area of IA performance, the VPVOS noted the superior handling
and performance characteristics of the Soviet fighters supplied to Vietnam
and then proceeded (or continued) to deploy a new generation of fighters
that lacked most of these characteristics. Even though VPVOS authors
pointed out that air-to-air missiles had not made maneuvering air combat
obsolete, there does not appear to have been a shift in tactics or train-
ing of IA pilots until after some more direct lessons in the Mid-East.
67 For example, the MiG-23, MiG-25, and Su-15. See Panyelev (1977a, b,c).
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The introduction of extensive ECM and defense suppression by the
U.S. does appear to have caught the VPVOS ' s attention. The extent of the
reaction to it is difficult to judge, as the ECM-ECCM game can only be
evaluated in real combat. However, VPVOS authors did devote a significant
amount of space to the use of ECM, as well as defense suppression and
decoy maneuvers. 00 This is in keeping with a VPVOS campaign to "know the
enemy's tactics" and to prepare their forces to meet the "probable op-
ponent." The result of this campaign is unclear, and any technical im-
provements to increase jam-resistance have not been revealed. Tactical
training stresses tracking and destruction of targets under jamming condi-
tions, but the realism and extent of this training cannot be adequately
judged from the literature. The relatively low level of training
simulators available and the incentive structure for training (simpler is
better) all suggest that Soviet forces may not be well prepared to counter
a sophisticated ECM threat. Overall, there is no evidence of a massive
program of ECCM training.
The VPVOS appears not to have come to grips with the problem of
defeating or repelling or defeating a determined enemy. Discussions of
"impenetrable" defenses appear less often but the fiction of always
destroying the target with the first missile is maintained. The rare
estimates of effectiveness still suggest confidence in disrupting a con-
ventional attack, but their effectiveness against a nuclear attack could
not have been considered satisfactory.
68 Discussions of ECM may be found in, amongst others, Orlov (1967),
Plyachenko (1969), Shelekhov (1974), Paliy (1975), Ignat'yev (1976),
Klimovich (1980), and Chemukhin (1981).
69 Batitskiy (1972c), Gromov (1976), Mil'chenko (1971).
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On the positive side, the Soviets received confirmation of some of
the main tenets of operational art and tactics. Maneuver, concentration,
and use of mobile forces to ambush enemy aircraft were all contributors to
the effective use of PVO forces. u However, some of the good news went
relatively unnoticed. While VPVOS commentators noted that at low
altitudes aircraft were forced into the range of AAA fire, there was
little elaboration on this problem, nor was the question of AAA deployment
and effectiveness examined in a separate article. This neglect of AAA
forces may have been largely due to the fact that by the late 1960s --early
1970s the VPVOS had no AAA forces, the responsibility for such arms lying
with the PVO SV. Despite this, the Vietnam war, the 1970 canal war, and
the 1973 Arab- Israeli war all demonstrated that a combined AAA/SAM defense
provided the highest effectiveness and created a coordinated fire network
that provided mutual support for the AAA and SAMs. * Whether such an in-
tegration of AAA and SAM systems at the strategic PVO level was considered
is unclear. Certainly, given the low effectiveness of the SAMs an AAA ad-
junct might possibly have a noticeable effect, particularly for point
defense of very small targets where high density can be achieved. They
could not, of course, be expected to greatly increase effectiveness
against a strategic bombing offensive.
The success of thick radar coverage and ground control of inter-
ceptors was noted by the U.S. as well as the Soviets. 2 The redundancy of
the radars combined with their relatively high power may have limited the
70 Nordeen (1985; 13, 22).
71 See, for example, the description in Herzog (1984; 307-308).
72 Indeed, one Soviet source cites Broughton (1969) on the effectiveness
of Vietnamese ground- controlled intercepts, see Khyupenen (1977; 81).
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effectiveness of U.S. ECM capabilities. In this case the Soviet tendency
to hang on to old equipment, and to overdesign new equipment (in terms of
output power) may have proven advantageous. In short, in the deployment
of multiple radars and extensive AAA forces the Vietnamese and their
Soviet backers were following a conservative, incrementalist policy that
seems to have worked better than a less incremental policy might have
(e.g. SAM-based defenses with fewer but more sophisticated radars).
Overall, the Vietnam episode suggests that organizational considera-
tions and structure did contribute to an overestimation of PVO effective
ness, and that while the VPVOS did learn some significant lessons from
Vietnam several others were neglected. Most of the lessons of Vietnam
were obvious by the end of 1968, when the U.S. bombing of Vietnam was
halted, but they were not acted upon until the experience of later local
wars (particularly the 1973 war) amplified and confirmed the lessons.
Thus, a lag of several (3-5) years took place in VPVOS learning, and some
of the lessons of these local wars were not taken to heart until the early
1980s, if even then.
6.3.2 The Arab-Israeli Wars
The VPVOS gave a great deal of attention to the Arab- Israeli wars
but as with the Vietnam war, their interpretations are biased by their
preconceptions and preoccupations. The 1970 "Canal War" and the 1973
Arab- Israeli war were of particular importance to the VPVOS, because the
combat was much closer to that of a general European war, and the VPVOS
was closely and directly connected to the conflict.
73 The 1967 war is not viewed by the VPVOS as a test of air defense sys-
tems or technologies. Rather, it is used as an example of what happens if
the PVO's combat readiness is low and the enemy achieves tactical and op-
erational surprise. See, for example, Shesterin (1977; 77).
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After the Israelis commenced extensive air raids along the Suez in
July 1969, and deep raids in January 1970, the Egyptians turned to the
USSR for assistance in developing an effective PVO system. * Marshal
Batitskiy is reported to have visited Egypt in December 1969 to investi-
gate the (generally poor) performance of PVO systems, and again in July
1970 after Soviet pilots were shot down in a dogfight with Israeli air-
craft. ^ As a further indicator of the seriousness with which the Soviets
viewed the Egyptian PVO system, V.V. Okunev, previously the Commander of
the Moscow PVO District, was dispatched to Egypt to oversee the work. °
This high-level attention to the problem suggests that the VPVOS may have
regarded this not only as an important state mission, but also as an op-
portunity to prove the effectiveness of PVO systems and the competence of
their personnel. At the very least it would provide good data on the per-
formance of their systems in combat.
By April 1970 Soviet pilots had started flying operational missions
over Egypt, and by the end of June a thick PVO system had been established
some distance back from the Suez Canal. ' While the 1970 conflict
demonstrated that Soviet PVO systems could be fairly effective, they were
not effective enough to cause the Israelis to break off their attacks.
74 Herzog (1984; 210-214), Schiff (1985; 157-159).
75 Herzog (1984; 214, 218) The Commander in Chief of the Soviet Air
Forces (WS) also visited on the later occasion. It is not clear from
which service these pilots were drawn. Given that the MiG-21 was not in
general VPVOS service at the time the pilots were probably from the Soviet
Air Force acting under the overall control of the Soviet air defense rep-
resentative on the scene- -most likely Okunev. .
76 Erickson (1971; 99).
77 Herzog (1984; 216-7).
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Furthermore, Soviet pilots were proven inferior in their flying skill and
combat ability in contrast to the experienced Israeli pilots.
During the 1973 war the Egyptians deployed a very dense PVO system
that was able to cover the airspace over the Suez Canal and some distance
into the Sinai using SA-2, SA-3, SA-6 SAMs and the ZSU-23-4 mobile anti-
79
aircraft gun. 7 This networked, overlapping system proved highly effec-
tive against Israeli aircraft, particularly in the first hours of the war
when tactical and technological surprise favored the Egyptians. 80
The VPVOS appears to have considered the Mid East experience a
vindication for Soviet arms and operational art, and it drew a number of
01
specific conclusions. x First, PVO could be highly effective in a tacti-
cal environment against tactical fighter bombers, preventing the enemy
from attaining air superiority. Second, SAMs continued to be the main
means of PVO. Third, low altitude penetration presented the greatest
threat to PVO systems. Fourth, air combat most definitely was not dead
and pilots must be able to engage in maneuvering air combat. Fifth, in-
teraction of SAM, AAA and IA forces is crucial to the effective use of
forces. Sixth, ECM and defense suppression measures could be fairly ef-
fective in reducing the attacker's losses. Many of these lessons rein-
forced those from the Vietnam war. Let us briefly examine the VPVOS '
s
views on each of these issues in turn.







81 Shelekhov (1974; 49-50), Shesterin (1977; 79-80)
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by the Israelis, as proof of the effectiveness of tactical SAM systems. ^
While to some extent this has been exaggerated, the SAM systems did prove
quite effective in a tactical context, even though effectivenesses were
similar to those in Vietnam.
The VPVOS literature reflected this optimistic appraisal, often
citing Western sources in order to bolster the veracity of the argu-
ments. ^ Modern U.S. -built aircraft such as the A-4 Skyhawk and the F-4
Phantom had suffered significant losses from Soviet SAMs , and more impor-
tantly, the Israeli Air Force was unable to attain air superiority and was
seriously hampered in accomplishing its close air support mission. This
high effectiveness was due primarily to the thick SAM and AAA belt near
the canal, for as VPVOS authors point out, over 802 of Israeli losses were
due to SAM fire. 5 VPVOS sources give total numbers of aircraft destroyed
but there is no discussion of effectiveness rates, nor is sufficient data
given to enable their derivation. According to Western sources, although
the SAMs were highly effective in the first few hours of the war, their
overall effectiveness dropped over time and averaged the same as Viet-
nam. D Nevertheless, the Israelis avoided them wherever possible.
82 Herzog (1984; 311), for example, notes that "many of the accepted
concepts about air war would have to be changed."
83 Shesterin's 1977 article is a good example of this approach.
84 Shesterin (1977; 77), Shelekhov (1977; 49-50).
85 Shesterin (1977; 77). Most of the other losses were due to AAA fire.
This argument for the primacy of the SAM only holds for the Arabs . On the
Israeli side the proportions were reversed, with almost all Arab losses
coming from air combat. This fact is never mentioned by Soviet com-
mentators, and often neglected by Western commentators.
86 Isby (1981; 247, 254, 260). This was due to the rapid supply to Is-
rael of modern ECM equipment modified to counter the SA-6 SAM. Here the
effect of technological surprise was crucial for the Egyptians- -Israeli
aircraft had no warning or ECM systems to counter the SA-6 and in the
first few hours of the war many Israelis were caught by surprise by this
new weapon. The ability of the Egyptians to achieve such surprise against
a very well-equipped and prepared enemy should perhaps serve as a lesson
to the West in the limits of intelligence capabilities.
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Low altitude penetration was recognized as the main threat to the
PVO, and measures to counter it, such as the establishment of a network of
visual observers (similar to the old VNOS visual warning system) were
noted. ' This measure, first seen in the 1973 war, has been adopted by
the VPVOS to supplement its low altitude radar coverage. ° Another
measure used in 1973 (after initial use in Vietnam) was the overlapping of
SAM systems to provide mutual support, and their augmentation by AAA sys-
tems such as the ZSU-23. This joint use of AAA and SAM systems allowed
all-altitude coverage, and a substantial number of the aircraft damaged or
destroyed were hit by AAA fire while trying to fly under the SAMs or at-
tacking the SAM sites. 89 The use of the ZSU-23s and SA-6s along with SA-
2s and SA-3s suggests that the Egyptian air defense system was a mix of
VPVOS and PVO SV forces and planning, although under the overall supervi-
90
sion of Okunev. 7U
The most striking result of VPVOS reaction to the experience of lo-
cal wars, was an interest in maneuvering air combat. The lessons of Viet-
nam had been brought home forcibly in 1970 when Soviet pilots were
decimated by Israeli fighters in their only engagement. * This incident
87 Shesterin (1977; 81).
88 Falichev (1987; 2), Mal'tsev (1987; 2).
89 Herzog (1984; 217-218), Shesterin (1977; 79).
90 Erickson (1971; 99) also notes the presence of a large number of
Ground Forces personnel.
91 This engagement has been characterized as an Israeli ambush, which
seems quite likely. After the incident, Soviet pilots avoided any actions
that could lead to an engagement with the Israelis, so there is only one
data point from which to extrapolate. This avoidance may itself indicate
the confidence with which the Soviets regarded their air combat capabil-
ities.
-184-
suggested to the Soviets that they could no longer dismiss the enormously
high Egyptian air combat losses as a result of poor flying aptitude on the
part of the Egyptians. Furthermore, during the 1973 war, Arab pilots
trained by the Soviets lost approximately 334 aircraft in air combat, as
against 5 for the Israelis. 2 These results forced a recognition that
Soviet pilot training, and particularly VPVOS training, was not meeting
the demands of real combat.
The new stress on air combat training starts in 1971 and continues
to the end of the period under consideration. In 1971 Batitskiy refers
directly to the need for IA to prepare for maneuver combat, an unusually
detailed observation for a service chief. J This call was echoed in later
Batitskiy editorials, and in several other articles specially dedicated to
the problem, particularly after the 1973 war. H One of the Deputy Com-
manders of the VPVOS, and the former chief of Fighter Aviation, Marshal
Savitskiy, noted that large air battles were possible and that pilots must
avoid routine and "classical" solutions to problems. But while calling
for greater flexibility, Savitskiy noted that the place for the commander
92 Herzog (1984; 310). Schiff (1985; 161) gives figures of 227 and 6,
respectively. Either way the imbalance in favor of the Israelis, flying
roughly equal aircraft, is enormous. One Egyptian source implies that 90
Israeli aircraft were destroyed in air combat, but this seems implausibly
high. It is also noted that approximately half of Israeli sorties were
for air cover, thus reducing the effectiveness of their ground support ac-
tivities substantially. See Badri , Magdoub , Zohdy (1978; 157, 159).
While this book has much invaluable data on the air war and air defense,
some of the figures appear biased. Thus, it is claimed that total Israeli
losses were 280 aircraft, citing Soviet reports. Most VPVOS articles do
not give figures on total losses, but Shesterin (1977; 77) accepts the
lower Israeli figure of 115 aircraft lost.
93 Batitskiy (1971; 10).
94 See Batitskiy (1972; 10), Yezhov (1973; 106), Savitskiy (1973; 9-11),
Shelekhov (1974; 79), Yelkin (1976; 16-21), Panchenko (1976), Poltavtsev
(1977).
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of the IA regiment is in the command post, not in the aircraft. ^
Savitskiy's article was written just before the 1973 war, and reflects a
tendency to minimize the need for change. The exhortations to increase
flexibility are watered down by the emphasis on ground control by the com-
mander. Here, the initiative and flexibility is not at the level of the
pilot, but rather that of the commander in his regimental command post
watching the radar screens. Subsequent discussions of the role of the
regimental commander confirm that this basic tension between initiative
and centralized control remained throughout this period.
But despite the increased concern with training in dogfighting the
1982 Lebanon air war pointed out continuing deficiencies in this area,
suggesting that the VPVOS still has not fully absorbed this lesson and
taken the necessary measures. In contrast, the U.S. used the lessons of
Vietnam to develop new training programs and tactical aircraft that made a
major difference to USAF combat effectiveness in the mid-1970s and
1980s. 97
The effectiveness of the SAMs combined with the new emphasis on IA
in group combat led to the problem of interaction between the two bran-
ches. Even though Arab aviation was largely defeated in air combat it
also suffered significant (over 10Z of total) losses due to friendly
fire. ° This result apparently highlighted the problem of SAM and IA in-
95 Savitskiy (1973; 9-11, 13).
96 See the discussion in Chapter 8.
97 Specifically the F-16, F-18 and F-15 aircraft as well as the "aggres-
sor squadrons" and "top gun" schools for realistic dogfighting training.
98 Herzog (1984; 311). In contrast, the Israelis claim that none of
their aircraft were hit by friendly fire, see Weinraub (1987; 54).
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teraction, and articles by high ranking officers noting the problem
on
(usually by analogy to the Great Patriotic War) appeared. '
Finally, the Arab- Israeli wars confirmed the lesson of Vietnam that
ECM played a key role in the offense -defense interaction. Most of the ar-
ticles discussed above examined the effects of ECM on defense penetration,
portraying it as a serious problem, but one that could be overcome by good
training and persistence on the part of weapons operators. U.S. technical
efforts in this area were followed quite closely in the VPVOS press, but
there was little in the way of operational assessment of the equipment. °°
In sum, the VPVOS took the experience of the Mid East to heart, and
evinced serious concern over the low altitude threat, the need to improve
air combat capability, and to work out smooth interaction between bran-
ches. All of these measures were also necessary to improve VPVOS capabil-
ities for the new roles and missions assigned in the theater. The officer
directly responsible for Egyptian air defense assistance, Okunev, was
promoted to First Deputy Chief of the VPVOS in 1974, placing him in the
perfect position to apply the experience gained in the Middle East. U1
But despite the apparent realization of these problem areas, measures to
correct them do not appear to have been very successful: new fighters had
poorer air combat performance, while the solution to the low altitude
threat was increased deployment of the ineffective SA-3.
99 Grishkov (1974), Zimin (1975), Neupokoyev (1977),Sedov (1977; 50).
100 Paliy (1975), Shelekhov (1973), Shelekhov (1974; 52), Ignat'yev
(1976).
101 Okunev was presumably thrown out of Egypt along with other Soviet ad-
visers in 1972, but he is identified as First Deputy Chief of the VPVOS
only from June 1974. See CIA (1974; 7). Okunev's predecessor, Army Gen-
eral Shcheglov was moved over to the Warsaw Pact staff, presumably with
responsibility for PVO. This shift in itself might auger a greater VPVOS
role in Warsaw Pact PVO.
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While there is less evidence of distortion or misperception of the
lessons of the 1973 war than for the Vietnam war, there are still issues
that stand out. Perhaps most noteworthy is the relative balance between
IA and SAM effectiveness. While Soviet SAMs performed adequately in the
war, and were hailed as highly successful by the VPVOS press, IA forces
performed poorly by any estimation. Although the campaign to improve air
combat performance was initiated, it seems to have been rather half-
hearted and had to be renewed again after the 1982 debacle in Lebanon.
Traditional ground controlled intercept tactics and the narrow interpreta-
tion of initiative weighed against rapid VPVOS reform in this area. More
surprising is that in the mid- to- late 1970s there was a shift in emphasis
towards IA, with new aircraft increasing while SAM forces remained rela-
i no
tively stable. While this may represent an attempt to correct the
problems encountered in the 1973 war, many of the new aircraft introduced
had worse air combat capabilities than the MiG-21s used in that war. As
noted in the discussion of Vietnam, the air combat lessons were not com-
pletely accepted, or if they were the time lag was very long. Further-
more, while the problem of interaction between IA and SAMs was recognized,
there appears to have been little new thought or training on this prob-
lem.^
Finally, while the forces trained and equipped by the Soviets had
scored an impressive tactical victory, this accomplishment was tempered by
the fact that overall effectiveness still remained around 2Z and even the
102 See Figures 5.1-5.3.
103 For some of the few works on this topic see Grishkov (1974) , Zimin
(1975) and Goncharov (1982).
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peak effectiveness of approximately 10Z was only accomplished due to tac-
tical and technological surprise rather than an increase in intrinsic ef-
fectiveness. The implications for strategic air defense against bombers
carrying nuclear weapons are therefore less encouraging, for the penetra-
tion rate would be well over 902, resulting in enormous destruction.
Thus, from a strategic perspective the experience of the local wars proba-
bly confirmed the wisdom of a new emphasis on the more manageable problem
of defense against conventional attack, with defense against nuclear
forces still remaining important, albeit less feasible.
6.3.3 PVO in the European Theater
Initial indications of VPVOS reconsideration of its roles and mis-
sions appear in 1971, before the treaty was formalized but well after the
prospects for deployment of a PRO system had become very dim. Articles
addressing PVO issues more directly related to combat with tactical air-
craft and theater defense began to appear more regularly.
The earliest clear example of greater interest in theater PVO is an
article in Vestnik PVO in October 1971 that characterizes the threat and
the VPVOS response. In this article Colonel Polyakov defines the threat
to include tactical aircraft as well as strategic aviation and cruise mis-
siles, emphasizing the different characteristics of tactical and strategic
aviation while examining aspects of large group tactics. This article
lays out many of the issues that preoccupy the VPVOS in the 1970s : the
problem of low altitude penetration, the need to maneuver forces rapidly,
104 See the previous chapter.
105 Polyakov (1971; 17-18).
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the defense suppression threat posed by remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs)
and electronic countermeasures (ECM) , and the need for careful preparation
by the commander and knowledge of enemy tactics. A later article by
Major General Mil'chenko addresses the issue of preparation of the com-
mander and knowledge of the enemy's tactics and again stresses that both
strategic and tactical aviation constitute important threats, particularly
tactical aviation with its short flight time. °'
Other indications of a new stress on conventional and theater opera-
tions are found in discussions of the need for more attention to group
maneuvering air combat by IA units, and the need to increase low altitude
interception capabilities, both skills needed more in a tactical than
strategic environment. These points were reflected in Zimin's 1971 arti-
cle where he noted the growing importance of the shift to low altitude
penetration, the development of modern maneuverable fighters such as the
F-14 and F-15, and the development of AWACS aircraft. 108 These Western
developments received a great deal of attention in the Soviet press in the
following years. uy While this concern was partly due to the relatively
poor showing in air-to-air combat by Soviet trained pilots in local wars
there would have been little incentive for the VPVOS to make this a major
issue if the main threat were strategic aviation. Against large, heavy,
non-maneuverable targets the c gfighting tactics of the Mid East and Viet-
nam would be of comparatively little use, although the shortcomings in
106 Polyakov (1971; 16-19).
107 Milchenko (1971).
108 Zimin (1971; 79).
109 See Lepingwell (1986) for a review of Soviet assessments of Western
air defense technology and systems.
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pilot skill revealed in those conflicts implied problems in fulfilling
even relatively simple intercepts. Furthermore, the explicit character-
ization of tactical aviation as a primary threat was new. While previous
articles had characterized and evaluated NATO tactical air assets, in 1971
they are being clearly presented in articles dealing with VPVOS tactics
and operations
As a further indication of the growing importance of conventional
operations the year 1971 also saw the creation of a new section in Vestnik
PVO
,
a back page devoted to a technical review of enemy armaments, partic-
ularly fighter-bombers. 1U
In the realm of military-historical literature, a short absence of
major articles on the VPVOS in 1969-1970 was broken by a noteworthy arti-
cle by Svetlishin on the Kursk operation. The Soviets regard the Kursk
operation as the turning point of the Great Patriotic War, marking the
final transition from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive.
Svetlishin' s article also appears to mark a turning point in the VPVOS
military-historical literature. After this article, there is greater at-
tention to the VPVOS role in strategic offensive operations.
Svetlishin starts off in a highly unusual manner by directly criti-
cizing other authors for neglecting 1943 in monographs on VPVOS his-
tory. 11 During the battle of Kursk, the VPVOS was primarily responsible
for the defense of railroads feeding the Soviet buildup, and during the
110 See, for example p. 87 of Vestnik PVO numbers 4 and 7, 1971.
111 Svetlishin criticizes Batitskiy (1968), Ashkerov (1960), and Des-
nitskiy (1961) amongst others. This is despite the fact that Batitskiy'
s
book presents a fairly comprehensive account of the entire war, and that
Svetlishin was a member of its author's collective.
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Soviet counteroffensive maneuver was used to establish PVO on liberated
territory. Combined maneuver of PVO SV and VPVOS units was widely used,
especially for river crossings and to create reserve forces. **
The battle of Kursk was a critical one for the VPVOS because for
the first time it had to concentrate on the defense of LOCs rather than
urban- industrial centers. Kursk taught the VPVOS three new means of PVO
employment: 1) to repel massive German attacks with massive VPVOS forces,
up to an IA division at a time, 2) to concentrate forces by wide maneuver
of IA forces, allowing the transition from point to zonal defense, 3) the
creation of maneuver and mobile groups for screening important railroad
targets. -LJ Further, Kursk also presented the problem of keeping up with
rapidly moving offensive forces, requiring rapid maneuver and employment
of reserves. Thus, Kursk may be seen as the first example of the use of
the VPVOS in offensive operations. The criticism of the other authors
suggests that Svetlishin considered the operation particularly significant
and important, and also flagged the fact that this was an area to be exam-
ined in more detail. The problem of LOC defense and PVO of offensive op-
erations was to receive greater attention in the years to come as the
VPVOS adjusted to new roles and missions.
Since much of the discussion of operational art in the unclassified
literature takes place in studies of history, it is not surprising to find
a renewed interest in the VPVOS in the Great Patriotic War, and articles
specifically calling for more study of this period.
112 Svetlishin (1971; 28).
113 Svetlishin (1971; 31).
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The importance of historical study for solving contemporary problems
was stressed in a two-part article that appeared in early 1972 in Vestnik
protivovozdushnoy oborony by. Major General of Artillery I. Dzhordzhadze
and Col. F. Shesterin. * These articles stress the elements of surprise,
organizational structure, maneuver, combat readiness, and includes a fair-
ly detailed discussion of LOC defense.
The authors take an approach reminiscent of Biryuzov, stressing the
importance of surprise at the beginning of war, citing the World War II
examples of Poland, Norway, France, Pearl Harbor, and the Soviet Union.
These surprise attacks were aimed at both front and rear forces, with the
goal of destroying enemy air power and gaining air mastery. Even the
Soviet PVO system was not fully deployed at the beginning of the Great
Patriotic War, and full deployment took several days, resulting in very
difficult conditions for carrying out the PVO mission. 15 Three reasons
for the success of surprise are presented: 1) a lack of appreciation of
the significance of the air battle and an overconcentration on ground and
naval combat, 2) insufficient equipping and combat readiness of air
defense troops, 3) weak preparation of command cadres in questions of com-
bat with enemy aviation. It is implied that these reasons applied to the
USSR as well as to the Western states. 1& These criticisms of an un-
deremphasis on air combat and poor preparation for it are highly unusual,
114 Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin (1972a, 1972b). Shesterin is a professor
(Dotsent)
,
presumably at a military academy, see Shesterin (1977). He has
authored several articles in Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurrtal and Military
Thought on air force and air defense issues. Dzhordzhadze ' s position is
not known, although judging from his rank, the paper topic, and his col-
laborator he is probably the department head of a military academy.
115 Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin (1972a; 23).
116 Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin (1972a; 21-22).
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and may be aimed at current Soviet practice as much as past practice. ^-
Indeed, these statements imply that there is a danger of PVO forces being
neglected in overall resource allocation, a topic that is rarely touched
on in this literature. In part, then, this set of arguments appears to be
stressing the importance of maintaining a strong VPVOS . Furthermore, the
stress on surprise attacks against air assets may be part of an argument
in favor of extensive PVO screening of forward deployed Soviet Air Force
assets. This emphasis on the danger of surprise is a reiteration of ear-
lier VPVOS concerns, but it has been enlarged to incorporate both attacks
on tactical forces and rear areas. Of particular concern is the attempt
of the enemy to attain air superiority an issue of great importance in the
theater.
The authors pay a good deal of attention to the LOC defense mission,
presenting it as particularly important during the third period of the war
(after Kursk) and highly successful in preventing railway delays. To
accomplish LOC and frontal area PVO the authors emphasize the importance
of maneuver, pointing out that it allows PVO gaps near the front to be
117 The Soviet Union began in the 1970s a large buildup in tactical avia-
tion forces, perhaps reflecting a recognition that aviation had in fact
been neglected in previous years.
118 The authors claim that in 1943 there were 1039 railroad delays, while
in 1944 there were only a few short breaks in the work of the railroads.
This data is particularly interesting, for most accounts of Kursk and of
railroad PVO claim only a few short breaks, or even none. The 1039 delays
do not appear to have been cited elsewhere in the PVO literature, and imp-
ly that the Luftwaffe interdiction effort may have had a noticeable, and
even significant, effect on Soviet LOCs . See Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin
(1972a; 25-26). Almost paradoxically, they state that the number of Ger-
man flights declined from 1943 to 1944, from 7000 to 1161 flights. A
large number of these flights were probably directed against the railroad
yards near Kursk. The reason for the decline in Luftwaffe flights is not
given but appears to be a result of aircraft losses combined with in-
creased VPVOS resistance.
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filled by forces brought up from the rear and augmentation existing PVO
SV. Maneuver also allowed the use of zonal defenses at Kursk as well as
I -1 Q
in the general defense of railroads during 1943-44 . LX7 Zonal defense is
thus presented as the main form of defense of LOCs.
Overall, the first article by Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin emphasizes
the importance of preventing surprise by raising combat readiness, greater
recognition of the importance of airpower and attention to the problem of
defense of LOCs. For the latter zonal defense by IA is presented as the
primary means of executing the mission.
Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin' s second article examines the post-war
development of the VPVOS . Their discussion of organizational developments
is very similar to that presented in Batitskiy's book on the history of
the PVO. *® The authors stress the importance of the development of the
anti-air operation in the post-war years, clearly indicating its impor-
tance for the present. L1-J" Particularly important is their argument that
VPVOS combat activities are highly dependent upon the strategic conditions
at the fronts. Thus, they note that there is a substantial difference be-
tween the defensive portion of the Great Patriotic War and the later
strategic offensive period. 2Z This dependence is of great importance.
If the VPVOS were charged only with strategic defense against nuclear at-
tack, then there would be little dependence between its missions and the
situation at the fronts. What Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin imply is that
the missions of the VPVOS are directly dependent on the situation at the
119 Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin (1972a; 27).
120 See Chapter 4 and Batitskiy (1968; 334-72).
121 Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin (1972; 28-29).
122 Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin (1972; 28-29).
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front, and therefore that the VPVOS has missions that pertain to warfare
at the front level.
It therefore appears that Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin are arguing for
greater attention to the third period of the war and for new work in the
military-historical literature. While doing so, however, they are confirm-
ing the importance of the anti-air operation, particularly the use of
maneuver and employment of reserves . This set of articles thus seems to
set the stage for broader consideration of VPVOS history, particularly the
connection between the VPVOS and the ground forces and other services. In
the following years this call for a renewal of military history was taken
up, producing a great deal of literature on this subject, including prob-
lems of air defense in a conventional war.
In the 1970s the VPVOS military-historical literature, in Voyenno-
iscoricheskiy zhurnal shows a definite swing away from city defense
towards problems of LOC defense during offensive operations. This change
appears to reflect the use of the historical literature to examine prob-
lems of relevance to the present, in keeping with Dzhordzhadze and
Shesterin' s call for greater work in this field. Several main trends may
be discerned in this work.
First, there is a greater concern with the tactics and operational
issues involved in LOC defense, particularly railroads, yards, and sta-
tions. ** In order to provide for the defense of railroads a number of
123 In 1973, an article by Col. Yakimanskiy and Major Gorbunov discussing
the postwar development of the VPVOS appeared in Voyenno- istoricheskiy
zhurnal, reiterating many of Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin' s points about the
VPVOS and its operational art. See Yakimanskiy and Gorbunov (1973).
124 See Anaymovich (1972; 59-60) on railroad tactics and branch interac-
tion, Svetlishin (1974a) on LOC defense at Stalingrad, Bednenko and Mik-
haylenko (1974) on the Byelorussian operation, Komarov (1974) on the
Petsamo-Kirkenssoy operation, Batitskiy (1975; 45-46) on the third period
of the war, Batitskiy (1977b).
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special tactics were used, such as placing AAA on trains, establishing
fighter patrols over railroad lines, using small mobile groups of AAA to
"ambush" German aircraft, and the use of armored AAA trains to enhance
mobility and protect different stations.
Second, the use of VPVOS forces to protect LOCs and the rear of the
fronts presents the problem of coordinating the interaction between VPVOS
forces and those of the PVO SV and the Soviet Air Force. This problem
received a good deal of attention, as did the problem of interaction be-
tween VPVOS branches. For the most part however, these discussions empha-
sized simple issues like the creation of joint documents outlining the
rules of interaction, and coordination of zones. Several authors also
noted the importance of the formation of operational groups combining
VPVOS and PVO SV officers to defend one objective with their joint
forces. 125
Third, of particular concern was the use of combined maneuver to
prevent the creation of gaps between the VPVOS and PVO SV. This issue is
tied up with both logistical problems (complaints of insufficient trans-
port are common) and organization structure (an issue discussed later).
Suffice it to say here that gaps between the advancing PVO SV and the
VPVOS did arise, sometimes becoming quite wide. ^°
Fourth, the experience of the later periods of the war clearly indi-
cated to the VPVOS the importance of creating an organization structure
that could meet both the demands of the front and ensure centralized con-
125 Anaymovich (1972), Svetlishin (1974; 29), Bednenko and Mikhaylenko
(1974; 15), Komarov (1974; 30-33), Svetlishin (1977; 104).
126 Bednenko and Mikhaylenko (1974; 15), Svetlishin (1977; 110-114).
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trol of forces. This important issue, both in the Great Patriotic War and
the present, is examined in a later section.
In sum, the military-historical literature of this period reflects
an increased interest in LOC defense. The absence of articles on the
defense of Moscow and Leningrad, the classic examples of defense of
cities, contrasts with that of the revolution in military affairs period,
strengthening the conclusion that a shift towards VPVOS use in conven-
tional operations took place. The new mission of LOC defense appears to
have required a reconsideration of the experience of the Great Patriotic
War, resulting in a significant surge in total articles, and articles ad-
dressing the issue of LOC defense and the later periods of the war in par-
ticular. There is increased concern over the interaction of branches,
maneuver of forces to occupied territory, and formation of operational
groups for local defense coordination and interaction with ground forces.
These questions are solved by application of the basic principles of oper-
ational art, especially the concentration on zonal defense, maneuver, and
the echeloning of forces. Thus, different areas of operational art are
stressed in accord with the new missions.
What is the relevance of historical experience to the present?
Dzhordzhadze and Shesterin argue strongly that there is direct relevance,
as do other authors in this period. Given, however, that the Soviets do
not expect to fight another conventional war on their own territory, what
do these articles tell us about possible modern VPVOS employment? One
possibility is that many of the principles elaborated regarding the VPVOS
are to be applied to Warsaw Pact PVO forces: in the course of an offensive
operation into Western Europe air defense gaps behind the advancing forces
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would be filled by Warsaw Pact PVO forces, excluding VPVOS forces. 127 In
such a case the VPVOS would retain its homeland defense mission. It is
even conceivable that some VPVOS forces would be moved into the Eastern
districts of the Warsaw Pact countries to augment their air defense as the
Pact forces are redeployed to the west. This would seem to be consistent
with Batitskiy's concern about possible conventional strategic bombing and
would ensure that VPVOS forces remain intact when the transition to
nuclear war occurs. In this case the historical literature is actually
discussing the operational art and missions of the East German, Polish,
and Czech PVO forces.
Another possibility is that the VPVOS would undertake some missions
in Eastern (and even Western) Europe, deploying forces forward from the
USSR to plug gaps between the advancing PVO SV and the deployed Warsaw
Pact PVO forces. This would appear to be a much more demanding mission,
for it would involve large scale movement of forces and coordination with
forward PVO SV and rear Warsaw Pact PVO forces. Nevertheless, the empha-
sis on maneuver of VPVOS forces in the military historical literature,
combined with comments concerning the maneuverability of fighter aviation
forces, strongly suggests that in the event of a conventional war in
Europe there may have been plans to deploy VPVOS IA forces into Eastern
Europe to perform crucial LOC defense missions. Here, though, we find a
contradiction with the primary mission of the VPVOS, homeland defense.
The forward movement of VPVOS forces would lessen the defense of the
homeland, placing more of the burden on the SAM forces that are less
127 One problem with this plan is that Warsaw Pact PVO forces are not
very well equipped.
199-
maneuverable . There are no clear signs of the VPVOS coming to grips with
this problem of contradictory missions. During the Great Patriotic War
the problem did not arise, as the range of aircraft was limited and there
was no threat of nuclear escalation. Thus, in the case of a war in Europe
the question of major VPVOS redeployment would no doubt be a major issue
for the military and political leadership, the outcome depending to a
large extent on estimates of the likelihood of nuclear escalation against
the homeland. Such a decision would be made by the General Staff in con-
sultation with the Defense Committee or Defense Council, not by the VPVOS
alone. As the historical literature points out, deployment of VPVOS
forces during the Great Patriotic War was determined by the Stavka not by
the VPVOS leadership. 128
Even in the case of nuclear escalation by NATO two scenarios are
possible, and these scenarios pose the same problem for the VPVOS. First,
if NATO initiates use of nuclear weapons at the tactical level employing
tactical airpower, forward deployment of VPVOS forces might be considered
essential to the effective air defense of LOCs and even the Western Mili-
tary Districts of the USSR. Thus, by deploying VPVOS forces forward the
VPVOS may achieve its aim of increasing the number and depth of defensive
echelons
.
The second scenario might be considered a follow-on to the first.
In the event that there is rapid nuclear escalation by either side (the
Warsaw Pact in response to initial NATO use, or NATO escalation after un-
successful tactical use) VPVOS forces might be caught out of position in
128 This issue is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
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Eastern Europe and unable to engage U.S. strategic bombers attacking the
USSR.
Thus, there are strong contradictory incentives, both to forward
deploy VPVOS forces, and to retain them for homeland defense. This prob-
lem must have weighed heavily on VPVOS and General Staff planners.
There does not appear to be enough data in the articles surveyed to
allow us to determine whether, or how, a clear choice was made between the
two possible uses of the VPVOS. It is possible, and even likely, that
such a decision was not made until the late 1970s. Nevertheless, during
this period the VPVOS clearly took on the responsibility for preparing for
this mission.
6.4 VPVOS Threat Perceptions and Misperceptions
As the role of the VPVOS changed, so did its threat perceptions and
analyses. These changes are most clearly reflected in the "In Foreign Ar-
mies" section of Vestnik PVO , During this period the VPVOS showed a
strong interest in the strategic aviation threat and in tactical aviation,
while discussions of Western PRO and ASAT programs disappeared almost
entirely, and the emphasis on strategic missiles diminished. In this sec-
tion some aspects of this literature will be examined in more detail to
determine how Western actions and equipment were perceived by the VPVOS.
The threat perceptions and lessons arising from the use of aviation
in local wars has been described above. In this section I investigate
VPVOS perceptions of the strategic environment and threat in relation to
their primary mission of homeland defense. Throughout this period the
VPVOS paid fairly close attention to the development of U.S. strategic
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forces, particularly the air-breathing component. While the ICBM and SLBM
forces were not ignored, the bulk of the material focused on the bomber,
cruise missile, and air-to-surface missile threat. These articles were
primarily devoted to the prospective threat, with a time horizon of
several years to almost 10 years. Indeed, the VPVOS showed interest in
the B-l bomber and the air-launched cruise missile (ALCM) at a very early
stage in their development.
In 1972 the first discussion of the B-l and ALCM appeared in Vestnik
PVO
,
in an article that explicitly noted that strategic aviation will con-
tinue to comprise a significant part of U.S. strategic offensive
forces. ^ The technical characteristics given for these weapons appear
to be fairly accurate, given the early stage of development and testing.
It was claimed that the B-l was required because the B-52 had a low prob-
ability of penetrating a strong PVO system. JJ- Overall, the strategic
threat is portrayed as well equipped and growing more dangerous, with fu-
ture deployment of both new bombers and air-to-surface missiles posing new
problems for the VPVOS. There is no indication of likely PVO effective-
ness, PVO countermeasures , or U.S. plans for using these weapons, nor do
such discussions appear in other VPVOS threat descriptions. These issues
are apparently considered too sensitive for general discussion, although
129 See, for example Shelekhov (1972), Shelekhov (1978), Shelekhov
(1979), Ignat'yev (1979), Borisov (1977).
130 Mil'chenko (1971; 63) mentions the B-l and the SCAD but doesn't give
any details. (The ALCM was at this time known as the SCAD- -Supersonic
Cruise Armed Decoy, an outgrowth of a program for an advanced unarmed
decoy. See Werrell (1985; 144-150).) Shelekhov (1972; 82) gives the
first detailed examination of these arms. This article also contains a
fairly detailed discussion of the Short-Range Attack Missile (SRAM) that
was just being deployed in SAC at the time.
131 Shelekhov (1972; 84).
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some Vescnik PVO articles on Western air defenses occasionally touch on
then,. 132
From 1972 the VPVOS tracked the development of the ALCM quite close-
ly and during the mid- 70s it appears to have become a topic of some con-
cern to the VPVOS leadership. While cruise missiles were not new to the
VPVOS , some having been deployed in Europe in the late 1950s and early
1960s, these new generation weapons posed a qualitatively greater
threat. 33 The realization that the new cruise missiles presented a new
threat was somewhat slow, and it was not until later in the decade that
the VPVOS fully appreciated the full ramifications of cruise missile de-
velopment.
One of the first indications of growing VPVOS interest in cruise
missiles is found in the historical literature. An article published in
Vescnik PVO examined British air defense performance against the V-l,
noting both the ineffectiveness of pre-emptive bomber strikes against V-l
launchers and the relatively high effectiveness of the air defenses. 3
The importance of the proper organization and echeloning of defenses is
emphasized, and the author reports an effectiveness of 60Z towards the end
lit
of the campaign. JJ However, only the capture of the V-l launchers com-
132 See Lepingwell (1986).
133 Werrell (1985; 108-112, 156-64, 178-87). Most VPVOS comments on
cruise missiles in the 1960s and early 1970s were limited to a ritual
statement on the ability of IA to destroy both aircraft and cruise mis-
siles. See, for example, Korablev (1967; 12-13), Khalipov (1968; 11).
Biryuzov discusses British defenses against the V-l in his 1961 article
(1961; 25-6) but does not comment on Soviet preparations to repel a V-l
attack.
134 Orlov (1971; 90-91).
135 Orlov (1971; 90-91). Many of these points are also made in a later
article by Orlov in Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal (1975). An earlier Or-
lov (1970) article on the use of cruise missiles concentrates less on
their PVO aspects than on the questions of targeting and strategy. Orlov
appears to be the "resident expert" on the V weapons.
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pletely halted the V-l threat. JO This article is quite accurate in its
portrayal of the interaction between the offense and defense, but it also
implicitly raises a number of questions concerning modern PVO and cruise
missiles. First, how should the echelons be constructed? Second, are
SAMs or IA to be the primary means of combat with cruise missiles? Third,
what effectiveness can be expected, are cruise missiles more vulnerable to
PVO forces? While no answers to these questions are given in this arti-
cle, or explicitly in the VPVOS literature, there are hints that they were
being considered during this period.
On the question of effectiveness, the allusions to high PVO effec-
tiveness in World War II suggest that the VPVOS considered cruise missiles
particularly vulnerable. There are also some more modern indications of
this view. Thus, in his 1971 article, Polyakov notes the possible use of
cruise missiles and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) and suggests that
while they may be used for defense suppression and penetration, that they
tend to be more vulnerable than piloted aircraft because of their lower
maneuverability and responsiveness. While a joint attack of bombers and
cruise missiles might complicate the defense of a target, it is not pre-
sented as an insuperable problem, merely requiring more skillful use of
PVO forces for its defeat. 38 The cruise missile in itself is not seen as
a major new threat, rather it is its joint use with bombers that presents
a problem.
136 Orlov (1971; 91).
137 Compare it to Briggs (1981)
138 Polyakov (1971; 18).
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While the cruise missile garnered some attention in 1971, the sig-
nificance of the new threat does not appear to have been fully appreciated
until the mid 1970s. In 1973 Batitskiy published his Military Thought ar-
ticles on VPVOS history, largely reiterating Biryuzov's comments on the
i in
ineffectiveness of cruise missiles. -^ Two years later, however, a reap-
praisal of the importance of cruise missiles appears to have taken place.
In both the historical and editorial literature cruise missiles take on a
higher priority.
Apparently for the first time, in 1975 Batitskiy discusses Soviet
preparations in the Fall of 1944 to defend against V-l attacks on
Leningrad and Moscow.
^
u Of course, such an attack never took place, but
Batitskiy claims that VPVOS forces were organized in a deeply echeloned
structure and uses this threat to justify retaining large forces around
the major administrative and industrial centers. ^ This theme is picked
up by Svetlishin a year later in an article on organizational structure
and troop control, that in August 1944 the commanders of the Leningrad
PVO army, the Moscow Special PVO Army, and the North PVO Front col-
laborated on a plan for V-l defense. 2 While Svetlishin doesn't elabora-
te on the point, the very fact that it is mentioned suggests that
Batitskiy' s article sparked new interest in, and discussion of, the prob-
lem of defense against the V-l. ^
139 Batitskiy (1973a; 44).
140 Batitskiy (1975; 45). Defense against cruise missiles is alluded to
in Batitskiy (1968; 333) but nothing substantive is said.
141 Batitskiy (1975; 45).
142 Svetlishin (1976; 42).
143 Svetlishin had not mentioned plans for defense against cruise mis-
siles before this time despite several opportunities to do so.
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Batitskiy raised the increasing threat of the cruise missile in a
1976 editorial in Vestnik PVO, placing the cruise missile at the top of
the list of threatening new U.S. arms developments. Two months later
an article on tactical and operational preparation of commanders noted
that at the end of World War II defense against both ballistic and cruise
missiles had been placed on the agenda. The threat of a new generation of
air-to-surface missiles with low radar cross section, low altitude and
high speed flight capability, and long range allowing launch outside of
PVO range is emphasized as one of the factors requiring even greater
knowledge and skill on the part of VPVOS commanders. ^ No solutions to
this threat, other than greater efforts to develop the tactics and opera-
tional art of the VPVOS are given, but the article serves as a further in-
dicator that the development of cruise missiles was viewed with some con-
cern by the VPVOS.
In 1977, more detailed discussions of the cruise missile threat are
presented, and Batitskiy alludes to the weapons in an editorial, but it is
not until 1978 that cruise missiles are the subject of their own arti-
cle. ° Cruise missiles are presented as highly accurate, capable systems
to be used primarily for defense suppression or as stand-off weapons. The
144 Batitskiy (1976; 7)
.
145 Buturlin and Golodnyy (1976; 17, 18). Note that the authors do not
specify that these are cruise missiles, but rather mention air-to-surface
missiles in general. Thus, they may also be referring to the SRAM and the
projected follow-on the Advanced Strategic Air Launched Missile (ASALM) as
well.
146 See Batitskiy (1977; 5), Borisov (1977). Note, however, that
Batitskiy does not refer to the V-l in his 1977 historical article in
Voyenno- iscoricheskiy zhurnal. Other Batitskiy editorials of this period
do not address specifics of the U.S. threat and do not mention any partic-
ular weapons, including the cruise missile. The article on cruise mis-
siles is Shelekhov (1978).
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author notes that while a B-52 could carry up to 20 of these weapons, a
modified Boeing 747 could carry 70 to 90. A projection of up to 2300 air-
launched cruise missiles for the U.S. Air Force (including 500 for train-
ing) is given, plus 1200 sea- launched cruise missiles for the Navy, with
France and West Germany working on similar weapons. ' The prognosis,
then, was for a total of 3000 nuclear armed cruise missiles. These num-
bers suggest why the VPVOS showed growing interest in the cruise missile:
they posed a large, complex threat to the PVO system as a whole. Notwith-
standing their technical advantages, the sheer number of penetrators could
stress the system very severely.
As the cruise missile programs reached deployment decisions VPVOS
coverage of them increased, and by the 1980s a great deal of attention was
paid to the new threat as the weapons were actually deployed. These later
reactions are discussed in the next chapter. °
VPVOS reaction to cruise missiles appears to have passed through two
stages. In the first stage, up to the mid 1970s, cruise missiles appear
to have been regarded in light of the successful British defenses and the
postwar failure of the U.S. to develop an effective cruise missile.
Cruise missiles were regarded primarily as aids to penetration, to over-
load, confuse, and suppress PVO systems. Their relative lack of
maneuverability made them more vulnerable to interception, although their
large numbers and small size might to some extent counteract this ad-
147 Shelekhov (1978; 87).
148 See Sozinov (1978; 3), Ignat'yev (1980), Chistyakov (1979). For a
review of VPVOS reaction to cruise missile deployment in the 1980s see the
next chapter.
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vantage. The example of World War II held out the hope of the PVO scoring
high attrition rates against such targets.
In the second stage the scale of the U.S. program and its high tech-
nical level made a strong impression on Soviet threat analysis. The
cruise missile was recognized as a highly accurate weapon, and its low
altitude and speed would make interception very difficult. While there
still may have been hopes for high attrition rates, the very large numbers
discussed in the Western press would have required a very large force to
intercept and destroy all the cruise missiles. Because ALCM launch might
occur before landfall the VPVOS ' s preferred tactic of intercepting the
cruise missile carrier before launch was made extremely difficult, if not
impossible. In the worst case scenario, instead of 300 penetrating bomb-
ers, the VPVOS might be faced with 3000 penetrating cruise missiles. Such
a threat demanded serious consideration.
What does this case tell us in terms of learning and organizational
behavior? First, we should note that the initial response was to inter-
pret the new threat in light of past experience, a common trait of organi-
zational behavior. The new cruise missiles were not clearly differentia-
ted from previous generations of cruise missiles resulting in an un-
derestimation of the threat.
Second, when the emerging threat was gradually recognized, it was
referred to first in the historical literature, and the lessons of the
past were examined for relevance to the present. The creation of a deeply
echeloned defense was presented as the Great Patriotic War solution, and
this pointed the way to a contemporary solution.
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Third, the threat was used in calls for greater stress on tradi-
tional operational art principles and for better training and preparation
for commanders. Nowhere is it hinted that the new weapons might not be
vulnerable to existing PVO systems.
Fourth, Western estimates of technical parameters were taken at face
value. Rarely was there any criticism of ALCM technology or its per-
formance. Despite the harsh and vocal criticism of the cruise missile by
some Western analysts, the VPVOS did not emphasize or discuss in detail
the program's testing problems and deficiencies. Instead the analyses
could be termed "worst case" in that they accepted the optimistic
estimates of the U.S. military and industry.
Fifth, while Western estimates of cruise missile performance were
published, there was no quantitative or even explicit qualitative discus-
sion of the cruise missile's ability to penetrate PVO systems except in
the historical material. While the articles present the problem of inter-
ception as difficult, nowhere is there a clear indication of exactly how
difficult it might be. In part this might reflect a lack of good Western
sources to cite, but it is also characteristic of the VPVOS to avoid
giving any effectiveness figures, particularly in the post-Vietnam era.
By reading between the lines, and examining the cruise missile performance
figures, however, the magnitude of the threat must have been clear to most
VPVOS officers.
In sum, the cruise missile case suggests that the VPVOS did react in
a manner suggested by the organizational politics model. The VPVOS
tended not to recognize the threat, and when the danger became clear it
relied on tried and true methods of assessment, analysis and
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counter-measure . The VPVOS did not appear to engage in threat inflation in
order to argue for increased funding, primarily because the threat did not
need inflation. The new cruise missiles posed such a major threat to the
effectiveness of the existing PVO system that any further inflation might
have made the problem seem insuperable. Instead the VPVOS presented the
threat fairly clearly, and in the editorials by Batitskiy called attention
to the threat. Rather than inflating the threat, the VPVOS gave it a
prominent place in its literature and did appear to suggest that measures
had to be taken to counter the cruise missile.
6 . 5 Summary
During this period the VPVOS shifted towards greater involvement in
defense against conventional attack, in response to both changing Soviet
strategy and the conditions of the post-ABM treaty world.
The first point to note is that the VPVOS did not wither away after
the ABM treaty. While VPVOS funding declined somewhat it retained fairly
high force levels and an increase in funding appears to have been starting
towards the late 70s. The VPVOS retained its primary mission of
homeland defense and augmented it with an increased role in LOC defense in
the theater.
How did the transition to conventional and theater missions come
about? I argue that the VPVOS and the General Staff reached a decision
partly based upon military analysis (the need for strong PVO of LOCs in a
conventional campaign, the remaining nuclear bomber threat) and partly
based upon organizational considerations (the desire to preserve the
149 CIA (1978; 5-6).
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VPVOS , sunk costs, inertia, conservatism). Given the immense sunk costs
in the VPVOS, finding a new and efficient use for the force made sense for
all concerned. There was a convergence of interests between the General
Staff and the VPVOS that allowed the redefinition of VPVOS missions and
ensured its continued role in the changing Soviet force structure.
There are indications that VPVOS leaders engaged in advocacy for the
continued strong support of the service, particularly Batitskiy's cita-
tion of foreign experts on the growing importance of air defense, and his
stress on the conventional strategic bombing threat. so The articles of
Zimin and Grishkov also suggest that the VPVOS was arguing for the impor-
tance of air defense. Kulikov's editorial appears to have signalled the
General Staff's decision on the role of the VPVOS in both conventional and
strategic operations. The fact that this editorial came after early evi-
dence of VPVOS interest in conventional operations suggests that Kulikov's
editorial was the official confirmation of a new role worked out between
the VPVOS and the General Staff. Certainly, while the new role and mis-
sions of the VPVOS posed new problems for the VPVOS they also ensured the
service a set part in the overall Soviet force structure even under the
changing doctrine of the time.
The interaction between the General Staff and the VPVOS in this case
appears to have been largely non-conflictual , and bureaucratic politics
does not appear to have played a major role. While there was some ad-
vocacy for continued VPVOS support the existing VPVOS forces provided a
needed capability for conventional operations and this need for increased
PVO coverage appears to have been the decisive factor in the decision to
150 Batitskiy (1973b; 33).
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maintain a strong VPVOS force. Thus the continued support for the VPVOS
does not reflect a simple bureaucratic inertia, but rather the joint in-
terests of the General Staff and the VPVOS in carrying out a mission con-
sistent with Soviet strategy.
While the decision concerning the future of the VPVOS appears to
have been worked out by a process involving the VPVOS and the General
Staff most of the details of operational art and tactics were determined
within the VPVOS and appear to be well represented by the organizational
politics model.
In the area of learning behavior the VPVOS displayed a tendency to
selective interpretation of experience and misperception of the adver-
sary's intentions. This was clearly the case with the interpretation of,
and reaction to, the lessons of Vietnam and the Middle East, but it also
appears to hold for some strategic issues as well. Certainly the concern
over conventional strategic bombing represented a quite striking misunder-
standing of U.S. strategy. Similarly, the nature and extent of the cruise
missile threat was only slowly realized because of existing preconceptions
and biases. On balance, though, the VPVOS did a fair job of interpreting
U.S. strategic force developments, although the estimates of technology
and effectiveness appear to have been worst case estimates. Rarely were
doubts expressed about the technological capabilities of U.S. weapons or
the likelihood of their deployment.
In the VPVOS ' s shift to a more conventionally-oriented role, we
again see a combination of rational military analysis combined with orga-
nizational influences such as sunk costs, inertia and advocacy. Yet there
appears to have been little conflict between the actors in this decision-
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making process and bureaucratic politics was not a major factor. In the
next chapter, however, we examine a debate over VPVOS organization struc






In 1980-81 the VPVOS underwent a major reorganization that resulted
in a complete restructuring of its forces. This reorganization was not a
whim on the part of the General Staff or the Politburo, instead it was the
end result of a long study of the optimal organization of the VPVOS and
PVO SV within the overall structure of the Soviet Armed Forces. In this
chapter the factors contributing to this reorganization, and VPVOS and PVO
SV viewpoints on the necessity and appropriate form of organization are
considered in detail.
The debate over the VPVOS reorganization differs significantly from
that over PRO because viewpoints and Issues appear to have remained fairly
constant over time. Therefore, rather than presenting a chronological
summary of the debate, the positions of the relevant parties are examined
for their points of agreement and contention. This allows a comparison of
the organizational viewpoints expressed before the reorganization with the
details of the reorganization. From this comparison it becomes quite
clear that the reorganization was not a VPVOS initiative because it con-
tradicted many of the basic principles of VPVOS operational art and
theory. Instead, the reorganization appears to have been a decision by
the General Staff that overrode VPVOS objections and was intended to pro-
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duce a more efficient allocation of forces to conventional warfare mis-
sions .
7.2 Reappraising Organizational Structure
Several factors contributed to the debate over PVO interaction and
organizational structure. First, there was a General Staff reexamination
of the Soviet strategic command and control system. This reexamination
may have started as early as 1968 and the pivotal article on this topic
was published in 1975 by Marshal Kulikov, the Chief of the General Staff.
^
One of Kulikov' s primary concerns was the control of multi-front opera-
tions
,
and for this purpose he endorsed an intermediate level of command
and control at the TVD level between the General Staff and the fronts.
This idea was supported by his successor, Marshal Ogarkov, who pressed for
the creation of these TVD level commands during peacetime. Given this
ferment, the question of the organization of the VPVOS within this new
structure must naturally have arisen.
Second, as noted in the previous chapter, the VPVOS itself faced new
challenges inherent in its conventional missions and may itself have in-
stituted a study of command and control options. Interaction between
VPVOS and PVO SV forces would be a topic of particular concern.
Third, as the VPVOS literature of the late 1960s and early 1970s
continually stresses, the widespread introduction of electronics, com-




2 Rice (1987; 69), Kulikov (1975; 15-16).
3 Rice (1987; 69).
4 Indeed, Kulikov refers to the Stavka's role in ensuring interaction be-
tween the services during the Great Patriotic War mentioning coordination
between fronts and PVO forces as one of his examples. Kulikov (1975; 22).
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puters, and automated systems of control (ASUs) into the VPVOS control
system was providing new opportunities for improving command and control.
This may have spurred interest in new means of strategic and operational
level troop control.
Fourth, towards the late 1970s the ramifications of the cruise mis-
sile threat were finally becoming clear to both the VPVOS and the General
Staff. The realization of the danger presented by cruise missiles may
have caused a reappraisal of VPVOS forces and organization.
'
All these reasons to reconsider the role of the VPVOS, seem to have
come together in the late 1970s. A hypothetical chronology, based on some
known data points, is given in Table 7.1. In it I assume that the final
decision for any reorganization would have had to take place at least a
year, and possibly 18 months, before its implementation in order to allow
time for planning and execution.
One event that may have influenced the debate over reorganization is
the 1978 KAL incident that not only showed up some weaknesses in the VPVOS
structure and capabilities, but also precipitated a change in VPVOS
o
leadership. But despite this change, VPVOS views on organizational
structure remained fairly stable over the period under consideration.
5 The importance of automation runs throughout the VPVOS troop control
literature. For an overview of some debates associated with the introduc-
tion of ASUs see Bremner (1984). Some of the articles by Batitskiy that
touch on the issue of ASUs are Batitskiy (1969; 8), (1972c; 9-10), (1973b;
41), (1974; 4-5), (1978; 7).
6 The classic Soviet work on the impact of computers (cybernetics) on
command and control is the book by Kontorov and Druzhinin (1978). Druz-
hinin was commander of the RTV troops in the 1960s before joining the Gen-
eral Staff.
7 Jones (1982; 138-40).
8 The 1978 KAL incident is examined in detail in Appendix B.
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Table 7.1: Illustrative Chronology of the VFVOS reorganization
1975 Kulikov article. Initial discussions of PVO reorganization.
1976 Studies of reorganization, Svetlishin article on Fronts
1977 Decision to form TVDs probably made. Ogarkov becomes Chief of GS in
January (Akhromeyev (1986; 506)).
1978 April --KAL 1978. Koldunov appointed CinC VPVOS in July. December-
Formation of Far East TVD. Strusevich article
1979 Further discussion of reorganization? Probable decision on
reorganization.
1980 Last possible moment for decision. Mid-year, beginning of
reorganization of VPVOS?
1981 Reorganization.
1982 VPVO Chief of Staff Romanov killed, Mal'tsev into Main Staff.
1983 KAL 007.
1984 Ogarkov out in Fall. Discussion of reversal?
1985 Decision to reverse? (By at least beginning of year.)
1986 De-reorganization. Mal'tsev article.
Thus, by 1978-1979 the debate over VPVOS reorganization should have
been nearing its culmination, and this surmise is supported by some of the
evidence cited below.
7.3 Changes in Organizational Structure
The reorganization of the VPVO was conducted relatively quietly and
it took several years for Western analysts to fully understand its dimen-
sions and implications. The reorganization appears to have had two major
aspects: 1) peacetime control of VPVO forces was assigned to a deputy
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commander of the Military District and 2) the PVO SV was formally in-
corporated within the VPVO. During wartime the control of VPVO forces
would be vested in a deputy commander for air defense at the TVD level.
In addition to these organizational changes almost half of the
VPVO's fighter aviation assets were transferred to the Air Forces of the
Military Districts, leaving the VPVO with a force of approximately 1,200
interceptors. Simultaneously, two of the three VPVOS aviation schools
were transferred to the Air Force, and the schools and academy of the PVO
SV were transferred to the VPVO. Force size seems to have increased to
630,000, but this number is very approximate. Finally, the Baku Air
Defense District was dissolved, leaving the Moscow Air Defense District as
Q
the only "named" PVO district. These changes had major implications for
the overall command and control of VPVO forces, as well as their effec-
tiveness in performing a variety of missions.
The first indications of a merger of the VPVOS and PVO SV appeared
in late 1980, and the name change and full reorganization appears to have
taken place in January, 1981. ° This change was also reflected in Vescnik
PVO, and in the March issue articles on PVO SV issues began to appear in
the journal. 11
9 U.S. Department of Defense (1984; 36-39, 55), Scott and Scott
(1984;160-164), Urban (1983; 204), Jones (1981; 83-85). The above sources
suggest that the transfer of IA assets took place in 1981, however Collins
(1985; 186) places the transfer in 1982-83. Collins' s numbers could be due
to the late realization of the reorganization by IISS and other force
-
counting organizations. On the size increase see Breightner (1983; 125).
10 Jones (1981; 83).
11 It appears that the editorial staff were not informed of the change
until the last moment, for while the January Vescnik PVO issue bills it-
self as the journal of the VPVO and the editorial refers to the VPVO, but
the rest of the material in the journal refers to the VPVO scrmny (VPVOS)
as before. The delay of several months for the PVO SV material is con-
sistent with the publishing lag for Soviet military journals.
-218-
The place and role of the old PVO SV. in.the^VPVO is rather un-
certain, but it appears to have been accorded a status rather like (or
higher than) a branch, and the former Commander of PVO SV, Levchenko , be-
came a First Deputy Commander in Chief of the VPVO. 2 Levchenko 's succes-
1 ^
sor, Chesnokov, also received this post. J The VPVO literature does not
refer to the PVO SV or its forces as a separate branch and there is little
indication of how these forces were integrated into the branch structure.
The traditional SAM troops, Fighter Aviation, and Radiotechnical branches
were retained but it is not clear if PVO SV forces w»re integrated into
them or remained separate. * It is most likely that the PVO SV became a
branch within the VPVO but that its forces were directly subordinated to
the military districts (or Groups of Forces in Eastern Europe) and some
SAM units might even have been assigned to them.
The delineation of responsibility between the TVDs and the VPVO cen-
tral leadership is also uncertain. In place of the 16 air defense dis-
tricts, an military district-based system was established, with opera-
tional control going to the TVD commands in wartime. But the five TVD
commands (Western (Central Europe), Northwestern, Southern, South West-
ern, Far Eastern) that would form the new "PVO Districts" do not include a
Central TVD for defense of the homeland. 16 Thus it is likely that in ad-
12 See his obituary in Krasnaya zvezda August 29, 1982, p. 3.
13 Chesnokov (1982).
14 In such a case it is assumed that AAA forces would be subsumed under
the SAM branch.
15 Some evidence for the PVO SV retaining some independence, or at least
a separate identity, may be found in the continuation of the PVO section
in the SV journal Voyennyy vestnik. Indeed, Vestnik PVO appears to have
changed fairly little, with only a few articles per issue specifically
devoted to PVO SV issues.
16 International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (1987; 35), also
Urban (1983; 204), Department of Defense (1987; 16). Note that IISS sug-





dition to the TVD level commands there is a centralized command (like the
old Central PVO Front in the Great Patriotic War) with control of homeland
defense forces, probably based on the Moscow Air Defense District. ' This
would be in accord with the reported transfer of large IA forces to the
Air Forces of the Military Districts in the border districts', with the
central XA forces (defending the industrialized area West of the Urals)
under the direct coaoand of the VFVO or a Central PVO Front. 18 If this
surmise is correct, the VPVO would have retained a comparatively small
centralized force for homeland defense, while command and control of per-
haps half the previous force (plus all of the PVO SV forces) would be con-
trolled by the TVD commands.
Some of the factors considered in making this decision may be brief-
ly outlined here before we examine the arguments of the VPVOS and PVO SV
in detail.
Of particular importance was the need to increase the effective-
ness of PVO coordination with the Soviet Air Force and PVO SV forces.
Centralization at the TVD level would reduce the number of overlapping
control systems and various subordinations, concentrating authority in the
PVO Deputy. At the same time, the Deputy would be more closely
responsible to the TVD commander, thus ensuring that VPVO forces were used
17 Suvorov (1984; 78) notes that the "named" Air Defense Districts like
Moscow and (formerly) Baku would become PVO Fronts during wartime. This,
of course, refers to the time before the reorganization.
18 "Organization of the Soviet Armed Forces" (1987; 60) note that the
reorganization merged IA in border districts with the Air Force, whereas
Department of Defense (1987; 60) merely states that IA was merged with the
Air Force.
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in the interests of the conventional offensive, rather than being withheld
to meet a potential strategic threat.
Several other factors may have entered into the decision calculus.
Local wars had demonstrated the synergy between AAA and SAHs
,
particularly
during offensives. The VPVOS , however, had no AAA, so if rear installa-
tions were to be defended by a combination of VPVOS SAM and ground force
AAA forces problems of coordination and interaction would invariably
arise. One possible solution to this problem would have been the sub-
ordination of both of these forces to one service and commander.
Perhaps more important was the emergence of the cruise missile
threat, particularly the intermediate nuclear forces (INF) threat. As
noted in Chapter 6, the VPVOS reaction to the cruise missile had two
stages and in the second stage the nature and magnitude of the threat sank
in. But in 1979 the ground- launched cruise missile threat was added,
posing the problem of providing a reliable defense against cruise missiles
launched from the European theater against both TVD and homeland targets.
Although the threat of 364 ground- launched cruise missiles might not seem
very substantial in comparison with other strategic threats it should be
kept in mind that cruise missiles were also being considered for a range
of conventional attack missions, with the prospect of deploying far more
than a few hundred. The TVD reorganization, by centralizing PVO forces
within the TVD may have had the advantage of being able to concentrate TVD
PVO forces against this threat. Furthermore , PVO SV forces hmd Che lw-
altitude equipment necessary for combating cruise missiles in the TVD , and
coordinating this force with the VPVO forces would be necessary in order
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1 Q
to increase the overall effectiveness.'
While it is unlikely that concern over the ground- launched cruise
missile threat was the main driving force behind the VPVOS reorganization,
it may have been an important contributing factor. u During the early
1980s the cruise missile threat (both air and ground launched) received a
good deal of attention. It was a featured threat in editorials, figured
prominently in assessments of the U.S. threat, and was even explicitly
discussed in training material. * There is a sense throughout these ar-
ticles that modern low altitude SAM systems and IA forces can successfully
intercept cruise missiles, perhaps augmented with more unusual methods
such as "mining" approaches with charges that detonate as the cruise mis-
sile passes overhead. *• But there was also a sense of technological op-
timism in the VPVO in a direction favorable to the cruise missiles: the
VPVO believed most of the optimistic Western estimates of effectiveness
19 A similar argument is made in Jones (1982; 138-140), although he at-
tributes the concern more to air-launched than to ground- launched cruise
missiles. Furthermore, he suggests that the VPVOS leadership endorsed
such an approach, for which there is little evidence, and a good amount to
the contrary.
20 See, for example Sayenko's January 1981 article in Vestnik PVO
stressing that the best weapons against cruise missiles were mobile AAA
(ZSUs), low-altitude SAMs , and even portable SAMs
.
21 For example the January 1981 editorial singled out cruise missiles as
a new and important threat, see "K novym sversheniyam, " (1981; 5).
Koldunov refers to the INF cruise missile threat in Koldunov (1981; 8),
(1982; 8), (1984; 4). On cruise missiles in threat assessments see
Shelekhov (1979), Ignat'yev (1979), Ignat'yev (1980), Shelekhov (1981),
Savitskiy (1982), Nikolayev and Chernukhin (1984), Leonov (1985), Polynin
(1985). On IA training and cruise missiles see Moskvitelev (1984),
(1985). A historical examination of the problem is presented in Franishin
(1984), although it gives fewer figures than Orlov's earlier articles.
22 This unusual concept recurs often in Soviet discussions of cruise mis-
sile defense, even though it does not appear to be common in the Western
literature. See Dzhugashvili (1972; 86), Leonov (1985; 84), Sayenko
(1981; 77).
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and reliability. Thus the threat was depicted as both serious and manage-
able, and a good argument for a greater commitment of resources to the
VPVO. 23
The cruise missile threat did not unambiguously point towards a TVD
level organization, as the large threat against the homeland could also be
used as an argument for centralized control against a massed, highly
structured bomber and cruise missile attack. Such an argument would
stress the need for overall national coordination of defensive forces
throughout the depth of the country and TVD to ensure interaction between
echelons and maneuverability of forces. It is this argument that begins
to appear in some VPVO literature after the reorganization, albeit couched
in historical terms. The next section presents an overview of the VPVO
literature during the period preceding the reorganization and the discus-
sions of organizational structure to be found there.
7.4 Organizational Viewpoints and Reorganization
The ideas and principles embodied in the VPVOS reorganization can be
compared to the views and opinions expressed by representatives of the PVO
SV and VPVOS during the years preceding (and following) the reorganiza-
tion. In doing so one finds quite striking divergence on several major
issues such as VPVOS- -PVO SV interaction, levels of centralization, and
command and control. In the sections below the views of the two forces
are examined and contrasted. The VPVOS position is considered first, as
23 A more cynical view, not to be found in the VPVO (or broader Soviet)
press is that cruise missiles make the problem of air defense so difficult
that it is not worth attempting and that only a more limited warning and
assessment system is required (or possible). This argument is examined in
more detail in the conclusions.
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it sets out the basic issues and positions, against which we may contrast
the PVO SV viewpoints.
7.5 VPVOS Viewpoints
Discussions of VPVOS organizational structure appear to have started
just after the ABM Treaty and picked up momentum after Kulikov's 1975 ar-
ticle on strategic leadership. VPVO views of the reorganization are
primarily revealed in discussions of historical events, particularly the
performance of the VPVOS in the last period of the Great Patriotic War.
The details of the wartime reorganizations of the VPVOS are recounted in
Chapter 3, and reviewed in Table 7.2.
Many of the articles in the VPVOS historical literature use histori-
cal events in surrogate arguments about current problens and issues . Two
types of surrogate arguments may be defined. In the first, the author
consciously and fairly explicitly interprets historical events in a manner
that is clearly relevant to current issues. This form of surrogate argu-
ment is usually quite straightforward and easy to analyze. A second class
of argument is more difficult, for the author may be making a relatively
minor point in an ongoing debate with which the VPVOS readers may be fa-
miliar but outside analysts may not. A third, and very important type of
article may not necessarily have a surrogate argument in it at all. In-
stead it may embody the set interpretation of history prevalent at the
time. But even this last class of articles can be very important, for
they inform us of organizational viewpoints, perceptions, and interests
that may be used to predict probable reactions to new issues.
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Table 7.2: Organizational Changes During the GPV2^
Date Change
July 41 PVO Zones subordinated to Front Commanders as PVO Admin-
25lstrations^-'
Aug 41 Zones disbanded and all ZA directly subordinated to
fronts and armies 2 "
Nov. 41 ZA to VPVOS, Commander VPVOS position created
Jan 42 IA forces fully subordinated to VPVOS
April 42 Moscow PVO Front created, Leningrad, Baku Armies
June 43 E and W PVO fronts created, VPVOS subord to Arty Moscow
Special PVO army formed
Mar- Apr 44 N, S, Transcaucasus fronts created, numbered Corps and
Divs formed from regional units, Deputy Command
of Artillery for PVO position created2 '
Dec 44 N, S PVO fronts changed to W, SW fronts, Central front
created in Moscow
Thus, even if one does not accept the argument that the articles ex-
amined below are direct surrogate discussions of the reorganization there
is still good reason to believe that they represent the VPVOS ' s organiza-
tional viewpoint and interpretation of history. That these arguments
remained stable over time suggests that they remained representative of
VPVOS viewpoints. Were these interpretations of history to come into con-
flict with the prevailing views. and beliefs of the VPVOS they would be
24 Unless otherwise indicated all this information is from Yerofeyev
(1973a).
25 Svetlishin (1973; 96).
26 Svetlishin (1973; 97).
27 Komarov (1975; 86).
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changed. Indeed, it is common in Soviet historiography to change inter-
pretations of history to meet modern needs. Just before the reorganiza-
tion a major but temporary shift in interpretation does take place,
strengthening the argument that these historical discussions are relevant
to current issues. This shift, discussed in detail in the next chapter is
a good example of the exception proving the rule.
In considering the VPVOS's role in the reorganization debate, it is
worthwhile first to lay out some of the basic principles that appear to
have guided the VPVOS and to discuss some of the difficulties of the Great
Patriotic War and their relation to the present.
The issues that arise may be broken down into three broad but not
mutually exclusive categories: leadership and organizational structure,
resource issues, and interaction and coordination. In turn, each of these
categories has certain specific issues that arise and are shared between
categories
.
7.5.1 Leadership and Organizational Structure
First, and perhaps most fundamental, is the problem of leadership
and organizational structure. One of the most basic principles advocated
by the VPVOS is centralized control. But centralized control has several
aspects to it. First, what degree of centralization is optimal? Should
all forces be controlled from one command .post in Moscow, or should some
degree of decentralization be allowed? Second, how can centralization be
combined with effective interaction with other services? For the VPVOS
one basic element of centralized control is that the commander be a VPVOS
officer controlling VPVOS troops, but this might not lead to the most ef-
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fective interaction with other forces. Third, should the same centralized
system operate during both peacetime and wartime? Centralized control
thus touches on a number of important operational and organizational ques-
tions, and not surprisingly becomes a major point of discussion as the
VPVOS tried to adjust to its conventional roles and missions.
Throughout the VPVOS literature of the 1960s and 1970s the principle
of centralization is accorded great weight, particularly since the organi-
zational history of the VPVOS in the Great Patriotic War is one of a
struggle for centralized control of IA and AAA forces. ° Even after the
war the VPVOS in the early 1950s was reorganized and did not take on its
(comparatively) permanent form until 1954. The question of centralized
control of air defense forces is central to the VPVOS literature and to
the service itself.
The advantages of centralization are many. VPVOS authors point out
that centralization allowed the rapid maneuver of VPVOS forces to meet
enemy concentration, coordination of PVO battles over a wide expanse ac-
cording to a single plan (anti-air operations), clear lines of command and
control, and the most efficient and effective use of forces and
resources. 7 But while the importance of centralized control is stressed
for the Great Patriotic War, there are indications that the VPVOS consid-
ers it even more important, and feasible, with modern forces and equip-
ment. Thus the main advantage of automated troop control systems (ASUs)
is to allow more effective processing and transfer of data to enhance cen-
28 See Chapter 3.
29 Zabelok (1968; 21-22), Buturlin and Yakimanskiy (1969), Yerofeyev
(1970; 16-17), Batitskiy (1977c; 11).
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in
tralized control. u This is particularly relevant to the concept of the
anti-air operation, where combat is to be controlled from one master com-
"3 1
mand post. Ji
This stress on centralization of command and control is particularly
clear in VPVOS discussions of the beginning period of the war, before the
November 1941 reorganization. Criticism of the pre-war organizational
structure is fairly uniform throughout the VPVOS literature, with two ex-
•11
ceptions that will be discussed below. *
The beginning period of the war organization is criticized on
several points, all of which appear to be relevant to contemporary con-
cerns. One author notes the following "deficiencies":
--Incomplete realization of the principle of unified control of PVO
forces. IA forces only supported VPVOS.
--Control of PVO Zones was not through an independent organ but
through the control apparatus of the Military District.
--The territorial arrangement of PVO did not allow for establishment
of set complements of forces. J
These criticisms are more directly presented than in some VPVOS ar-
ticles, but they are representative. It should be noted though, that the
beginning period of the war organizational structure closely resembles
that adopted in the 1981 reorganization, and many criticisms of the begin-
ning period of the war structure appear to be surrogate arguments against
the reorganization. Indeed, the article from which the criticisms above
30 See Bremner (1984), Lepingwell (1986; 24-48).
31 Kalugin (1968; 51), Svetlishin (1977; 89-90), Gorokhov (1988; 1,3),
Belenko (1988; 98).
32 Frantsev (1981) and Gorbunov (1980).
33 Strusevich (1978; 35).
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were taken appears to be one of the strongest surrogate arguments against
the reorganization to appear in the VPVOS literature.
Criticisms of the beginning period of the war seem to take on a
special sharpness and greater frequency just before the reorganization,
suggesting that they were being used as surrogate arguments. ^ It is
also a later article on the beginning period of the war that signifies the
reopening of the debate over reorganization in 1984. 35
Having established the importance of the principle of centraliza-
tion, we must recognize that complete centralization is impossible and
some degree of decentralization must be built into the system. Here the
issue of the PVO Fronts and TVD level commands arises. Much of the post-
1975 VPVOS literature deals in (repetitious) detail with the creation of
the PVO Fronts in June 1943, and this discussion seems directly relevant
to the proposed devolution of authority to the TVD commands. The exis-
tence of a surrogate argument is fairly clear, as the issues involved are
similar and there is a sudden surge in discussion of the PVO Fronts. How
should these historical arguments be interpreted?
The PVO Fronts were roughly the same scale as modern TVDs and their
disposition was similar to that proposed for TVDs. This might suggest
that the discussions of PVO Fronts were arguments for TVD level PVO com-
mands. Such an argument seems plausible, but it is more likely that the
VPVOS was arguing for a different system.
First, VPVOS articles stress the importance of centralized control
and unified control of all branches under the VPVOS. As opposed to this




a TVD command would centralize control under the overall direction of the
TVD commander (a Ground Forces or General Staff officer) rather than under
the VPVOS . Service level centralized control of forces would thus be
reduced rather than enhanced.
This criticism of the TVD level commands appears to be reflected in
the argument emerging late in the 1970s against overly strict Stavka con-
trol of PVO forces and in favor of greater authority for the PVO Front
commander. ° A PVO Front system would retain VPVOS resources and control
within the service, albeit under the general direction of the Stavka.
Such an arrangement would not only retain VPVOS control and independence,
but might make for more rapid regrouping and maneuver of VPVOS forces in
the event of a strategic threat. Thus, I argue that the discussions of
PVO Fronts were not a direct surrogate for the TVD commands established in
1981. Instead, a PVO Front type of organization was being proposed as an
alternative to the TVD command as a measure that would improve coordina-
tion with the ground forces and PVO SV forces while retaining VPVOS
leadership of VPVOS forces.
First, let us look at how the PVO Fronts were portrayed. Two main
attributes were stressed: their ability to interact with ground forces on
the offensive, and their wide scale of operations. ' The VPVOS literature
uniformly treats the creation of the PVO Fronts favorably. Furthermore,
the PVO Fronts were classified as ob'yedineniy a term denoting a large
scale formation with an operational-strategic scope, similar to that of
36 Svetlishin (1979; 241).
37 See, for example, the discussion in Svetlishin (1976; 42-45).
-230-
fronts or TVDs . The advantages of the PVO Fronts are stressed as impor-
tant parts of the centralized PVO system of command and control.
There is one criticism of the PVO Fronts that emerges in Svet-
lishin's 1979 book on VPVOS operational art that might well be a surrogate
argument directed against the proposed TVD system. Svetlishin complains
of overly strict centralization because the PVO Front commander was unable
to move forces from defended objectives or determine objectives to be de-
fended without the specific approval of the Stavka. Nor were the PVO
Fronts allowed to create significant reserves. This represents a very
serious complication in the execution of maneuver and it is curious that
it was not mentioned before in the VPVOS literature. ° While Svetlishin
claims the PVO Front commanders were able to accomplish their tasks by
careful study of the situation and requests to Stavka to move forces, the
Military Soviets of the PVO Fronts several times put before Stavka the is-
sues of reserves and the right to regroup forces. These requests met with
no success. Svetlishin quotes a complaint by the South PVO Front Military
Soviet to the Commander of Artillery (Voronov) that illustrates the dif-
ficulties caused by this strict control:
The South PVO Front continuously receives requests to desig-
nate PVO means for protection of objectives of the rear of the Uk-
raine front. But we have no reserves at our disposition. Removal
of units or podrazdeleniy [battalion or smaller] from the defense
of objectives having lost their significance [value] or located in
the deep rear, currently can be done only with your decision in
each separate case. Such complete centralization in the use of
PVO means in the absence of free reserves does not allow timely
provision of protection to important objectives, and likewise ex-
cludes the maneuver of forces with the goal of strengthening the
38 Svetlishin (1979a; 237, 241)
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PVO of certain objectives subject to the systematic actions of
enemy aviation...
This quote clearly and concisely indicates the problems associated
with the very strict centralized control by Stavka. But Svetlishin does
not finish the story- -he gives no indication of how this problem should be
solved and implies that it was not. The point of Svetlishin' s comment is
clear: centralized control may have a damaging effect on combat effective-
ness if too much control is concentrated at the wrong level. The argument
is not against centralized control per se but rather against overly strict
control on the part of Stavka.
Svetlishin' s comments may be part of an argument for retaining con-
trol within the VPVOS , and widening the authority of the PVO Front com-
manders, rather than assigning responsibility for these dispositions to
the TVD level or to General Staff representatives. This argument is pre-
viously unknown in the VPVOS literature and it appears just before the
VPVOS reorganization. Furthermore, Svetlishin follows the standard prac-
tice of dealing with a sensitive argument: presenting it in the words of a
leading Great Patriotic War military figure. ° In short, Svetlishin's
argument is not with the formation of the PVO Fronts, but rather their de-
gree of independence and autonomy.
A second important component of the reorganization that created the
PVO Fronts was the subordination of the VPVOS to the Commander of Artil-
lery. While the decision to create the PVO Fronts is widely praised in
39 Svetlishin (1979a; 241). Note that this complaint was sent on May 22,
1944 well after most of the reorganizations.
40 This is the Soviet equivalent of "plausible deniability" - - the author
is only quoting what a Marshal said.
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the VPVOS literature the subordination to Artillery has received more
mixed reviews, as summarized in Table 7.3.
There are two aspects to the interpretation of VPVOS comments on the
subordination to Artillery. First, there is a purely historical aspect:
Idle subordination was a step backward from the creation of the VPVOS as a
i
separate service . VPVOS commentators take the issue of independence
seriously, and criticisms of this decision have been very harsh. For ex-
ample, Colonel General Zimin writing in 1965, stated that the subordina-
tion had been prompted by "subjective considerations" and did not work out
well. 1 A second interpretation, however, begins to emerge towards the
end of the 1970s. The subordination to Artillery also represented the
partial elimination of the delineation between strategic air defenses
(VPVOS) and tactical air defenses (PVO SV)
.
As such, discussions of the subordination may stand as a surrogate
for the combining of these two forces into one service. There is some
clear evidence for this, as the two articles (discussed in more detail be-
low) that herald the merger of the VPVOS and PVO SV into the VPVO reverse
the standard VPVOS conclusion about the advisability of the merger, and
claim that it was a great step forward in VPVOS operational art. (See
Table 7.3.) It should also be noted that from the PVO SV viewpoint, as
expressed by Levchenko and others, the subordination to Artillery brought
about a significant improvement in coordination between the two forces and
is strongly endorsed.
41 Zimin (1965; 111). The same comment in made in Yerofeyev (1973a; 88'
89) , see below.
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Table 7.3: Views on the Subordination of the VPVOS to
the Commander of Artillery
AUTHOR Mentioned? Pro or Con? Journal
Biryuzov (1961) N MT
Zimin (1965) Y -t-t-Con MT
Batitskiy (1967) Y +Con Vizh
Batitskiy (1967) N MT
Batitskiy (1968) Y +Con Book
Svetlishin (1969) N Vizh
Svetlishin (1971) Y NC Vizh
Batitskiy (1972a, b) N Vizh
Batitskiy (1972c, d) N MT
Yerofeyev (1973a) Y -H-Con VPVO
Yerofeyev (1973b) Y NC Vizh
Svetlishin (1973) N MT
Buturlin et al (1975) N VPVO
Komarov (1975) Y NC VPVO
Svetlishin (1976) N VPVO
Svetlishin (1977) N Vizh
Chedleyev (1977) Y NC VPVO
Strusevich (1978) Y +Con Vizh
Sozinov (1979) N Vizh
Klevtsov (1979) Y +Pro VPVO
Svetlishin (1979) Y NC Book
Gorbunov (1980) Y -M-Pro Vizh
Frantsev (1981) Y -H-Pro Vizh
Dagayev (1981) N Vizh
Yerofeyev (1981) N VPVO
Smirnov (1983) N Vizh
Koldunov (1985) N Vizh
Mal'tsev (1986) Y +Con Vizh
Particularly interesting is the treatment of the issue in two articles by
the same author, one published in Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal and the
other in Vestnik PVO. In the Vestnik PVO article the subordination is
criticized as incorrect and based on subjective considerations, whereas in
the Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal article the subordination is noted but
42 The Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal article is a shortened version of
the previously published Vestnik PVO article, see Yerofeyev (1973a, b).
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not commented upon. The omission of this criticism suggests the pos-
sibility that the formulation on subordination was already a sensitive is-
sue and that controversial service-oriented statements were being censored
from Voyenno- istoricheskiy thurnal. Indeed, Batitskiy's last critical
comment on the subordination was issued in 1968, and after that time he
avoided comment on the subject. The last critical evaluation of this
action in the pre -reorganization VPVO literature was in 1978.^ There
then follows a long period of silence on the issue, until after the rever-
sal of the reorganization in 1986 when the Chief of the Main Staff, Col.
Gen. I. Mal'tsev criticized the subordination as a negative development. °
This evidence strongly suggests that the historical event of subordination
to Artillery became a surrogate for the merging of strategic and tactical
air defenses. On this issue it is interesting to note that it was only a
low-ranking officer (Colonel Strusevich) who explicitly criticized the
subordination before the reorganization, while higher -ranking officers ei-
ther ignored it (often when it was directly pertinent to the issue under
discussion) or only mentioned it in passing. It may well be that this is-
sue was too controversial for high-ranking officers to discuss in public,
and that lower -ranking officers were designated for this task. '
43 Yerofeyev (1973a; 88-89), (1973b; 61-62).
44 Batitskiy (1968; 201, 341). See Table 7.3 for his later omissions.
45 Strusevich (1978; 39). Th phrase "subjective considerations" is par-
ticularly harsh and refers to Stalin's arbitrariness. Strusevich' s argu-
ment is that it simply added to the workload of the Commander of Artillery
and that the reorganization did not improve effectiveness while it set
back the VPVOS on the road to independence.
46 Mal'tsev (1986; 26-27, 31).
47 This practice of using "mouthpieces" has a long history in Soviet
defense debates.
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Thus the criticism of the subordination to the Commander of Artillery
strongly suggests that the VPVOS opposed the combination of PVO SV and
VPVOS forces into one PVO structure. This interpretation runs completely
counter to the viewpoint of the PVO SV, discussed below.
To sum up, while centralized control is valued throughout the Soviet Armed
Forces, the VPVOS interpretation of this principle had some particular
nuances. It went beyond the issue of simply centralized leadership to in-
clude the clear delineation between tactical and strategic PVO, and im-
plied that the centralized control should be under a VPVOS officer. PVO
Fronts appear to be one potential means of ensuring such centralized con-
trol, but only if they are vested with sufficient authority to maneuver
their forces and respond rapidly to the changing situation. All of these
views, however, run counter to the 1981 reorganization and suggest that it
was not endorsed by the VPVOS. These issues of control are also closely
intertwined with the second category of issues addressed in the VPVOS lit-
erature: resource issues.
7.5.2 Resource Issues
For the VPVOS the distinction between operational control of
resources and ownership of resources is an important one. This is very
clear in the case of Fighter Aviation which at the beginning of the war
was supposed to be controlled by the VPVOS even though its forces were
owned by the Soviet Air Force. Even after the November 1941 reorganiza-
tion that formally subordinated IA forces to the VPVQS the problem of dual
control was not fully solved. 8 While the actual aircraft were sub-
48 See Svetlishin (1973a; 97-98) for one of the earliest criticisms along
these lines.
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ordinate to the VPVOS , the maintenance and supply systems were subordinate
to the air forces of the military districts and fronts:
Air Force Commands of the districts and fronts deployed rear
[service] units only in the interests of their own troops, some-
times leaving [VPVOS IA] regiments without service. Such types of
quarrels in control and support of aviation units designated for
PVO of objectives of the rear of the country led to the dis-
organization of their combat activities and lowered the effective-
ness of the PVO of the country as a whole. 9
The above quote is revealing, for it very clearly indicates the ex-
istence of interservice competition for resources during the most acute
period of the war. While this runs counter to the generally accepted (and
promulgated by the Soviets) view of the Soviet military as a very careful-
ly and precisely run machine, it should not be surprising. Under condi-
tions of extreme resource constraints, very difficult missions, and severe
repercussions (both military and personal) for failure, the incentives to
retain control of all available resources become extremely strong. The
Soviet Air Force, greatly outnumbered and faced with the need to provide
ground and air support for the troops in the Battle of Moscow, was under-
standably reluctant to give up control of its scare forces and therefore
it engaged in organizational attempts to retain control and to fend off
the VPVOS. 50
49 Chedleyev (1977; 82)
.
50 It is also worth noting that the subordination of IA to the VPVOS did
not take place until after the worst of the Battle of Moscow was over, and
after German air strikes had tapered off. The reason for this is unclear,
perhaps during the actual battle the upper command and control levels were
too overloaded to deal with Air Force-VPVOS resource problems. More like-
ly, however, is that the lessons of the Battle of Moscow took a while to
be learned and that the reorganization was decided upon in order to bol-
ster VPVOS defenses against an expected Spring bombing campaign. While
VPVOS sources do not refer to any such expectation, given the disposition
of German troops and aircraft near Moscow such an expectation would not be
unreasonable, particularly since the Soviets were expecting a renewed
ground campaign against Moscow. This would also explain the April 1942
formation of the Moscow PVO front. See Werth (1964; 389-90).
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It was this problem of dual subordination that was resolved by the
January 1942 reorganization that completely transferred IA to the VPVOS
,
including the airfield support battalions that had previously been sub-
ordinate to the Air Force. * The subordination of IA to the VPVOS greatly
eased IA command and control problems for the VPVOS and the historical
discussions concerning IA clearly indicate the importance to the VPVOS of
the ownership of all forces designated for PVO by the VPVOS. Operational
subordination is regarded as insufficient, as the service with ownership
will still try to impose its own missions on the forces. 2 This argument
has direct repercussions for the TVD reorganization that removed sig-
nificant IA forces from central VPVOS control and ownership. Beyond the
fact that this reduced overall VPVOS forces (and hence capability) , even
if they were to be operationally subordinated to the VPVOS in some cases
this would still represent a situation very much like that prevailing in
the beginning period of the war. Indeed, the argument by Chedleyev quoted
above appears in 1977 at a time when deliberations on possible VPVOS
reorganization were probably already underway, and it may well be a direct
criticism of the proposals.
Other resource control issues are also raised by the VPVOS, particu-
larly the issue of logistics. The importance of central control of rear
and supply units is emphasized later in Chedleyev' s article as he points
out that the Spring 1944 reorganization of the VPVOS also centralized and
subordinated all supply (except for food) under the VPVOS. 3 In November
51 Svetlishin (1973a; 98).
52 Chedleyev (1977; 82), Svetlishin (1973a; 97-98).
53 With the exception of the Transcaucasus PVO Front which received its
support through the Ground Forces Front.
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1944 other rear support units (e.g. hospitals, depots, workshops) were
transferred to the VPVOS . Chedleyev claims that this had a positive ef-
fect on the support of troop combat readiness. These steps to include
more support forces under the VPVOS suggests a recognition both that they
were not well served by the Ground Forces fronts (which probably gave
priority to ground combat forces) and were a further step towards estab-
lishing the VPVOS as a self-sufficient service.
Thus the importance of service control and ownership of all elements
essential to its combat performance is stressed, from fuel to hospitals.
This tendency to "vertical integration" is clearly related to similar
tendencies in other organizations. 3 By achieving such integration the
service increases its control over the environment and reduces risk and
uncertainty, as it no longer has to rely on external organizations with
other goals and values. While we do not know if VPVOS logistics were
reorganized in 1981, it is quite possible that a centralization of TVD
logistics took place that might have reduced VPVOS control over its own
supplies. Even if that were not the case, however, the preference for
both control and ownership of all combat and support resources is clearly
represented in the VPVOS literature.
There is also the question of resource control in the transition
from peacetime to a war footing. Before the reorganization the VPVOS ap-
peared to operate under the same command and control structure in
peacetime as during wartime, in keeping with its stress on high combat
readiness. However, it seems that under the reorganization the military
54 Chedleyev (1977; 84-85).
55 Thompson (1967; 29-37).
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districts have peacetime administrative control over VPVOS resources,
while during wartime (or mobilization) the TVD commands (or perhaps even
Ground Force Fronts) would take over operational control. ° It therefore
appears that some time would be required for a full transition from
peacetime to wartime command and control structures. Any such lag (with
possible confusion as well) would reduce the combat readiness of the
VPVOS, and with the growing emphasis during the late 1970s on the danger
of surprise air attack this was viewed as a significant problem.
Overall, resource issues indicate a VPVOS preference for both owner-
ship and control of all necessary resources in both peacetime and wartime.
This is in keeping with the twin demands of centralization and combat
readiness that play such an important role in VPVOS operational art. Once
again, this set of views is both consistent with VPVOS organizational in-
terests and in conflict with the reorganization.
7.5.3 Interaction and Coordination
The third category of issues, interaction and coordination, is re-
lated to the questions of centralization and resource control but has more
direct operational and tactical significance. ° VPVOS authors stress four
developments that enhanced interaction: the creation of PVO Fronts, the
formation of operational groups, joint warning systems, and joint planning
and tactics. Of these, the PVO Fronts have already been examined. Their
56 See the discussion of the KAL 007 incident below.
57 Mil'chenko (1971), Nikolayev (1979), Gromov (1976), Batitskiy (1977;
4), Mal'tsev (1979), Koldunov (1981; 8).
58 Here we are mostly concerned with inter- service interaction but a
great deal of attention is also paid to the problems of inter-branch in-
teraction in the VPVOS literature.
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creation was accompanied by a redrawing of PVO boundaries to establish a
closer correspondence between PVO corps and divisions and the correspond-
ing SV formations (Fronts, armies). 7 This change allowed closer coor-
dination between the two forces by avoiding the need to coordinate between
several different commanders and forces.
Operational groups were presented by the VPVOS as the key to ensur-
ing coordination between VPVOS and PVO SV units defending the same target.
Often up to a division in size, these groups would be formed from the
staffs of the PVO Fronts. Although the operational groups do not appear
to have been given operational control over PVO SV forces they were in-
tended to coordinate closely on the defense of the assigned objective, and
their command posts were sometimes co- located with those of the PVO SV. u
The operational groups were first established at Kursk, and were ex-
tensively used throughout the later part of the war. * Indeed, the opera-
tional groups appear to be the main VPVOS solution to the problem of
interaction- -joint forces are to be formed at the tactical or operational
level as necessary, not at the service level by an organizational merger.
Where operational groups were not employed the VPVOS, PVO SV, and
the Soviet Air Force acted in echelons, with the PVO SV and the Air Force
providing cover for the battlefield and the immediate rear while the VPVOS
covered targets towards the rear of the Front, particularly LOCs . This
system is not as simple as it sounds, however, for coordination and
59 Sozinov (1975; 22).
60 Sozinov (1975; 22), Svetlishin (1976b; 43-44), Yerofeyev (1980; 72)
Note that this is a different arrangement from that of Stalingrad, where
VPVOS forces were actually placed under the command of the SV Front com-
mander
.
61 Svetlishin (1972; 25-26).
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delineation of the two echelons demanded a good deal of planning and
cooperation. From Soviet descriptions of this coordination there appear
to have been some major difficulties.
First, there was the problem of coordinating separate air observa-
tion and warning systems. The PVO SV deployed its own warning system
(VNOS) to provide warning and target information to its own batteries and
the VPVOS had its own system (including radar). This duplication resulted
in some predictable problems, including maldeployment of warning forces,
gaps in coverage, failure to pass on warning, and so forth. * In addition
the VPVOS had its own problems with establishing warning coverage because
its advance warning units would outrun communications lines.
Several steps were taken to reduce these warning problems. VPVOS
commentators mention the creation of joint warning systems integrating PVO
SV and VPVOS forces (or at least sharing their data) as a great improve-
ment in PVO efficiency. To solve the problem of communications the VPVOS
developed radiobattalions during the last years of the war- -warning posts
equipped with powerful radio stations for rapid and direct communica-
tions. But despite these measures some very basic problems were never
solved. For example the Air Force and VPVOS never developed a system for
62 Most articles simply note that joint warning was established, for some
more detailed and critical comments see Bednenko (1977; 16), Botin (1979;
77), Smirnov (1978; 34-35). On the maldeployment of VNOS forces see Svet-
lishin (1965; 35-36), Yerofeyev (1980; 75-76). It is often noted that
problems in warning and coordination resulted in the poor defense of
Gor'kiy, Saratov and Yaroslavl' in June 1943. See, for example, Sozinov
(1979; 24), Yerofeyev (1973a; 61), Batitskiy (1972; 24), Strusevich (1978;
38).
63 See Svetlishin (1977d; 114), Yerofeyev (1980; 75-76). It is a measure
of the fairly low level of electronics use that this measure took place
fairly late in the war and is considered a major technological break-
through .
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transferring targets between the two forces. It would therefore appear
that a target located by the Air Force would have to be re-located by the
VPVOS before it could be intercepted. This suggests a rather low level
of coordination between the two systems. It further appears that for the
most part Air Force and VPVOS aircraft operated in completely separate
zones in order to avoid mistaken attacks on friendly forces. 5 Other
reports of interaction problems suggest that in some locations this
delineation of zones caused major problems, and that forces were in-
tegrated on a case-by-case basis. ° Overall, though, there seems to have
been relatively poor communication between the services.
VPVOS authors do note the importance of joint planning between the
services, but their examples are rather simple: joint documents and
regulations, establishment of joint recognition symbols, and delineation
of zones of action. While the forces were indeed able to interact, the
stress seems to have been on separate zones of action in almost all cases.
This is quite different from the smooth "combined arms" performance
that one might expect from a highly centralized leadership. In fact, the
stress on centralization may have had a deleterious impact on inter-
service interaction, as it forced even routine problems to be sent to the
top for authorization. One example may serve to illustrate the problem.
At Budapest the PVO forces blockading the city needed to move a sear-
chlight company to allow PVO SV forces to fire on German night flights.
To accomplish this the Deputy Commander for PVO of the SV Front requested
64 Buturlin and Mosevkin (1976; 91).




the move from the VPVOS main staff, and receiving their agreement informed
the VPVOS Corps commander. The VPVOS Corps Commander could not make the
decision and requested a decision from the South-West PVO Front Commander
who approved the redeployment of the searchlight company. This process
took three days. While the authors who note this problem propose opera-
tional groups as the solution it is clear that the principle of strict
centralization had its inefficient aspects.
Another major problem experienced during the war was the appearance
of gaps between the VPVOS and PVO SV. While in many cases these gaps were
due to inadequate logistical support for the VPVOS (in some cases Stavka
had to intervene to order additional transport) there also appear to have
been lags associated with the authorization needed to move forces from the
objectives being defended. There are reports that gaps of up to 300 km
CO
occurred. 00
In facing the problems of interaction and coordination in modern
conventional warfare the VPVOS undoubtedly ran into these same problems,
with new technologies easing some aspects and complicating others. The
1981 reorganization was one attempt to solve the interaction problem by
concentrating the control of all PVO and Air Force assets at one command
67 Slezkin and Mosevkin (1984; 84). Note that they do not mention
whether the PVO Front commander obtained permission from the General
Staff, although earlier in the paragraph they state that such permission
is necessary.
68 Many authors note that attempts were made to prevent gaps from arising
between the VPVOS and PVO SV, but few are specific on this problem. See
Botin (1979; 77), Gorbunov (1980; 25-26), Dagayev (1981; 30).
69 For example the problem of identification friend-or-foe (IFF) has be-
come much more acute in an era of long-range missiles, as the Egyptians
discovered in the 1973 war when they lost a significant number of aircraft
to friendly SAM fire.
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level- -the TVD. Whether such a system would have solved the problems ex-
perienced during the Great Patriotic War is unclear- -certainly it would
have streamlined the control system and lines of authority. It would also
reduce the problem of interaction by pushing back the interface between
aircraft in the Military District Air Forces and the VPVOS IA to within
the borders of the USSR, thereby reducing the need for interaction against
most tactical targets. But while the TVD level commands might ease inter-
action with other services, interaction does not appear to have been a
major concern of the VPVOS. Most articles imply that the Great Patriotic
War system was largely successful, and that the operational group was the
basis for effective coordination.
In all three of these areas, leadership and organizational struc-
ture, resource control, and interaction, the VPVOS 's viewpoints were
largely opposed to the concepts embodied in the 1981 reorganization.
Where the VPVOS preferred centralized control at the national level, with
a clear delineation between VPVOS and PVO SV forces, and complete owner-
ship and control of all VPVOS forces, the 1981 reorganization went against
all of these principles. On the basis of all of these categories, then,
there is good reason to believe that the 1981 reorganization was not wel-
comed by the VPVOS. The 1981 reorganization embodied many of the same
characteristics of the 1941 organizational structure that had been so con-
sistently condemned by VPVOS commentators, and these criticisms continued
after the organization as well.
In contrast, the PVO SV held very different views, particularly in
the area of interaction, and these were more consonant with the
reorganization. They are examined in the following section.
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7.6 PVO SV Viewpoint*
The PVO SV has a much different mission and history than the VPVOS
and consequently has developed quite a different conception of the role of
PVO forces and their effective deployment. This conception is revealed
largely through the historical literature on the PVO SV, which although
less voluminous than for the VPVOS, is still very revealing of its organi-
zational interests and viewpoints.
The PVO SV literature shares several common themes with that of the
VPVOS, such as the importance of massing, concentration, and the search
for an optimal organization structure, but there are also many differences
in topics and perspective. Thus, the PVO SV literature strongly empha-
sizes the weakness of the PVO SV forces existing at the beginning of the
war, and implicitly (and occasionally explicitly) criticizes resource al-
location between PVO SV and VPVOS. The perspective on interservice inter-
action is also different, with the PVO SV particularly critical of the Air
Force in the early period of the war and some implicit criticism of PVO
SV- -VPVOS. Throughout, the perspective of the VPVOS historiography is
more closely tied to that of the ground forces than the VPVOS. Some of
the key issues in VPVOS historiography are examined below.
First, the VPVOS portrayal of the beginning period of the Great
Patriotic War is very different in emphasis than that of the VPVOS.
Whereas VPVOS authors discuss problems of organizational structure and
70 The term PVO SV is properly applied only after the troop air defense
forces became a branch of the SV in the late 1950' s. For convenience,
however, I will apply it to ground force air defense troops during the
Great Patriotic War.
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command and control problems, PVO SV authors tend to highlight the lack of
AAA forces throughout the army. 1 Indeed, many PVO SV authors argue that
sufficient AAA forces were not available until after the battle of
Stalingrad in the Fall of 1942. As pertains to organizational structure,
the November 1941 reorganization of Soviet air defenses that created the
delineation between the PVO SV and VPVOS is sometimes criticized for
reducing PVO SV force levels even further. 2
Second, the issue of organizational structure is quite important,
albeit on a tactical scale. After the November 1941 reorganization, PVO
SV forces had no centralized leadership until the summer of 1942 when all
PVO SV units were subordinated to the Commander of Artillery of the Armed
Forces and the post of Deputy Head of Artillery for PVO was created. Army
PVO regiments were also created, unifying some of the disparate PVO units,
73
and increasing the concentration of fire. J
Third, the principle of massing of forces was of great importance to
the PVO SV, reflecting their artillery heritage. Thus, in October 1942
the State Defense Committee ordered the creation of zenith artillery
groups (AAA groups) , incorporating 1/2 to 1/3 of the AAA forces of the
army or front. Army level AAA groups were to be commanded by a deputy
commander of artillery for PVO. Along with the creation of AAA groups,
special Reserve Divisions of the Supreme High Command (RVGK) were created
that could be assigned to armies or fronts in particularly active areas.
71 Tur (1962; 15-16), Desnitskiy (1963; 13-16), Lavrent'yev (1971a; 30),
Lavrent'yev (1972; 25-26).
72 Lavrent'yev (1972; 26)
73 Tur (1962; 19), Lavrent'yev (1972; 26-27).
74 Tur (1962; 19), Desnitskiy (1963; 22), Lavrent'yev 1972; 28).
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Like other reserves these were under the direct command of the Stavka.
These reserves allowed massing and the creation of very high AAA densities
along sections of the front involved in breakthroughs or to defend river-
crossings .
Fourth, there is the issue of resource allocation between the VPVOS
and PVO SV. While this is never addressed directly and explicitly, a
close reading of the PVO SV literature reveals a clear annoyance with the
priority given to the VPVOS during the early period of the Great Patriotic
War when resources were very scarce. The primary example of this is the
allocation of all production of mid-calibre 85 mm AAA guns to the VPVOS
and anti-tank units until early 1943. This lack of mid-calibre AAA
severely hampered the PVO SV for it allowed German aircraft to overfly the
small calibre AAA and strike with impunity. ° Radar stations also appear
to have been assigned first to the VPVOS, although this case is not as
clear.
Fifth, and finally, the PVO SV and the VPVOS appear to have very
different interpretations of their interaction during the war. This issue
is examined in detail below. One particular concern of both was the PVO
SV forces outrunning the VPVOS forces creating a large gap in the
defenses
.
It should be noted that in general the PVO SV pays little attention
to the VPVOS (and vice versa) in the historical literature and interaction
is often described in a pro- forma manner. This point will be discussed in
75 Tur (1962; 20, 22), Levchenko (1976; 37), Chesnokov 1983; 29-30).
76 Tur (1962; 19-20), Desnitskiy (1963; 15-16, 18, 22).
77 Tur (1962; 23),
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more detail in later sections, but it should be pointed out that in most
of the major offensives of the last period of the war the PVO SV forces
played a much larger role than the VPVOS . Indeed, just by comparing the
total number of aircraft destroyed during the war by the two forces (PVO
SV: over 21,000, VPVOS: 7313) one gets a relative estimate of their impor-
7fi
tance during the Great Patriotic War.
Thus, while there are some points of congruence between the VPVOS
and the PVO SV there are also some clear divergences and even indications
of a muted rivalry.
The clearest and most authoritative statement of the divergent views
of VPVOS- -PVO SV interaction and organization was presented by Colonel
General P. G. Levchenko , the Commander of the PVO SV, in a rare appearance
in Vestnik PVO in September 1976 as part of a short historical series ex-
amining VPVOS interaction with other services during the Great Patriotic
War. Levchenko 's article is harshly critical of the interaction of VPVOS
and PVO SV forces and has clear relevance to contemporary issues.
Levchenko 's framework of analysis is a chronological overview of the
development of VPVOS- -PVO SV interaction, similar to that of some VPVOS
articles. In analyzing the first months of the war (before the November
1941 reorganization) Levchenko states that Ground Forces Front control of
AAA forces resulted in a very effective use of the available resources for
front defense. Lines of authority were clearer and Ground Forces com-
manders could maneuver and assign forces as the situation demanded. All
available forces were used for front echelon PVO and the unified warning
78 These numbers are probably somewhat inflated, and their ratio is more




and fire control systems were effective. Compared to the VPVOS descrip-
tions of misallocated forces and ineffective use Levchenko's argument is
almost exactly the opposite.
In describing the November reorganization that transferred AAA
forces to the VPVOS, Levchenko emphasizes the negative effects of strip-
ping the majority of AAA from the fronts for rear area defense. ^ Lev-
chenko further implies that this reorganization was the start of the orga-
nizational and interaction problems: "From this time the interaction be-
tween the VPVOS and PVO SV became one of the complicated operating
[operational] measures in the system of PVO in the frontal [prifrontal]
zone. ^ Thus, the organizational advance hailed by the VPVOS authors is
treated as a large step backwards, complicating the command and control of
PVO.
According to Levchenko, the principal problem with the reorganiza-
tion was that it gave responsibility for LOC and rear area defense to the
VPVOS , which did not fall under the direct control of the Ground Forces
Front commanders. The Ground Forces Front commander had to send requests
and petitions to the VPVOS for VPVOS forces to screen his LOCs and rear
areas rather than designating his own forces for this purpose. If VPVOS
forces were not forthcoming c were insufficient then the Front commander
79 Levchenko (1976b; 77).
80 Levchenko points out that the reorganization stripped the fronts of
971 of their AAA regiments, 712 of the detached mid-calibre AAA bat-
talions, 602 of small-calibre AAA, 502 and 402 of the detached mid-calibre
AAA and small -calibre AAA batteries respectively, and the majority of
anti-aircraft machine gun and VNOS (warning) units. See Levchenko (1976b;
78). Given what we know from Lavrent'yev's work on the poor state of AAA
at the beginning of the war this action must have denuded the troops of
almost all their PVO forces at a crucial point in the Battle of Moscow.
81 Levchenko (1976b; 78).
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had to stretch his own PVO SV forces to cover the objectives. * These PVO
SV forces then had to be coordinated with any VPVOS forces protecting the
objective, usually through the formation of a unified group of forces sub-
ordinated to a commander agreed to by the two (VPVOS and PVO SV) commands.
It appears that the VPVOS had primary responsibility for target designa-
tion in the frontal rear while the PVO SV coordinated the plan for the ac-
tual PVO in accord with force dispositions. J This form of interaction
appears complicated and unwieldy. The unified groups that Levchenko
refers to appear to be the same as the operational groups praised by the
VPVOS, but here they are presented as inflexible hybrids of the two con-
trol systems required by an unwise delineation of PVO tasks.
Levchenko goes on to stress the need for maneuver of PVO SV and
VPVOS forces during offensives and the importance of rapid exchange of in-
formation concerning the air situation. The defense of large cities at
the front lines (e.g. Moscow, Stalingrad) is presented as the best example
of interaction between the two forces, for then the VPVOS was already
designated to defend the city and its LOCs, so by default it screened the
frontal rear.
The reorganization of the VPVOS into two fronts and subordination to
the Commander of Artillery is also reinterpreted. Unlike VPVOS com-
mentators Levchenko notes that the subordination increased the interaction
between the VPVOS and the PVO SV, pointing out that they even worked to-
gether in one building. This also allowed the resolution of some ques-
82 Levchenko (1976b; 78).
83 Levchenko (1976b; 78). Levchenko is very vague on the exact delinea-
tion of VPVOS and PVO SV responsibilities.
84 Levchenko (1976b; 79).
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cions of the movement of small PVO forces within the Commander of Artil-
Q C
lery structure.-^
The advantages of the VPVOS reorganization were allegedly proved at
the battle of Kursk. Unlike VPVOS historians Levchenko claims that the
VPVOS was unable to designate sufficient forces to protect the LOCs and
that an equal quantity of PVO forces was assigned from the fronts to pro-
tect LOCs. This also required close coordination with VPVOS units acting
86in the same area.
As the Soviet offensive gained speed the problem of providing inter-
action between the advancing PVO SV and VPVOS units defending the rear was
addressed by the Spring 1944 reorganization of the PVO Fronts. Levchenko
welcomes this reorganization and cites the blockade of Breslau as another
87
example of successful interaction. But Levchenko claims that at
Stalingrad and Kerch the results of mixing VPVOS and PVO SV forces in one
combat order had proven unfavorable, so at Breslau the forces were as-
signed to separate areas of the blockade. This almost offhand comment
again suggests that the coordination of these forces had not been smooth
and that the preferred solution was to keep the forces distinct so as to
prevent confused and mixed command and control.
Levchenko also looks at the final offensive on Berlin, and particu-
larly the PVO of the Oder rivercrossing as an example of interaction.
Here again he presents some implicit criticisms of VPVOS performance and
85 Levchenko (1976b; 79-80).
86 Levchenko also cites the battle of Tamansk as an example of good
coordination between the two forces. Levchenko (1976b; 80).
87 Levchenko (1976b; 80-81).
88 Levchenko (1976b; 81).
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suggests that the disposition of forces was suboptimal.
Having presented mixed examples of interaction, Levchenko goes on to
an overall assessment of the Great Patriotic War experience. Levchenko
notes two main reasons for the problems of interaction: untimely informa-
tion on the air situation, and the planning of PVO in two different sys-
tems, often without taking into account the interacting forces and means
and their tasks. Consequently, there were places where enemy aircraft
were allowed to pass through, firing on friendly forces, and saturation of
warning posts in one area while there were none in others. °
Levchenko also goes on to make comments that, while not direct, are
even more important as they concern organizational structure and interac-
tion. His position on the separation of PVO SV and VPVOS is unusual:
Levchenko observes that the concept of a clear delineation between VPVOS
and PVO SV forces was correct but that this concept was not realized be-
fore the end of the war. L This is tantamount to saying that the separa-
tion was a bad idea, or at least that it was poorly executed. Levchenko '
s
further comments strengthen this argument. The PVO SV had responsibility
for rear area defenses but not the forces to cover them, so VPVOS forces
had to remain in the rear areas to defend them. Thus, responsibility was
laid on the SV commander who had no forces directly subordinate to him in
order to carry out the mission- -a clear recipe for command and control
89 Levchenko (1976b; 81-82).
90 Levchenko (1976b; 82). Surprisingly, for these criticisms Levchenko
cites Svetlishin's 1965 article on the third period of the war. See Lev-
chenko (1976b; 82), Svetlishin (1965; 36). But while Svetlishin was fair-
ly critical of the interaction he is generally approving of the VPVOS com-
mand structure particularly the 1944 reorganization.




According to Levchenko , attempts to improve interaction by experi-
menting with subordinating VPVOS forces to the Ground Force Front commands
(Stalingrad, Don front) failed because the subordination was incomplete.
The Ground Forces Front was able to worry about (zabocif sja) , warn and
coordinate their actions but was not given the right to maneuver or
redeploy the VPVOS forces or assign them tasks. These were carried out
according to the VPVOS ' s own plan. To complicate matters further, even
the VPVOS Corps commander could not respond to the Ground Forces Front re-
quests, for they had to be approved by the "central organs" (the VPVOS
staff or even the General Staff ). J This system did not allow for clear
and flexible control of the forces. The conflicts over jurisdiction, need
to appeal to higher authorities, and overly strict centralization appear
to have seriously hampered command and control in Levchenko' s view. Even
in those cases where this joint subordination was not attempted Levchenko
implies that many of these coordination problems (particularly the need to
clear everything through central organs) would have remained.
Sounding one positive note, Levchenko states that the reorganization
of the fronts in 1944 eased the situation by freeing up more VPVOS units
from the deep rear of the country and easing their maneuver. This echoes
the standard VPVOS appraisal of the 1944 changes. Levchenko then adds,
however, that the unification of VPVOS and PVO SV (under the Commander of
QA
Artillery) played a significant role in easing the interaction. As we
92 Levchenko (1976b; 82).
93 Levchenko (1976b; 82).
94 Levchenko (1976b; 82).
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have seen, this statement is anathema to the VPVOS , directly contradicting
the standard VPVOS argument that it must be centralized and independent.
Finally, Levchenko hints at the contemporary significance of his ar-
ticle, clearly stating that at present the role of PVO is to support
ground operations, and the functioning of the state and its economy. This
is in itself a reversal of the usual VPVOS priorities, but Levchenko takes
it further noting that given the increased threat the PVO requires even
closer, more rational and fast acting interaction of PVO forces than in
the Great Patriotic War, and that this must be considered as part of the
problem of PVO as a whole. J
Levchenko 's article appears to be a critical one in the debate over
organizational structure. It sets forth a view clearly at variance with
that of the VPVOS that reflects a PVO SV. Its points of divergence are
major and striking. But what points was Levchenko making in respect to
the contemporary situation?
First, note that nowhere does Levchenko extol the virtues of cen-
tralization. The article stresses throughout the need for flexible local
control of PVO resources in the interest of the Ground Forces commander.
The need to constantly consult higher staff organs for permission to move
forces (particularly those of other services) is presented as a clumsy
time-consuming system.
Second, the delineation between PVO SV and VPVOS forces, lauded by
the VPVOS, is almost condemned by Levchenko. His complaint has less to do
with the existence of the VPVOS (although he implies there was no need to
create it in the first place) than with its role in the frontal rear.
95 Levchenko (1976b; 82).
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Levchenko implies that PVO of all frontal LOCs and rear area targets
should have been the responsibility of PVO SV forces under the control of
the Ground Forces Front commander. Such an arrangement would provide
flexible local control and avoid the problem of dual subordination of
forces and interaction. Indeed, the logical corollary of this argument is
that VPVOS forces should have been transferred back to the PVO SV after
the threat to the rear areas of the country ceased.
Third, Levchenko endorses the subordination of the VPVOS to the Com-
mander of Artillery. In doing so Levchenko again implicitly questions the
need for the VPVOS as a separate service and implies that questions of in-
teraction with the Ground Forces Fronts and PVO SV were of primary impor-
tance .
Overall, Levchenko ' s analysis suggests that the system of PVO SV and
VPVOS interaction in the frontal rear areas was unsatisfactory. In its
place, Levchenko appears to be arguing for a less centralized, but
unified, PVO force that would have control over all PVO forces in the
frontal area (or by analogy, TVD) . The VPVOS would then be relegated to
its main mission of defense of the territory of the country, rather than
involving itself in frontal defense. A unified command for this purpose
is not ruled out, and Levchenko 's enthusiasm for the subordination of the
VPVOS suggests that he was in favor of a possible unification of VPVOS and
PVO SV. (One may speculate that Levchenko would be in favor providing he
received responsibility for the control of all the PVO SV forces, includ-
ing those transferred from VPVOS control.) All these points emerge fairly
clearly and strikingly from Levchenko 's article and they bear a close
resemblance to the VPVOS reorganization of 1980-81. Thus, it appears that
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Levchenko was an outspoken supporter of this reorganization, or at least
of a preliminary variant that would incorporate the ideas noted above.
While Levchenko was outspoken in Vestnik PVO in an article pub-
lished in Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal in the same year he largely avoids
the question of interaction between the VPVOS and PVO SV. ° Levchenko
does pay some lip service for the need for close interaction with the
97
VPVOS, but says nothing substantive. ' Levchenko appears to have chosen
to use the Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal article to promote the achieve-
ments of the PVO SV, while addressing questions of concern to PVO forces
in a more restricted and limited forum. Furthermore, Levchenko' s article
is more focussed on problems of interaction with Air Force fighters and he
may have wished to address these issues separately.
Levchenko also did not criticize VPVOS performance in an August 1978
Q O
Vestnik PVO interview. ° Levchenko is quite circumspect and does not
repeat his criticisms of VPVOS- -PVO SV interaction. But he does restates
some of the PVO SV's views on issues of interest to both forces. First,
Levchenko attributes most of the problems of the beginning period of the
war to the economic problems of the 1930s and insufficient arms produc-
tion, rather than criticizing the organizational structure, a position
99
consistent with Levchenko 's earlier views. ' Second, in response to a
96 Levchenko (1976a).
97 Indeed, in one oblique reference to LOC defense he claims that from
October 1944 to May 1945 there were only 145 Luftwaffe attacks (1120
sorties) against trains and railway stations. See Levchenko (1976a; 36).
This suggests that the VPVOS role in the final period of the war was mini-
mal or that at best it served a deterrent function.
98 Levchenko (1978) . The interview was in honor of the 30th anniversary
of the creation of the PVO SV as a separate branch of the SV.
99 Levchenko (1978; 85-86).
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question concerning measures taken to improve the effectiveness of the
PVO , Levchenko ignores the November 1941 reorganization completely (since
from the PVO SV viewpoint it didn't increase PVO effectiveness). ®® These
omissions further indicate that the PVO SV had a very different inter-
pretation of the Great Patriotic War experience.
More unusual was the publication in the July 1979 Vestnik PVO of an
article by Colonel Klevtsov on PVO SV development during the Great
Patriotic War, only the second such article in the 1970s. °^ First,
Klevtsov criticizes neither the organization of PVO during the beginning
period of the war nor the November 1941 reorganization of the VPVOS . In-
stead, he notes that while the VPVOS was given centralized control in the
November 1941 reorganization that the PVO SV had to wait until June 1942
i no
for a similar centralization of control. ^ Second, Klevtsov endorses the
subordination of the VPVOS to the Commander of Artillery in June 1943.
Klevtsov' s reasons for approving the subordination are similar to those of
Levchenko, for he claims that it prevented VPVOS assets from being
"frozen" in areas unreachable by enemy aviation. The reorganization also
allowed easier maneuver of forces and interaction with the PVO SV. But
Klevtsov points out that even after this change the VPVOS and PVO SV still
retained their separate command structures and acted independently.
Levchenko, on the other hand, emphasizes the importance of close interac-
tion with the PVO SV as the primary reason for the subordination.
100 Levchenko (1978; 86).
101 Klevtsov' s service affiliation and position are not known. He is a
candidate (later Doctor) of historical science, and is also co-author of
an article in Vestnik PVO in 1985 on Frunze.
102 Klevtsov (1979; 73).
103 Klevtsov (1979; 74).
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Klevtsov pays less attention than Levchenko to interaction between
the VPVOS and PVO SV, instead concentrating on a relatively standard his-
tory of the PVO SV forces. But Klevtsov' s article does seem to represent
a PVO SV viewpoint in its treatment of the November 1941 reorganization
and the subordination to Artillery. The publication of such an article in
Vestnik PVO is very unusual, and it may have been intended as an indicator
of changes to come. The observation that the PVO SV and VPVOS retained
their independence after their subordination to Artillery may be an in-
dication that a similar independence would be accorded the two command
structures if they were merged into one service, as was done in the 1980-
81 reorganization.
In the same year three authors (Andersen, Drozhinin, Lozik) under
the "general direction" of Levchenko published a detailed study of the
history and current state of the PVO SV. iU^ For the most part the book
follows the standard PVO SV line, ignoring the November 1941 reorganiza-
tion, extolling the virtues of AAA groups and centralized control through
the artillery apparatus, and largely ignoring the VPVOS. ° 5 In examining
the lessons of PVO interaction in the Great Patriotic War, however, the
authors provide their own illuminating quote, taken from Marshal Zhukov.
Zhukov states emphatically that the SV Front must have the necessary PVO
means to defend all of its objectives right up to the rear of its area and
he criticizes the dual division of PVO (VPVOS and PVO SV) as artificial
and incorrect. ° 6 This quote appears from almost nowhere, as there is
104 Andersen is a fairly high ranking PVO SV officer, A. I. Drozhinin and
P.M. Lozik are probably also PVO SV officers. This book received a good
review in Vestnik PVO in 1980, see Yerofeyev (1980b).
105 Andersen et al (1979; 43-48).
106 Andersen et al (1979; 55).
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little discussion of interaction before it, and it is striking in its
forthrightness and clarity. Furthermore, the authors do not make any
editorial comment on the quote, letting it stand by itself. Such a
presentation strongly suggests that this quote is a reflection of the PVO
SV position on the delineation of targets in frontal areas. Unified con-
trol under the PVO SV of all forces acting in the frontal area is clearly
endorsed, while the system touted by the VPVOS as highly effective is con-
demned.
There is little additional discussion of interaction during the
Great Patriotic War, but the treatment of current problems of interaction
clearly indicates that the VPVOS will screen some objectives in the fron-
tal rear and troops of the second operational echelon. The authors
note that the forces may operate either in separate zones or in one zone,
but in both cases there must be a system for augmenting the VPVOS forces
as the PVO SV forces move forward with the troops. The operational group
1 AO
is favorably mentioned as one means of ensuring interaction. The au-
thors do not repeat their criticism of dual subordination nor do they make
any normative statements on the desirability of such interaction. Instead
the issue is treated as a problem that must be solved. This lack of com-
ment suggests that the initial statement on interaction might have been
strong enough and that further negative comments were not necessary. In-
deed, even if the PVO SV were to have complete control over forces in the
107 Andersen et al (1979; 192-3). This is initially presented as an ob-
servation by West German authors, but from the context and ensuing discus-
sion (which directly refers to the VPVOS in a historical context) it is
clear that a surrogate argument is being presented.
108 Andersen et al (1979; 193).
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frontal region, there would still have to be an interface with the VPVOS
and some problems of interaction would arise.
The PVO SV viewpoint thus differs substantially from that of the
VPVOS. This stems largely from their different mission orientations and
experiences in the Great Patriotic War. While the VPVOS is primarily con-
cerned with homeland and LOC defense, the PVO SV is much more closely con-
nected to the SV command's viewpoint and shares its concern with defense
of troops and operational formations. This difference is clearly
reflected in the PVO SV preference for a unified command of all PVO forces
in the frontal areas under an SV officer. Similarly, the interpretation
of historical events is consistently biased in that it stresses the impor-
tance of interaction even at the expense of VPVOS interests such as inde-
pendence and homeland defense. There is very clear evidence here of a
sharp conflict between the VPVOS and PVO SV on the relative importance of
troop and homeland air defense and over the nature of their interaction.
Overall, the PVO SV position appears to be much closer to the ideas real-
ized in the 1981 reorganization— unification of command and control of PVO
forces in the frontal (TVD) areas, merging the PVO SV and VPVOS forces in
those areas, and a greater emphasis on PVO responsiveness to SV needs.
Indeed, Levchenko's article in Vescnik PVO may represent one of the first
proposals along these lines and may well have formed the basis for further
study leading to the TVD reorganization.
7.7 Summary and Conclusions
The material examined above clearly indicates a divergence of views
between the VPVOS and PVO SV concerning a number of historical issues with
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direct relevance to modern problems of interaction and organizational
structure. These divergences tend to conform to service or branch inter-
ests. While there are some changes in these positions over time, for the
most part they are relatively constant, suggesting that they reflect basic
principles and beliefs.
The primary question throughout this debate was one of centraliza-
tion and command and control. The need for interaction between the two
forces was clearly recognized, but the form of this interaction and who
would play the dominant role, was a major point of contention. Let us
briefly summarize the positions of the two services on this point.
The VPVOS throughout this period emphasized the priority of central-
ized control and unification of the IA and AAA branches under one leader-
ship. Yet the emphasis on centralization was tempered by the recognition
that sustained, rapid offensive operations posed problems for the control
structure that would require some level of decentralization, whereas a
highly centralized defense of fixed targets in the country would be pos-
sible, and even desirable, the fluid situation in frontal rear areas as
troops moved forward would strain any such centralized system. This
point was clearly enunciated in discussions of the rationale for PVO
Fronts, the creation of which (particularly in their 1944 guise) was in-
tended to deal with such difficulties. The PVO Fronts (as of Spring 1944)
were able to concentrate attention on interaction with the SV Fronts along
several strategic directions and accomplish the maneuver of VPVOS forces.
109 This seems to be the point with which Buturlin and Yakimanskiy (1975)
disagree. Their article appears to be the only indication that some VPVOS
officers believed that intermediate levels of control (probably including
Fronts) were rendered unnecessary by advances in command and control tech-
nology.
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During the later part of the period under discussion, however, VPVOS au-
thors argue that the PVO Fronts' authority was excessively limited and
that their ability to move forces was very small. Close interaction with
the PVO SV forces was to be dealt with through the formation of opera-
tional groups that would coordinate the tactics and control of forces op-
erating in the same area, even though direct control would apparently
remain with the separate commanders.
The VPVOS view seems to have been that the Great Patriotic Uar sys-
tem of interaction and command and control was quite effective. Some
deficiencies, particularly in the areas of coordinated warning systems,
difficulties in handing off targets between Air Force and VPVOS IA forces,
and in moving forces quickly, are noted but they are not portrayed as
critical. Nor is there any indication that there were serious organiza-
tional structure deficiencies during the war that would merit major
restructuring. In short, the late Great Patriotic War system, with 4 PVO
Fronts and the use of Operational Groups seems to have been the preferred
VPVOS solution to the problem of interaction.
These views derived from the historical literature tells us a great
deal about VPVOS attitudes to the 1981 reorganization. As discussed
above, there appears to have been opposition to the creation of TVD level
commands with VPVOS forces subordinate to a Ground Forces commander. Fur-
thermore, the subordination of VPVOS forces to the military districts dur-
ing peacetime and the transfer to approximately 1000 interceptors to the
military district Air Forces went directly against VPVOS concepts of
resource ownership and control. The post-reorganization structure, par-
ticularly the subordination of IA forces, closely resembled that of the
-263-
beginning period of the war structure that is strongly condemned in the
VPVOS historical literature. Indeed, the stepped up criticism of the IA
subordination problem in the years leading up to the reorganization may be
an indication of serious opposition to this proposal.
Finally, on the issue of the merger of the PVO SV and VPVOS there is
no indication that the VPVOS favored such a move. This may seem con-
tradictory, as the organizational imperative to grow would suggest the op-
posite attitude. Two possible reasons for this contradiction appear like-
ly: first, that the merger was part of a "package deal" that included ele-
ments anathema to the VPVOS, second, that incorporating the PVO SV would
complicate command and control, increase the responsibility of the VPVOS,
and divert it (and possibly resources) from its primary mission (which was
still homeland defense). The addition of the PVO SV, as discussed in the
next chapter, does not appear to have been much of an advantage to the
VPVOS, as the former seems to have kept much of its own administrative
structure and its ties to the SV. In short, there may have been little to
gain and a lot to lose by incorporating the PVO SV in the VPVOS structure.
The PVO SV's views on these Issues pere quite different from those
of the VPVOS and reflected the branch's own interests. The bottom line is
that the PVO SV would have preferred not to have the VPVOS responsible for
the defense of frontal rear areas and LOCs. Instead, the comments of PVO
SV authors suggest that a preferable arrangement would be for frontal, and
perhaps even TVD level PVO to be provided by PVO SV forces. However, if
VPVOS forces are to be operating in the area a command structure where the
PVO SV commander has control over them, both operational and maneuver con-
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trol, might be acceptable. There seems to be relatively little PVO SV
enthusiasm for the operational groups touted by the VPVOS
.
Overall, the PVO SV's'view of interaction seems to be more closely
tied to that of the ground forces: their main concern is protection of
troop formations during a rapid offensive. There is less concern about
operational independence (not surprisingly for a branch) , and more concern
about making the PVO forces responsive to Ground Forces requirements.
Thus , the PVO SV authors appear to ba more amenable to a TVD level control
system, particularly if that system provides unified control of both the
troops and the frontal rear.
On the question of the merger the PVO SV's position is less clear.
Levchenko and other authors endorsed the joint subordination of PVO SV and
VPVOS to the Commander of Artillery, and this suggests an interest in
closer organizational interaction and possibly incorporation. The com-
ments, however, that the two systems retained their separate staffs and
control systems suggests that such a merger should not be too close, and
that the two should remain separate systems (with the possible exception
of forces in the TVD)
.
Thus the VPVOS and PVO SV's interests appear to have been
represented in the debate over interaction and organizational structure.
The VPVOS clearly preferred the existing system of centralized control, or
a Front based system that would retain VPVOS independence while giving it
a theater role. The PVO SV did not have any independence to lose, and may
have stood to gain in terms of resources and control over its area of re-
sponsibility, and so seems to have argued in favor of reform of the Soviet
PVO structure.
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But despite the arguments of the VPVOS to the contrary, the
reorganization was enacted. In this case, as in the case with the PRO de-
cision, the advocacy of the VPVOS was insufficient to win the day. The
reorganization was proposed in order to enhance control of PVO resources
in the theater for conventional warfare, reflecting the strategic concerns
of the General Staff and its domination by Ground Forces officers. The
General Staff appears to have been willing to trade off some centralized
control for greater coordination and interaction between the PVO forces
supporting rapid ground offensives. As a bonus, the TVD level command
might have provided a more effective defense against ground- launched
cruise missiles in Europe.
The fact that the General Staff was able to enact this reorganiza-
tion despite the objections of the VPVOS gives a fairly clear indication
of the relative power of the two levels. But there are also indications
that the General Staff was not completely dominant. First, the VPVOS in-
dicated disagreement with the proposed reorganization and some dissent
remained after the reorganization. It appears that the General Staff was
not able to completely convince the VPVOS leadership of the wisdom of the
reorganization or to silence them. Second, the very long time between the
initial Kulikov article (and the even earlier studies of strategic leader-
ship) and the formation of TVDs raises the possibility that the VPVOS op-
position slowed the implementation of the proposals. Indeed, the forma-
tion of the first TVD command (in the Far East) appears to have been un-
dertaken without a reorganization of VPVOS and Air Force forces in the
area. Thus, it is possible that VPVOS advocacy had some influence in the
decisionmaking process. This case therefore provides some bounds on the
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influence of the VPVOS : it is clearly weaker than that of the General
Staff but it is able to advocate its positions and participate in the de-
cisionmaking process. This supposition is strengthened by the subsequent
decision to reverse the reorganization in the mid-1980s, the topic exam-
ined in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 8
THE VPVO AFTER THE REORGANIZATION
8 . 1 Introduc t ion
In the previous chapter VPVO viewpoints and its opposition to the
reorganization were investigated. After the reorganization these views,
and even the opposition, do not appear to have significantly changed. In-
deed, throughout the period from 1981 to 1986 there are various indica-
tions of VPVO opposition to the new organizational structure. This criti-
cism of the new organization intensifies after the KAL 007 shootdown and
culminates in the 1986 reversal of the reorganization.
Throughout this period the VPVO maintained an opposition to the
reorganization that kept the issue from completely disappearing from the
agenda. The identity of the two forces (formerly VPVOS and PVO SV)
remained quite separate despite their new formal unity and their perspec-
tives on the reorganization continued to differ. The KAL 007 shootdown
revealed shortcomings in the new command and control structure that again
raised the prominence of the issue on the agenda and gave the VPVO a con-
crete example for its arguments. Furthermore, the changes in the top
political and military leadership in 1984 may have created a good op-
portunity to press its case and reverse the original decision. The evolu-
tion of VPVO positions on the reorganization and their consequences for
the decision to reverse the reorganization are examined below.
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1.2 VPVO Reactions to the 1981 Reorganization
The 1981 reorganization was heralded by two articles reinterpreting
the history of the VPVOS and PVO SV in a quite striking and blatant man-
ner. These articles are clear examples of the use of history to make
arguments concerning the present and they run counter to all the previous
articles in the VPVOS press. 1
The most elaborate presentation of the pro-reorganization viewpoint
is found in an article published in the November 1980 issue of Voyenno-
2istoricheskiy zhurnal by Colonel Gorbunov. This article may be viewed as
a justification of the merger of the PVO SV and VPVOS. For the first
time, Gorbunov merges the historical literature of the PVO SV and VPVOS,
providing an overview of the development of PVO forces during the Great
Patriotic War. Gorbunov also claims that the main tendency in the devel-
opment of the PVO system was to "create a system of PVO that can provide
both an effective defense of troops on the battlefield and of objectives
in the rear of the country." Thus Gorbunov goes much further than any
previous author in suggesting the merging of the air defense forces.
While Gorbunov does point out some deficiencies in the pre-war PVO
organization he is not very critical and he is also lukewarm towards the
1 It is noteworthy that they appeared in Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal,
rather than Vestnik PVO, probably in order to reach the widest possible
audience of officers rather than just the VPVO officers. No similar arti-
cles were published in Vescnik PVO, perhaps indicating an unwillingness to
endorse the changes.
2 Gorbunov' s position is not known, but he did coauthor an earlier arti-
cle with Yakimanskiy in 1973, suggesting a possible affiliation with the
VPVOS Command Academy.
3 Gorbunov (1980; 23)
.
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November 1941 reorganization, pointing out that the transfer of AAA from
the PVO SV to the VPVOS was detrimental to troop PVO. 4
The most unusual aspect of Gorbunov's article is his discussion of
the separation of the PVO SV and VPVOS. While most VPVOS authors regard
the separation as beneficial, Gorbunov points out a number of deficien-
cies, noting that in offensives in Fall 1942 and Spring 1943 PVO SV didn't
have sufficient forces and a gap of up to 3-0 km arose between the PVO SV
and VPVOS. The weak defense of Gor'kiy also stemmed from the lack of
coordination between the two forces. From this, Gorbunov argues that in-
tegration was required, allowing more rational use of forces. Echoing the
arguments of Klevtsov and Levchenko , Gorbunov argues that this prevented
the "freezing" of PVO forces around objects out of range of the enemy, al-
lowed VPVOS units to move to the front, and facilitated wide maneuver of
the forces. Overall, Gorbunov argues that the joint command of the two
forces allowed formation of a closely coordinated, multi-echelon air
defense
.
Gorbunov notes the importance of the formation of PVO Fronts and
argues that centralization of control at the operational- strategic level
by the formation of PVO Fronts and armies (ob 'yedineniy) was an important
element in the development of the PVO. Indeed, Gorbunov points out that
the PVO Fronts are an example of the "forward character" of Soviet milita-









28). Note that Svetlishin (1976; 45) also uses this
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for the TVD level command, for unlike other VPVO authors he couples the
argument for centralization at the operational-strategic level with a call
for unified (e.g. PVO SV and VPVOS) PVO forces.
In closing, Gorbunov notes that successful air defense requires a
PVO system in which PVO SV and VPVOS are component parts, centralized
leadership of all forces and means of PVO, and an organizational structure
that is in accord with the nature of armed combat.
Gorbunov thus argues that the purpose of the reorganization is to
create a more flexible and responsive PVO system that can maneuver and
control troops in the TVD. By merging the two forces the problems of dual
subordination and freezing of VPVOS troops in the rear can be avoided,
providing a stronger and more coherent PVO to support conventional of-
fensives in the TVD.
While Gorbunov' s article was a dramatic reinterpretation of VPVOS
historiography, it was not the only indication of a change in the VPVO.
In case readers missed the import of Gorbunov' s article another clear in-
dicator of change was published in the April 1981 issue of Voyenno-
istoricheskiy zhurnal. This article, by Colonel Frantsev, is noteworthy
for its extreme brevity- -it is only two pages long. Most of the article
is a recitation of well-known facts about the quantitative growth of the
VPVOS during the Great Patriotic War. The outstanding part of the article
and probably its raison d'etre, is one paragraph in which Frantsev notes
that "regrettably the central organs of unified1 leadership of all troops
8 Gorbunov (1980; 29).
9 Most Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal articles are five to 10 pages long,
A two page article is almost unheard of.
10 The word used here is ob'yedineniy
.
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of the PVO were not developed further during the course of the war."^
Frantsev thereby turns the once deplored merging of the PVO SV and VPVOS
under the leadership of the Commander of Artillery into one of the most
important and favorable events in VPVOS development, a very blatant exam-
ple of the reinterpretation of history to fit the present. ^ This article
may have been intended as a signal of the importance of the reorganization
and or even an indication it had been completed.
While the articles by Gorbunov and Frantsev might have been expected
to usher in a new era in VPVO historiography, they did not. The articles
published by VPVO historians and high-ranking officers after the
reorganization are primarily notable for their resemblance to those pub-
1 T
lished before the reorganization. J First, the integration of PVO SV and
VPVOS history presented by Gorbunov and Frantsev is not repeated. Sec-
ond, the argument that the subordination to Artillery was a positive de-
velopment is not repeated. Indeed, there is a noteworthy silence on this
topic. 5 Most VPVO (and all former VPVOS) authors completely ignore the
Gorbunov and Frantsev viewpoint.
If the Gorbunov and Frantsev articles were not intended as a "new
line" in VPVOS history why were they written? These articles were sur-
11 Frantsev (1981; 47)
.
12 It is interesting to note that neither Gorbunov nor Frantsev seem to
have published on VPVO topics since, and that these relative unknowns were
chosen for these statements rather than more prominent VPVO historians or
other VPVO officers. It suggests that these articles are meant less as
serious work than as justifications for decisions already made.
13 See, for example, Romanov (1982), Smirnov (1983).
14 With the interesting exception of Mal'tsev (1986) which is the post-
mortem on the reorganization.
15 See Table 2 in Chapter 7.
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rogate discussions and justifications of the 1981 reorganization and they
may have been commissioned by the General Staff in order to explain the
reorganization to officers both within and without the VPVO. The fact
that these arguments were not endorsed or repeated in the VPVO literature
strongly implies VPVO disagreement with the reorganization, and the fact
that implicit criticisms of many of the points made by Gorbunov are
repeated in the VPVO historical literature after 1981 is an even stronger
indication of VPVO discontent. Furthermore, the existence of two quite
different bodies of historical literature within the VPVO (PVO SV and
VPVOS) indicates that both forces retained their own viewpoints and were
not very integrated.
VPVO dissatisfaction with the new arrangement slowly emerged in new
themes in the VPVO literature after the Gorbunov and Frantsev announce-
ments of the reorganization. VPVO discussions appear to have gone through
two phases. First there was a general "passive resistance" and muted
criticism in 1981-83. 16 Second, in 1984 criticisms of the VPVO structure
become more direct and frequent and new themes rise to prominence, such as
the creation of a combat ready PVO system before the start of the war.
8.2.1 Early Reactions to the Reorganization
While Gorbunov had referred to the importance of centralized con-
trol, Koldunov came up with a new phrase to describe the optimal control
structure: "single" control of unified forces. The phrase "single" con-
16 The Russian word used is yediniy which I translate here as "single"
as this seems more appropriate than "unified." Both senses of the word
may apply, as the VPVO argument appears to be for both centralized control
of several "unified" branches under a "single" leadership.
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trol appears to be an argument in favor of control of all VPVO forces by
one leader, rather than a system of dispersed control such as the TVD com-
mands. This is distinct from Gorbunov's call for a unified PVO system
incorporating both VPVOS and PVO SV forces. 18
The importance of single command and control was stressed in
Koldunov's first Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal article, recounting the air
defense of Moscow. While the rest of Koldunov's article is unremarkable,
towards the end he draws the conclusion that:
Experience showed that only a single control of all PVO
forces, in the first order Fighter Aviation and AAA, (and later
Surface- to-Air Missile Troops), provides for their coordinated ac-
tivities. And this appears an important condition for the effec-
tive use of the VPVO in combat with the air opponent. y
This explicit reference to a modern VPVO branch in the context of a
historical essay is highly unusual and indicates that Koldunov intended
his comment to be applied to the present. Having made this argument
Koldunov goes on to place great stress on the importance of learning from
Of)
history, particularly so that past deficiencies will not be repeated. w
While Koldunov doe^ not specify what deficiencies it appears he is refer-
ring to referring to the need for centralized, single control rather than
the more decentralized command structure of the beginning period of the
war.
Similar comments on thp need for "single control" appear in several
of Koldunov's articles and editorials, as well as in the works of other
17 Koldunov distinguishes between unified (ob'yedineniy) forces and
single control in his discussion, suggesting that he is stressing single








VPVO authors. * The appearance of this new phrase indicates some dis-
content with the creation of a less centralized command and control system
for the VPVO. This theme becomes even clearer after 1983, when the debate
over organizational structure again becomes more explicit.
Another indication of dissatisfaction with the reorganization was
indicated in an article by Colonel General of Aviation N. Dagayev which
examines the problem of establishing PVO of liberated territory. ^
Dagayev' s article is fairly routine, but in an unusual comment he states
that the successful defense of liberated territory was possible only be-
cause of the operational subordination of fighter aviation units and divi-
sions to the VPVOS . This conclusion seems to be pulled out of the air,
and coming so soon after the transfer of IA assets to the military dis-
tricts, it suggests a surrogate argument against the transfer. This view
is reinforced by Dagayev' s comment almost immediately afterwards that the
experience of the war can help solve contemporary theoretical problems. 3
21 Koldunov mentioned the issue again in a Vestnik PVO editorial in April
1982, observing that its importance for coordination of IA and AAA was
demonstrated in the Great Patriotic War. Koldunov points out that such a
system of control provided for high effectiveness in all periods of the
Great Patriotic War. See Koldunov (1982; 4), Koldunov (1984; 17),
Koldunov (1985a; 61), Koldunov (1985b; 5), Slezkin (1985; 87). It is not,
however mentioned in some other, largely historical articles by other VPVO
officers such as Romanov (1982) and Smirnov (1983).
22 Dagayev (1981). Dagayev apparently used to be in the VPVOS in the
early 1960s, as he signs a number of VPVOS obituaries, but in 1962 he be-
came Chief of the Main Directorate for Military Assistance of the General
Staff, and in 1975 became a Military Consultant to the Main Inspectorate
(CIA (1983; 4)). Thus, Dagayev' s tie to the VPVO is rather distant and it
is surprising to find him writing on this topic. Given his position at
the Main Directorate it is very likely that he was deeply involved in es-
tablishing the PVO systems of Vietnam and Egypt.
23 Dagayev (1981; 35).
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While most VPVO articles either ignored the reorganization or sub-
jected it to veiled criticism, a more moderate stance also seems to have
appeared briefly. This view was that the organizational structure of the
beginning period of the war had- not been given time to prove itself and to
have all the problems worked out in exercises before the start of the
war. while this viewpoint was only expressed in two articles in 1983
and 1984 it indicates a possible growing acceptance of the reorganization.
After these articles, however, criticism of the reorganization increases,
suggesting that the authors may have lost a debate over whether the
reorganization had been successful or not. Since both authors were from
the Zhukov Academy it is possible that this view was accepted to some ex-
25tent at the Academy.
During the early years after the reorganization, VPVO dissatisfac-
tion was registered more by silence than by active criticism. Nonethe-
less, this "passive resistance" seems to be fairly clearly directed
against the main features of the reorganization. In later years, however,
VPVO objections appear to have greatly increased and become more open and
explicit.
8 . 3 External Factors : The Lebanon Air Var and KAL 007
During the early 1980s the VPVO leaders may also have been dis-
tracted by events beyond their control: the Lebanon air war and the KAL
24 Slezkin (1983; 89), Boshnyak (1984; 45).
25 Boshnyak was head of the Zhukov Academy from approximately 1982 to
mid- 1985. It is possible that his removal from the academy position after
a relatively short tenure was prompted by his partial endorsement of the
reorganization. Slezkin was a Kafedra head at the Zhukov Academy, and ap-
pears to have retired sometime in the mid-1980s. A later article co-
authored by Slezkin does not refer to his old Views on the beginning peri-
od of the war organization.
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007 shootdown. But while not directly connected to the issue of
reorganization these events nay have had an impact on the course of the
debate.
The Lebanon ai^jyar raised serious questions about VPVO capabil-
ities: the weapons destroyed in the Israeli attack were all front-line
VPVO equipment, primarily SAM- 6 missile batteries and MiG-23 fighters.
That the successful Israeli action provoked concern amongst the VPVO
leadership is quite clear: only 4 days later a delegation headed by Col.
Gen. Yurasov was sent to Syria to investigate the situation. D Further-
more, the Soviet media went to unusual lengths to reaffirm the value of
Soviet arms and implicitly lay the blame on the Syrians themselves. '
Despite the attention given to the Lebanon war, there were no major
repercussions in the top VPVO leadership: no top officers in the branches
or Main Staff lost their jobs. At least one lesson was learned from the
war, and that was the importance of dogfighting. Vietnam and the 1973 war
had indicated the essential importance of this skill for fighter pilots,
but the VPVO made only minor changes along these lines. 8 The Lebanon air
war was a critical reminder of the consequences of neglecting realistic
air combat training and the overemphasis on ground-controlled intercept
tactics, and during 1983 a large number of articles on this topic appeared
26 Lambeth (1984; 2, 13). Marshal Ogarkov, Chief of the General Staff is
also reported to have visited Syria, another very significant indication
of high-level military concern. See Lambeth (1984; 13).
27 Lambeth (1984; 13-17).
28 See Chapter 6, And Lambeth's discussion of similar Soviet Air Force
tactics. The very strict control of the ground- controlled intercept oper-
ator over the pilot's actions has also been commented on in the KAL case
,
where an actual transcript is publicly available. See Harsh (1986; 227-
229, 232-234). The transcript is reprinted in Dallin (1985; 22-25).
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in Vescnik PVO. Whether these articles brought about a real change in
IA performance and skills is uncertain, for complaints about a lack of
pilot initiative and skill continued to appear for several years after-
wards. Once again, the lessons may have been clear but the incentive
structure combined with old habits inhibited any rapid change in training
or performance . This is particularly so since there was no turnover in
leadership, so the same old officers were entrusted with developing and
overseeing the new training plan.
While the Lebanon air war certainly did not enhance the VPVO's
prestige, it did not result in harsh penalties as the VPVO apparently
deflected much of the blame onto the Syrians. This setback may, how-
ever, be a contributing factor to the decrease in articles on organiza-
29 A new campaign to improve Soviet fighter performance was kicked off in
the March 1983 Vestnik PVO, with an article by the Deputy Commander of
Aviation Lieutenant General Tsibizov. Tsibizov points out that the enemy
will attempt to use electronic countermeasures (ECM) to disrupt the work
of pilots, command posts and particularly ground- controlled intercept op-
erators, a clear allusion to the Lebanon air war. He then goes on to
stress the need to develop air combat skills, noting that they were proven
necessary in local wars in the Mid East (read Lebanon) and the Falklands
.
See Tsibizov (1983; 16). Some of the other articles in this campaign are
Omel'chenko (1983), Mikhaylovskiy (1983), Khatylev (1983). For a detailed
examination of the response of the Soviet Air Force in one article see
Lambeth (1984). Lambeth's report also includes the best available sum-
mary of Israeli actions against the Syrian PVO and a very informed and in-
teresting examination of the lessons learned and aisleamed by the Soviet
Air Force . Lambeth's general conclusions are similar to those suggested
here and in Chapter 4: the services tend to interpret the combat experi-
ence through their own cognitive preconceptions, learning lessons that are
the most compatible with current tactics and weapons, while misinterpret-
ing or ignoring evidence that runs counter to their preconceptions.
30 See Rusanov (1987), as well as Kudinov (1986) and Gorbatyuk (1986).
31 After all, they could point to the relative success of the Egyptians
in 1973, or at least the Egyptian SAM forces. Furthermore, they could
plead the uniqueness of the Mid East case, a case that is not likely to be
repeated in Europe. This point is elaborated upon bv Lambeth (1984; 10-
11).
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tional structure noted in 19&3: the Lebanon experience wouldn't enhance
the argument for de- reorganization, and the VPVO leadership might not have
been in a position to press its views.
After the Lebanon air war things didn't quiet down for the VPVO:
"U.S.. overflights of the Kurile Islands in April. 1983 caused VPVO forces in
the Far East to be placed on a high alert level for most of the spring and
summer. ^ In September 1983, however, the problems with the command and
control system appear to have been shown up clearly.
Unlike the 1978 KAL incident, the story of KAL UP7 Is well known and
need not be recounted here. Uhat concerns ui "«Pr^j|^^S^Ixc«IiOns' for the
VPVO and its command and control system, areas that have not been examined
in much detail. Fortunately. Hersh's book <m
EH
ncldent provides a
fairly detailed and presumably accurate account^olTthe working of the
Soviet control system during the incident. 3
According to Hersh's description the chain of command for the final
intercept and shootdown went from the Sakhalin base tracking the aircraft
up to the military district headquarters (and the Deputy Commander of the
military district for PVO) at Khabarovsk 3^ From there we might expect
the chain to connect directly to the TVD command in^hita. 5 However, the
32 Spring 1983 also saw the announcement of SDI , another topic of inter-
est to the VPVO. Hersh (1986; 16-19).
33 Hersh (1986). Hersh's book is largely based on interviews with mem-
bers of the intelligence community and presents the most detailed picture
available of Soviet reactions to the KAL flight. While there may be parts
of the story missing if Hersh's interviewees tried to protect sensitive
information the general outline of Spvjpr ar.rinns seems plausible.
34 Hersh (1986 ;T24).~
35 Some articles and newspaper accounts suggest this, but do not give any
evidence. See Green and Rivkin (1984; S10671), Owen (1983; 1). The lat-
ter source has major errors in other respects and may be wrong in this as
well. I am indebted to Peter Almquist for bringing these sources to my
attention.
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Deputy Commander for PVO went directly to the VFVO main command post in
•J c
order to get instructions and authorization to fire. ° Apparently after
the reorganization the Khabarovsk PVO center did not have direct secure
communications to the Moscow command post, nor could it directly transfer
radar tracks. ' After receiving a message from Moscow (evidently a pro-
cess taking several minutes) the order was given not to fire unless visual
identification of the target was accomplished first. As Hersh points out,
the local VPVO commander on Sakhal in^violated these rules of engagement
and ordered the aircraft shot down. 38
This sequence of events provides some insight into the VPVO command
and control system. (First), if Hersh is correct, the next higher level of
command was the Moscow command post, not the TVD command. This is con-
sistent with the TVD command bfljng in fl "H/%rr"'T' tr— state during peacetime,
waiting to take control during wartime but not in the everyday loop. (Sec-
ond^ it suggests that the Military District Deputy for PVO was either un-
36 Hersh (1984; 230-31).
37 Hersh (1984; 230-32). The actual communication link had to be made
from a separate building used by the Air Force. The comment on radar
data is a surmise from Hersh' s account- -there is no indication that digi-
tal data transfer of radar tracks or other essential information was
transferred to the Moscow command post. The main link appears to have
been a scrambled voice circuit. This suggests that despite the constant
discussion of the importance of automated systems of control to the cen-
tralized control of VPVO force.- that the system may not be completely
automated. This conclusion is surprising given that the U.S. SAGE system
completed in the early 1960s had most of these capabilities using rela-
tively primitive computer technology. Further evidence for this may be
found in Belenko's (1988; 95-98) comments on the primitive state of the
VPVO system. There is also abundant Soviet material indicating that radar
tracks are still manually plotted and that Morse code is used for communi-
cations .
38 Hersh (1986; 232-34).
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able or unwilling to make the decision to fire himself. Given the
tendency to "pass the ruble" upwards in the Soviet system it seems highly
likely that even if the Deputy had the authority to make the decision he /?,
would have "tried to shift the responsibility "upwards to*che higher command ^-*-ct.
levels. It seems unlikely that the Deputy for PVO was unable to make
the decision since the point of the reorganization was to give the milita-
ry districts that type of decisionmaking power. Thus it appears likely
that the Deputy for PVO was trying to yt formal approval for his actions
from the top leadership. (^ThircO the length of time required to establish
the communications lines seems to have been very long, perhaps a matter of
up to tens of minutes, a significant problem in a time-urgent situation.





over Kamchatka and that warnings nay not have been passed to higher com-
mand levels (such as the military district in Khabarovsk). ° If they
were, the upper command levels do not appear to have taken any special
steps before the aircraft came within radar range of Sakhalin. * Thus,
there is evidence of local cover-ups of crucial information that severely
hampered central control.
Overall, the VPVO turned in a mediocre performance. Certainly
there were deficiencies in the combat readiness and performance of some
units at the local level. On the other hand the intercept was finally
made. But more importantly, the VPVO that had always been arguing about
the need to prepare for surprise attack found itself reacting fairly slow-
39 See the discussion of this topic in Chapter 2
40 Hersh (1986; 218-9).
41 Hersh (1984; 223)
.
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ly to a real surprise. The system did work, but it was cumbersome and
sluggish.
From the data provided by Hersh it appears that the VPVO command and
control sv s_£em had a number of problems. The Khabarovsk military district
control center was ill-equipped and unprepared to communicate with Moscow
'~ ! — ~
and perhaps even with Chita and the overall reaction time was quite long,
indicating that even if the command and control system were not flawed it
was not very efficient. These problems may well have provided arguments
for those who were already critical of the TVD command system.
VPVO reaction to the incident was swift and harsh. In a November
Vescnik PVO editorial the KAL 007 flight was denounced as a "criminal
diversion organized by U.S. special services in the Far East." But the
editorial was no less harsh on the performance of the VPVO command and
control system, and particularly on the performance of some commanders.
Indeed, the editorial was titled "Heighten the Operativeness of Combat
Control" and It called for rapid, flexible control at all levels.
Decisiveness and swiftness of reaction were stressed and officers who
spend too much time dithering without solving problems were harshly criti-
cized. The importance of quick reaction, even at the expense of consider-
ing all possible actions, is stressed and pedantry and formalism are at-
42 It is curious that the TVD level was not involved in the decisionmak-
ing process. It may just be that Hersh was unable to gather information
on their role. Even if the TVD command in Chita had been involved, it is
unlikely that it would have decreased the VPVO response time. Instead the
addition of one more command level might have slowed the process even fur-
ther, as it undoubtedly would have been referred up to Moscow for final
decision and additional transfer time would have been required.
43 "Povyshat' operativnost ' boyevogo upravleniya" (1983a; 3).
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tacked.^ A new theme also appears, spurred by revelations of U.S. eaves-
dropping: the need for greater emphasis ^bfi **BmmtIhleBt^.WS security . In
sum, the reaction was primarily to blan* f*i» rfrmammYiAm-r* hnr the stress on
the importance of flexible command and control indicates that problems in
the system were suspected and the command structure was undoubtedly sub-
jected to scrutiny. Thus the VPVO clearly stressed the importance of the
command and control system and implied that it had not performed well.
But while there were denunciations and even demotions of lower- leve
commanders there were some « 1 or iHff*rmT,f>.m* +Trm fo» 1979 IttL Incident
First, there were no top-level leadership changes, indicating a general
satisfaction with the VPVO perfofmaribe . ' Indeed, within 18 months
Koldunov had been promoted to the highest military rank, Chief Marshal of
Aviation 48 Furthermore, the Commander of the far East TVD. Govoroy . was
promoted and moved to Moscow as Chief of the Main Inspectorate , becoming a
Deputy Minister of Defense as well, and he later moved on to head Civil
44 "Povyshat' operativnost ' boyevogo upravleniya, " (1983a; 3-6).
45 "Povyshat' operativnost' boyevogo upravleniya," (1983a; 5). The best
example of this new stress is an article by Major General Reshetov the
Chief of Communications Troops of the Moscow military district. Among
other things Reshetov states that Morse code is still used and implies
that all means of communication (including telephone land- lines) must be
assumed to be tapped. See Reshetov (1984).
46 Hersh (1986; 236-37) reports that "two senior officers on duty at Sak-
halin were relieved of command and presumably demoted." However the
deputy commander for air defense at Khabarovsk was promoted, according to
Hersh for insisting on visual identification before firing. Hersh also
claims, without being specific, that the VPVO force at Sakhalin was
restructured and rules of engagement were revised.
47 Hersh notes that the Deputy Commander of the military district for PVO
was promoted after the shootdown, but that some lower- level officers were
cashiered. Hersh (1986; 236-7).
48 See Koldunov (1985) for the new rank listing.
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Defense. Clearly there was no guilt or blame attached to the higher
command levels, and their performance even seems to have been rewarded.
In the wake of the KAL incident the VPVO undertook a campaign to
correct some of its revealed deficiencies. An article in Vestnik PVO by
the Commander of the Radiotechnical Troops stressed the need for radar
units to pass on all contacts to higher command posts as rapidly as pos-
sible. ° Koldunov addressed the KAL incident (which he describes as the
penetration of Soviet borders by an "American military aircraft") by call-
ing for realistic, objective appraisal of combat readiness, and the need
to avoid overestimating the abilities of one's troops. ^ Thus, once again
the stress returns to maintaining high levels of combat readiness. 2
Finally, after the criticisms of combat readiness and RTV per-
formance the lawyers got their turn. In a very direct article discussing
the Law on Combat Alert, the First Deputy Chief of the Military Procuracy,
General Major B. Popov, outlined the strict criminal punishments for those
found negligent while on combat alert. The law on combat alert, and the
penalties for breaking it "with heavy consequences" were changed in De-
cember 1983, increasing the terms substantially, to from 3 to 10 years im-
prisonment. As an example of "heavy consequences" Popov happens to choose
49 Warner, Bonan and Packman (1987; 36). Govorov was replaced at the
TVD command by his former subordinate and Commander of the Far East Mili-
tary District, General I. M. Tret'yak. Tret'yak later went on to become
Chief Inspector, then in the wake of the Rust affair became the Commander
in Chief of the VPVO. See Warner, Bonan and Packman (1987; 51).
50 Dobrovol'skiy (1983; 9-11).
51 Koldunov (1984a; 6-7).
52 See also Mal'tsev (1984). Mal'tsev became the new Chief of Staff
after Romanov died in a plane crash May 1984. See Krasnaya zvezda May 5,
1984 p. 4.
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(amongst others) penetration of Soviet airspace by a foreign military air-
craft. " To make the point clear Popov cites the case of a junior
sergeant who was drinking when he was responsible for guarding Soviet air-
*. -^ * m*.&»*>6*>*^ OS wm&i'T^kA
space, noting that'"he will be tried under the lav.- 4 Other officers are
also criticized for not monitoring their troops properly and allowing
drunkenness and absences from combat posts during combat alert. 5 Popov's
article is clearly not a coincidence and < *• IjMUff^*** »Ki»Jy>.»»w, »t-n -r-< *.
*
of drunken pilo£&_and inefficiency" on the part of the VPVO Might have been
rather close to the mark.
Overall the VPVO reaction demonstrated more open criticism than in
1978 but there were fewer ramifications for the top leadership. The VPVO
did manage to fulfill its mission, and despite the public embarrassment of
destroying a civilian airliner, the private embarrassment appears to have
been much less. From the VPVO point of view shooting down the aircraft
was probably a better result than letting it pass unintercepted or damag-
ing the aircraft and having it fly around Soviet territory undetected, as
had happened in 1978. At least in this case they had intercepted and
destroyed the target and with it the evidence, thereby proving the capa-
bilities of the VPVO to those who didn't examine the details too closely.
But from a VPVO perspective the KAL 007 incident had revealed a rather
sluggish command and control system that allowed a foreign aircraft to








level commanders this incident seems to have spurred renewed concern over
the command and control system.
1.4 The Debate Rejoined: 1984-86
The debate over organizational structure intensified in 1984, with
several articles directly related to this topic appearing in both Vovenno-
istoricheskiy zhurnal and Vestnik PVO. It likely that this new debate was
triggered by the KAL incident. Of particular interest is the emergence of
the theme of "timely creation" of the PVO system, a suggestion that com-
mand and control VPVO forces be under the same leadership under both
peacetime and wartime because of their need to react rapidly to a surprise
attack.
Critical high-level discussion of the VPVO reorganization reappears
in 1984 with a Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal article by Marshal Koldunov
on the organization and conduct of PVO in the beginning period of the
Great Patriotic War. Koldunov focuses on a period where the organization
of th2 VPVOS was similar to the present and presents an attack on the be-
ginning period of war system that resembles the new organization struc-
ture .
Koldunov outlines the zone (military district) based pre-war struc-
ture, noting that the Main Staff of the Chief PVO Directorate (GU PVO) had
no operational control, and that operational control was given to the Gen-
eral Staff. This statement is highly unusual. Most accounts state that
operational control was vested in the military district or Front com-
manders at the beginning of the war and it was not until a few months into
56 Koldunov (1984; 12-13).
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the war that the leading role of the General Staff became apparent.
Koldunov's statement appears to be more relevant to the present when Gen-
eral Staff control would be exercised through the TVD level. The state-
ment may also be a flag that a surrogate discussion of contemporary topics
is to follow.
After describing the PVO organization at the beginning of the war,
Koldunov turns to a critical discussion of the PVO's performance.
Koldunov notes the need for the timely creation of the PVO with necessary
forces and states that the beginning period of the war demonstrated that
the defense of important centers and regions could not be left to frag-
mented PVO forces subordinated to various levels of command. The language
used in denouncing the fragmentation is unusually direct and harsh and
Koldunov strongly argues the need for single control of all PVO forces,
specifically including IA, as a necessary condition for successful
defense. Koldunov's arguments are more vociferous and direct than those
of many other VPVO authors and they are presented in a context that con-
veys their relevance to present conditions and concerns.
Koldunov also stresses the importance of combat readiness, appar-
ently referring in part to the need to establish the wartime command
structure in peacetime. Koldunov stresses the danger of surprise attack
throughout the depth of the country, citing local wars as well as the
Great Patriotic War for support. ° This appears to be an allusion to the
danger of conventional air attacks throughout the theater and into the
57 Koldunov (1984; 17). In this case Koldunov criticizes the shortages
of AAA in a manner reminiscent of the PVO SV articles.
58 Koldunov (1984; 19)
.
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Soviet Union itself. This would further imply the need for a single con-
trol of both border and homeland areas.
Koldunov argues that the enemy air force is the main strike force
for resolving operational and strategic tasks in the beginning period of
the war and that a strong PVO is therefore the decisive condition for
preserving the military-economic potential of the country and the combat
CO
ability of the armed forces. Thus the VPVO could be decisive in the be-
ginning period of the war, and perhaps in the war as a whole. In a manner
reminiscent of the early 1960s Koldunov claims a very great strategic im-
portance for the VPVO in counteracting the surprise attack threat. As if
to make the point unmistakable, Koldunov repeats it twice in his conclu-
sion, adding the argument that the role of surprise is growing.
The argument that a surprise air attack is likely to start any war
strongly suggests that VPVO forces must have a peacetime command and con-
trol system that is on a war footing. In case of a surprise air attack
there would be no time to reorganize the command and control system and
re-route command lines through the TVD. Thus Koldunov' s argument for a
combat ready, timely created PVO presents itself as a criticism of the
peacetime/wartime split in the command structure and the rest of the arti^
cle argues for a more unified system that would exercise direct control
over forces in both peacetime and wartime, eliminating the transition
problem. Indeed, Koldunov reiterates his call for a the unification of








While many of the arguments raised by Koldunov are similar to those
presented before the reorganization, their presentation, combined with
the recommendations, strongly suggests great concern over the loss of op-
erational control in the border regions. Koldunov appears to have used
the discussion of the beginning period of the war as a surrogate argument
in favor of returning Fighter Aviation to VPVOS control and creating a
single unified command system for the entire country and theater.
Early 1984 also saw the publication of two other articles that ex-
pressed dissatisfaction with the organizational structure, albeit from
different viewpoints. On the VPVOS side, the problem of overly central-
ized General Staff control was again raised. This issue had been first
brought up by Svetlishin in 1979, and then remained dormant during the
first years of the reorganization. Slezkin and Mosevkin, in a Vestnik PVO
article raised this point as one of the critical factors hindering the ef-
fective control and maneuver of VPVOS forces during the Great Patriotic
War. 2 They also note that the PVO Front commanders were limited to a
small reserve force (a podrazdeleniy- - an AAA battery or an armored train)
that is clearly far too small for such a large operational unit. ^ But,
as noted in Chapter 7, the author's solution to this problem is to endorse
the creation of operational groups, even though such groups also would not
have the authority to move forces. In closing the authors note that close
interaction of PVO forces in the prifrontal regions is necessary and that
62 Slezkin and Mosevkin (1984; 84). See Chapter 7 for their account of
the difficulties of transferring a searchlight company from one position
to another.
63 Slezkin and Mosevkin (1984; 84).
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it was organized according to Supreme High Command (VGK) orders that cre-
ated the basis for a single PVO system in the TVD . Given their earlier
criticisms the authors seem to be arguing for greater authority for the
PVO commanders, possibly to be vested in operational groups to facilitate
interaction of PVO SV and VPVOS forces.
But while the VPVO authors were criticizing the tight General Staff
control, a PVO SV representative made a suggestion of quite a different
kind. Writing in Vestnik PVO a month after Slezkin and Mosevkin, General
Major Sherstyuk argued strongly against any VPVOS role in the prifrontal
regions. 3 After describing the methods and problems of PVO SV and VPVOS
interaction during the Great Patriotic War, Sherstyuk cites Voronov to the
effect that:
Effective PVO of troops of the front, army and frontal rear
objectives, communications, is possible only when all of the
soyedineniy and units of the PVO in the field of the front up to
its rear borders is completely subordinate to the military soviet
of the [SV] front. Soyedineniy of the VPVOS must protect from at-
tack objectives beyond the rear borders of the front.
This conclusion is remarkably direct and blunt: the VPVOS should not
have any role in the frontal rear areas but should be confined to defend-
ing behind these areas. In essence, this argument means that the VPVOS
should not pursue the LOC defense missions close to the front that were a
large part of its work during the Great Patriotic War. If it does, how-
ever, those forces should be fully subordinate to the SV Front. This
64 Slezkin and Mosevkin (1984; 85).
65 Sherstyuk appears to be a PVO SV officer, probably a professor at the
Vassilevskiy Academy. This surmise is based on his lack of previous pub-
lication in Vestnik PVO and a more recent article reflecting a PVO SV
bias
.
66 Sherstyuk (1984; 91).
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argument is very similar to that made by Andersen in 1979, and clearly
reflects a PVO SV preference for keeping VPVOS forces out of areas where
dual subordination could become a problem. This argument could be ex-
tended from the Front level to the TVD level, suggesting that Sherstyuk is
endorsing the centralized command of all forces under the TVD command.
Thus by early 1984 a new debate proper PVO organization had emerged.
The positions closely resemble those of 1979: the VPVOS arguing for a
single centralized control system, with the PVO SV arguing for a more
decentralized system with all PVO forces subordinate to the SV Front (or
TVD) .
Many of these issues also appear in the following year, just before
the de-reorganization, albeit in a less direct form. In a 1985 Voyenno-
istoricheskiy zhurnal article Koldunov stresses the importance of single
centralized control on a nationwide scale, while ignoring the Subordina-
te
tion to Artillery. Koldunov also notes the important contributions of
PVO Fronts, particularly their easing of interaction with PVO SV forces in
the TVD. 9 But the PVO Fronts are not presented as great breakthroughs in
Soviet military science, and instead the stress is laid on the 1941
reorganization and the importance of unified and centralized control.
While this article does not feature the fairly direct arguments of his
previous article it reiterates many of its main points and concerns.
67 See the discussion in Chapter 7. Note that Andersen et al (1979)
also resorted to a prominent military figure for the argument, rather than
proposing it themselves.
68 Koldunov (1985a; 58, 61). Single centralized control is also endorsed
in Koldunov (1985b; 5)
.
69 Koldunov (1985a; 62).
70 Koldunov (1985a; 61-62).
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By the time this last article appeared in Voyenno- istoricheskiy
zhurnal the decision to undo the 1981 reorganization had probably already
been made, as the de-reorganization appears to have taken effect at the
beginning of 1986 and the planning for it would have taken several months
to a year. It therefore appears that the early 1984 cluster of articles
represented an important step in the debate over organizational structure
and the final decision on the issue may have taken place in mid to late
1984.
Throughout the period surveyed there is evidence of VPVO concern
over centralized, unified, command and control of VPVO forces with an im-
plicit criticism of the military district and TVD organizational structure
adopted in 1981. This concern was reflected in Koldunov's stress on
unity, the failure to endorse the subordination to the Commander of Artil-
lery, the criticisms of the beginning period of the war organizational
structure, and objections to overly strict centralization by the General
Staff. All of these points indicate a strong preference for the creation
of a PVO system under centralized control with a command and control sys-
tem that would be able to transition rapidly and smoothly from a peacetime
to wartime state.
These arguments come to she fore in 1984 and 1985 after the KAL in-
cident, and the VPVO and PVO SV viewpoints are articulated in a renewed
debate. This debate coincides with the advocacy and decisionmaking stage
of the decisionmaking process, and suggests that the VPVO had found a new
opportunity to press its case. In the section below the course of the
reversal of the decision and its consequences are examined.
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8.5 The Reorganization of 1985-86
Beginning in early ?i986 -|&ere:*re~itidl:e*tiOtis of a major change in
the VPVO organizational structure. Articles from former PVO SV schools
disappear from the pages of Vestnik PVO, as do the articles about, and * "
photos of, PVO SV forces. In Kr3.sn.aya zvezda troop designations change
and VPVO forces are not attributed to Military Districts . 71 Finally, the
former First Deputy Commander VPVO for PVO SV forces, Colonel General
Chesnokov appeared in Voyennjy vestnik listed as the Commander of PVO SV
with no VPVO affiliation indicated. 72 Jhus, the .IgQ Jff forces appear to
have been returned to the Ground Forces while $PVO forces ^*ve^%«en taken
out of subordination to the military districts. J Furthermore, at least
one, and probably both, of the IA schools transferred to the Soviet Air
force have been resubordinated to the VPVO. This in turn suggests that
IA forces have been returned to VPVO control and is confirmed by the in-
creased numbers currently attributed to the VPVO by the Defense Depart-
ment. 75
71 Based on the author's survey of Krasnaya zvezda during the 1984-1986
period.
72 Chesnokov (1986). An earlier indication of Chesnokov's move is his
signature on an obituary published in Krasnaya zvezda on May 5, 1986 which
he signs with the Ground Forces officers rather than with the VPVO of-
ficers.
73 Department of Defense (1987; 58-9). This is also based on the scan of
Krasnaya zvezda, indicating that military district affiliations are no
longer attached to VPVO forces, although they are attached to PVO SV
forces. (The branch or service affiliation of the force can usually be
determined by descriptions of equipment or photographs.)
74 This is based on the publication of an article in Vestnik PVO by an
officer identified as affiliated with the Daugavipils aviation school.
See Shimanovskiy (1987).
75 Department of Defense (1987; 59).
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While the new peacetime organization suggests a complete reversal of
the 1981 reorganization, we know much less about the possible wartime
structure. The general endorsement of the PVO Front system by various
VPVO leaders leaves open the possibility that such a system might be es-
tablished during wartime, although without its being subordinate to the
TVD command. If this is the case then the new wartime structure would
very closely resemble that of late 1944, although with greater authority
given to the PVO Front commander.
In shore, the reorganization of the VPVOS appears to have been
largely reversed with only the name change remaining.
The VPVO's views on the reorganization and de- reorganization were
expressed early in 1986 in a Voyenno- istoricheskiy zhurnal article by
Colonel General I. M. Mal'tsev, Chief of the Main Staff of the VPVO.
Mal'tsev's article treats both PVO SV and VPVOS organizational changes
during the Great Patriotic War and comes to a conclusion opposite to that
of Gorbunov and Frantsev: the delineation between VPVOS and PVO SV was a
positive development, and their joint subordination to the Commander of
Soviet Artillery was a negative development. The difficulties with the
beginning period of the war organization are noted and Mal'tsev specifi-
cally criticizes the fragmentation of forces under various commands, and
argues for concentrating the control of PVO forces under one commander.
Mal'tsev also approves of the June 1942 centralization of the control of
the PVO SV under the control of the Commander of Artillery, noting that
76 Mal'tsev (1986; 26-27, 31).
77 Mal'tsev (1985; 22-3)
.
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this marked the culmination of the separation of the VPVOS and PVO SV, and
then states that this solution to the problem of controlling the PVO
forces was proven correct during the course of the war. B By so doing,
Mal'tsev clearly implies that the separation of the two forces is a cor-
rect organizational structure during wartime.
Mal'tsev appears to be restrained in his enthusiasm for the PVO
Front system. Describing the creation of the two front system he mentions
the increase in flexibility and "operativeness" that resulted but then im-
mediately criticizes the system for complicating control by creating two
independent fronts, one of which was inactive. Furthermore, Mal'tsev ex-
plicitly states that he views the subordination of the VPVOS to the Com-
mander of Artillery was a step backwards in the development of the organi-
zational structure of the VPVOS. y His discussion of the further develop-
ment of the PVO Front system is more neutral, but even his comments on the
final four front system do not constitute a strong endorsement. 80 The
overall tenor of Mal'tsev's comments, combined with his denunciation of
the subordination constitute a strong criticism of the 1980-81 reorganiza-
tion.
Ground force PVO organization receives less attention, but here
again Mal'tsev notes deficiencies. Mal'tsev is particularly critical of
the lack of corps level PVO control, arguing that centralized commands at
the front and army level were unable to respond rapidly to the air situa-








drawn up but were never enacted, so that the organizational structure of
the PVO SV stayed unchanged until the end of the war. 1
In his closing arguments, Mal'tsev notes that during the war a num-
ber of measures were taken to improve the organizational structure, first
among these being the separation of PVO SV and VPVOS forces. The other
measures that Mal'tsev singles out are the creation of operational-
strategic (front) and operational VPVOS formations (ob 'yedineniy)
,
and
formation of separate IA and AAA forces as branches of the VPVO. Finally,
he points out that VPVOS had strategic tasks to perform and thus reported
to the highest command authorities, while the PVO SV was responsible to
combined arms commanders, with an independent system of control. To make
sure that the surrogate argument is clear, Mal'tsev includes the statement
that the creative use of the Great Patriotic War experience can solve con-
temporary problems of PVO control. Mal'tsev thus makes his point quite
forcefully and directly: PVO SV should be under the combined arms com-
manders, while the VPVO should report to the highest command levels as an
independent service with centralized control of all VPVO forces. The
argument directly criticizes the 1980-81 reorganization, particularly the
subordination of VPVO assets to Military District and TVD level com-
manders .
Mal'tsev's article is both a justification of the de-reorganization
and an argument for it. It is interesting to note that this article is
more detailed and clear in its surrogate arguments than those published
81 Mal'tsev (1986; 27). This criticism is very similar to that made by
Lavrent'yev (1980; 76), see Chapter 6.
82 Mal'tsev (1986; 31).
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before the decision. Clearly the earlier authors had to be more circum-
spect in putting their views across before they became accepted policy.
Furthermore, unlike the arguments for the 1981 reorganization, this arti-
cle is written by a high-ranking officer which implies that it had the
VPVO's seal of approval.
Thus, there is evidence of strong VPVO opposition to the 1981
reorganization and a strong endorsement of the later reversal of the
reorganization. How did the decisionmaking process work in this case?
8.6 Summary: Decisionmaking and the Reorganization
The VPVO's opposition to the 1980-81 reorganization was based on
strongly held beliefs and principles concerning the effective organization
of PVO. Chief amongst these is the emphasis on centralized, single con-
trol of VPVO forces by the VPVO leadership. The importance of this prin-
ciple is reflected throughout the VPVO historical literature and during
the 1980s it was reemphasized in arguing against the decentralization pro-
duced by the reorganization. The KAL incident appears to have triggered a
reexamination of the problem and an increase in opposition.
The main target of VPVO dissatisfaction was the devolution of com-
mand and control of VPVO forces to the military districts. This violated
the principle of centralized, single control and was consistently criti-
cized through allusions to the deficiencies of the PVO organization at the
beginning of the Great Patriotic War.
The second aspect of the reorganization was the transfer of PVO SV
forces to the VPVO. While this transfer increased the forces available to
the VPVO it also added responsibilities without a corresponding increase
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in authority. Thus, while the PVO SV was added to the VPVO force struc-
ture it appears to have retained substantial autonomy and probably did not
fall within the operational jurisdiction of the former VPVOS top leader-
ship. Furthermore, the addition of these forces may have diluted the
VPVO's main mission definition and complicated problems of resource al-
location.
The addition of the PVO SV forces appears to have been insufficient
to compensate for the loss of core forces such as half the IA fleet.
These forces were directly concerned with the VPVO's main mission,
homeland defense, and were not commensurate with the added PVO SV forces.
This reduction in capability took place without a corresponding reduction
in responsibility. Thus, the VPVO was placed in the difficult position of
having to do more with less.
Finally, in addition to violating the principle of centralization,
the new organizational structure seems to have complicated the transition
from peacetime to wartime control. This issue was emphasized in the
VPVO's concern over surprise attack and the need to react immediately to
any air threat.
But given all these reasons for VPVO opposition to the reorganiza-
tion, what could have prompted the reversal of the reorganization? What
could have produced such a change in outlook on the part of the General
Staff and State Defense Committee to induce them to reverse their deci-
sion?
First, VTVO objections appear to increase after the KAL incident,
suggesting that the case might have provided additional ammunition in the
campaign against the reorganization. While VPVO opposition had never com-
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pletely disappeared, it took this incident to place the problem of organi-
zational structure back on a prominent place on the agenda. The VPVO also
did not lose any time in pressing the issue, as the Koldunov article argu-
ing for changes in organization appeared only a few months after the KAL
incident.
Second, two important personnel changes took place as Brezhn«v died
and in September 1984 Marshal Ogarkov was transferred to head the Western
TVD and was replaced by Marshal Akhromeyev. An issue of such major impor-
tance as the reorganization of a service would have had to be approved at
the highest level, so these changes may have been critical. Ogarkov'
s
departure removed the architect of the TVD command system and its most ^ar-
dent advocate. While Akhromeyev' s position on TVD commands is not known
it might have been easier to convince him of the VPVO's point of view
since he was not directly responsible for the earlier decision and imple-
mentation. The replacement of two of the key players in the original de-
cision may well have eased the path to the reconsideration and reversal of
the reorganization.
Third, the development of the U.S. threat may have influenced the
decision, although the direction of the influence is difficult to
determine. From the Soviet perspective the U.S. threat had increased and
become more imminent during late 1983 as the first ground- launched cruise
missiles were deployed in Europe and the intermediate nuclear forces (INF)
talks were broken off. At the same time the deployment of air-launched
cruise missile equipped bombers had begun, presenting a qualitatively new
threat for the VPVO. -> The new weapons, coupled with a greater U.S.
83 Cochran, Arkin and Hoenig (1984; 175).
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stress on nuclear weapons in general, may have caused a shift in emphasis
within the VPVO back to homeland defense from theater missions. While
there is no clear evidence of this shift in the VPVO literature, it would
be consistent with the new emphasis on centralized control of forces. On
balance, though the increased U.S. threat may have catalyzed the decision
to reconsider organizational structure it does not appear to provide a
strong argument against the 1981 reorganization.
The confluence of all these factors seems to have strengthened the
VPVO's hand and allowed it to win the debate, in contrast to 1981. This
result is highly significant, for it implies that in some cases service
advocacy may be able to win out over the General Staff position. While
such cases may be rare, they do indicate some limits on the power of the
General Staff and suggest that persistence by the services may eventually
produce a reversal of unfavorable decisions. Thus, if in the normal case
the General Staff may be able to dominate most debates the service posi-
tion at least has the possibility of carrying the argument. If the Gener-
al Staff completely dominated the decisionmaking process such an outcome
would be highly unlikely.
At the same time, this case indicates that personalities may play an
important role in the decisionmaking process: a reversal of the
reorganization so soon after its enactment would appear to be much less
likely with a strong proponent of the TVD organization like Ogarkov as the
Chief of the General Staff. 84
84 Ogarkov was also a very forceful and persuasive character, whereas
Akhromeyev appears to have much less personal and political influence.
-300-
Thus the interaction between levels 2 and 3 is not entirely one-way.
The services do have some room to argue their cases, even though after a




9.1 Overview: VPVO- -General Staff Interaction
In the previous chapters the evolution of the VPVO has been examined
with particular attention to issues of operational art and the role of the
VPVO in Soviet strategy. At several points during the past 40 years the
VPVO has undergone major changes in role, funding, or organization and
these changes provide opportunities for examining the interaction of the
VPVO with the other levels of the Soviet defense decisionmaking. What
conclusions can be drawn regarding this interaction?
First, the crucial interaction is between the General Staff and the
VPVO. The General Staff constrains the organizational behavior of the
VPVO and imposes a unitary strategic actor viewpoint on the service. This
conclusion is clear from the cases of PRO and the 1981 reorganization.
The decisionmaking stages in the PRO case seem to have a "bubble
up" character, as service programs expanded to become matters of doctrinal
importance. The agenda was set at the lower levels of the decisionmaking
structure as the VPVOS forged ahead with its PRO development and deploy-
ment programs, and the issue rose upwards in the structure due to the
unique nature of the weapons involved. The PRO system transcended the
VPVOS ' s realm of operational art and took on a strategic and doctrinal
significance that required the decision to be made at the Politburo level.
The General Staff role in the PRO case was to some extent superseded by
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the political dimension, for the issue had doctrinal significance that re-
quired settlement at the highest level. Nevertheless the position of the
General Staff provided an important military argument against the con-
tinued PRO deployment that in turn influenced the argument amongst the
political leaders, for had the military presented a strongly unified posi-
tion in favor of PRO development it would have been more difficult for a
political leader to advance an anti-PRO position. We may conclude,
therefore, that both the General Staff and the VPVOS attempted to exert
decision influence but that actual decision authority clearly rested with
the Politburo, and the actual decision may have been determined more by
political considerations than the nuances of the two sides 's arguments.
In the case of the 1981 reorganization the role of the General Staff
in determining strategy and strategic -level force organization is clear.
The General Staff succeeded in completely restructuring Soviet air and PVO
forces in the theaters, in an effort to increase their conventional war-
fare capabilities. While this change was opposed by the VPVO it was none-
theless pushed through. In this case while the VPVO attempted to in-
fluence the decision, the decision authority rested with the Defense Coun-
cil although the plan itself and the initiative behind it would have come
from the General Staff. But while the General Staff was able to push
through the decision, the VPVO did not cease its opposition to the plan.
1 This is due to both the limited expertise available to formulate such a
position, and the sheer political difficulty of maintaining a position
that is condemned by the specialists in the field. This is not to suggest
that the military has veto powers in this area, but the use of military-
technical arguments can play an important role in influencing leadership
debates. See Meyer (1985; 39; 44-47).
2 The distinction between decision influence and decision authority is
drawn in Meyer (1985; 39-40).
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Furthermore, if the intent of the plan was to merge the VPVO and the PVO
SV there are indications that it did not succeed in the implementation
phase. The distinction between the two forces remained clearly drawn,
particularly in the historical literature, and the surrogate arguments in-
dicated that they retained different perspectives on organization and mis-
sions. Furthermore, the KAL incident seems to have provided evidence that
the new command and control system did not perform well, and provided the
opportunity for renewed efforts to influence and reverse the decision.
If the PRO and 1981 reorganization cases indicate the extent of the
General Staff's authority and influence, then the 1986 reorganization pro-
vides some insights into the VPVO's role in the decisionmaking process.
In this case service- level advocacy succeeded in undoing the earlier Gen-
eral Staff decision after a fairly short period of time. While the KAL
incident may have acted as a catalyst for the change, it appears that
other factors such as personnel changes also played a role. What is most
interesting about the case, however, is that the VPVO appeared to put the
issue on the agenda and bring about a favorable decision. This suggests
that in some circumstances the services may be able to exert a significant
level of influence and even bring about the reversal of previous General
Staff decisions under favorable conditions. However, this does not mean
that the services and the General Staff are equally powerful. Instead, it
indicates that they are comparable actors and that the services may in a
minority of cases achieve favorable decisions.
The case of the creation of the VPVO seems to be primarily a matter
of level 1 (Politburo) and level 3 interaction, as the existence of a
strong proponent of defense in a powerful position (Khrushchev) appears to
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have had a very significant impact on the formation and development of the
VPVOS . From this case we can derive little information about service and
General Staff interaction, but we do see a form of influence on the Polit-
buro based on the inflated estimates of effectiveness produced by the
VPVOS. In this case these estimates appear to have had important
strategic and even doctrinal implications for they formed an important
basis for the decision to create a nationwide air defense system. Thus,
by presenting military- technical arguments the service was able to in-
fluence higher- level issues.
Finally, in the transition from a nuclear-oriented homeland strategy
to a more conventional orientation the VPVO and General Staff appear to
have reached a consensus on the new VPVO roles and missions. This agree-
ment was grounded in the needs of Soviet strategy (as determined by the
General Staff), the capabilities of the VPVOS, and the historical experi-
ence and traditions of the Great Patriotic War. Thus, there does not ap-
pear to have been any conflict over this decision, and it seems to have
passed through the decisionmaking structure at both levels 2 and 3 with
the VPVOS carrying out the implementation. The implementation, however,
may not have been highly successful for it required changes in operational
art and tactics that the VPVO was slow in implementing. This slow imple-
mentation, though may be less due to organizational resistance than to the
difficulties of organizational learning and conservatism outlined in a
following section.
In examining the external behavior of the VPVO, then, we may place
some bounds on the influence of the service. In the cases examined the
VPVO appears to have attempted to influence decisions having both
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strategic and doctrinal importance, but with relatively limited success.
In comparison to the General Staff the VPVO appears to have significantly
less influence, although not so much less that it cannot hope to win the
debates. But the General Staff also has limitations on its power and in-
fluence, and these are similar to those of other directive organs in
Soviet society. While their power may be quite great, actual execution of
their decisions may be impeded and thwarted ry the lower levels
responsible for implementation. It is in this area, operational art, that
the decisionmaking process appears to be quite different.
These issues of relative power and domains of responsibility are not
abstract issues for they are directly related to Western interpretations
of Soviet forces and intentions. To take one current example, how should
the Soviet construction of the Krasnoyarsk radar be interpreted? Is it a
result of bureaucratic bungling on the part of the VPVO, placed there be-
cause the terrain was suitable and the engineers were unaware of the ABM
Treaty? Or was it cleared and approved by the military and political
leadership despite the fact that it represents a potential violation of
the ABM Treaty?
First, the Krasnoyarsk radar does fall within the domain of VPVO re-
sponsibility and such a project would undoubtedly have been reviewed by
the VPVO top leadership. Second, for such an important system the deploy-
ment would be formally reviewed by the General Staff. The approval pro-
cess would have revealed the potential treaty violation, and elevated the
issue to an even higher level for decision- -the Politburo or the Defense
3 This, surprisingly, was the argument advanced by the Soviets in in-
formal discussions with the U.S. congressional team that visited the site
See Downey, Carr , and Moody (1987; 12).
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Council particularly since the General Staff would be reluctant to take
responsibility for such a risky deployment. Third, the Minister of the
Radioelectronics Industry during the time the decision to build the Kras-
noyarsk was made had been a senior delegate to the SALT negotiations that
resulted in the treaty. It is almost inconceivable that the Minister was
not aware of both the location of the radar and of the fact that it
represented a potential violation of the treaty, since the issue would
certainly have come up during both Ministerial and Military-Industrial
Commission reviews. For such a decision to slip by unnoticed would re-
quire gross incompetence and negligence on the part of the VPVO, General
Staff and the Radioelectronics Ministry. There is no evidence of such
massive incompetence, and there were no apparent recriminations against
the VPVO when the U.S. started complaining about the radar.
Thus there are very good reasons to believe that the VPVO leader-
ship, the General Staff and the Defense Council were involved in the deci-
sion to approve the radar. Given the tendency to elevate problems to the
highest possible level for decision it is almost certain that the decision
to site the radar would have been made by the Defense Council and hence
approved by the political leadership. In this case, then, the limits of a
purely organizational approach to the study of Soviet defense decisionmak-
ing are clear, and the application of a more detailed model of interaction
between the services suggests a rather different decisionmaking process
and intent.
4 The minister in question is Aleksandr N. Shchukin. I am indebted to
Peter Almquist for pointing out this fact.
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9.2 Operational Art and Internal Behavior
The other major area of concern is the internal behavior of the VPVO
and to what extent it may be explained by the organizational politics
model
.
Many of the propositions of the organizational politics model have
been borne out in the case study, but the limitations of these proposi-
tions and the model must also be recognized. The organizational politics
model acts as a supplement to the unitary strategic actor represented by
the General Staff, and it applies primarily to issues falling within the
domain of responsibility of the service, such as operational art. This
provides considerable opportunity for organizational influences to
manifest themselves in forces and operational art. While this domain of
responsibility is much smaller than that of the U.S. services, it is non-
negligible and has a definite impact on force structure and combat effec-
tiveness .
Within the service the effects of organizational behavior tend to
dampen innovation, foster inflation of performance, and hinder learning
from combat experience. Let us examine the impact of organizational fac-
tors on the internal behavior of the VPVO following the categories pro-
posed in Chapter 2.
9.2.1 Decisionmaking
The organizational politics model of organizational behavior sug-
gests that decisionmaking within the organization will reflect conserva-
tism and incrementalism. In the case of the VPVO these traits are ob-
served in the area of operational art, weapons development, and tactics.
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There is a good deal of evidence indicating that the VPVO engaged in
incremental innovation, or even no innovation, in the area of operational
art. The basic principles of operational art remained the same throughout
the period under examination and are even invariant across nuclear and
conventional threats. Despite the input from combat experience in local
wars the rate of innovation seems very low in both operational art and
tactics.
Did the VPVO develop standard operating procedures? The answer to
this is a qualified yes. The principles of operational art form a set of
standard operating procedures in that they provide simple guidelines that
form the basis for decisionmaking. While such principles are part of any
military service those of the VPVO are noteworthy for their lack of change
over time and their application to a wide range of threats. Similarly, in
the area of weapons development and tactics the VPVO and the design
bureaus continued to apply their old standard operating procedures for
designing aircraft, stressing ground-controlled intercept and missile at-
tacks despite the growing importance of low altitude penetration and
maneuvering air combat. Thus, in the broad sense standard operating pro-
cedures did figure in VPVO decisionmaking.
Weapons deployment also seems to have been distorted by a combina-
tion of inaccurate threat forecasting and organizational inertia. Thus
5 The incrementalism in much of Soviet weapons design is a result of both
technological limitations and of design practice and tradition. In-
crementalism may over time produce very highly effective weapons, particu-
larly if the basic concept was correct. Thus the MiG-21 (and the French
Mirage) series aircraft despite their simplicity achieved very high per-
formance in a number of areas critical to air combat. See Alexander
(1978/9). As Stephen Meyer has also pointed out, sustained incremental
change may also produce major changes over time. Furthermore, radical de-
sign changes may not always produce better products, as witness the F-lll
and MiG-23 aircraft.
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both the SA-5 and MiG-25 were deployed even after the threat they had been
designed for did not materialize. Although they were assigned to other
missions these missions were not as urgent as those for which they had
been designed and probably would not have provided sufficient reason to
design them in the first place. Thus, while the deployment of these
weapons was not irrational bureaucratic inertia neither was it an optimal
decision.
In the area of threat perception and inflation two competing
dynamics seem to be at work. First, there is the conservative tendency
not to interpret U.S. threats as an insuperable threat and to view them as
evolutionary threats. Second, there is the tendency to worst -case analy-
sis, to assign high effectiveness to enemy weapons systems. In the case
of the cruise missile both of these tendencies seem to have been opera-
tive. The initial reaction was to view the cruise missile as a variation
on an old threat, but as the scope and nature of the cruise missile pro-
gram became clearer over time the threat perception shifted and became
more of a worst-case analysis. At no time, however, did the VPVO admit
that the cruise missile problem might be insuperable, it was always pre-
sented as a serious but manageable threat given the emerging new defensive
technologies
.
In the area of organizational change, it is clear that the 1981
reorganization was conducted on the initiative of the General Staff and
that it was strongly opposed by the VPVOS. Conversely, the shift to a
more conventional mission appears to have been precipitated by both the
overall strategic shift towards conventional war and by the ABM treaty.
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This shift served VPVO interests and coincided with those of the General
Staff and appears to have been carried out successfully, although the VPVO
did continue to retain a significant homeland defense role.
VPVO decisionmaking therefore seems to exhibit many of the charac-
teristics we expect from an organizational politics model, particularly
incrementalism and conservatism. In this case these tendencies may have
been exacerbated by the long tenure in office of the VPVO leaders, as part
of the stability of cadres policy. As in other areas of Soviet society
this policy seems to have contributed to a general lack of innovation and
efficiency in the VPVO.
9.2.2 Inter- -Branch Behavior
From the material surveyed there is relatively little indication of
inter-branch conflict. To some extent this may be due to the level of
material surveyed- -operational art rather than tactical. At the same time
there are some interesting hints about the nature of inter-branch rela-
tions .
First, the problem of coordinating Fighter Aviation and AAA (and
later SAM) forces was of great concern to the VPVO as shown in the histor-
ical literature. There are relatively few specifics on how to achieve
coordination, an omission which could be due either to classification or
the fact that these problems have not been worked out in detail.
Second, the tactical literature of the branches tends to be quite
separate- -SAM forces are not discussed in the Fighter Aviation literature
and vice versa. This compartmentalization in the literature may represent
6 On the one exception to this see Goncharov (1982)
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a real split between the forces, which could lead to an ignorance of the
performance and tactics of the other branches, thereby complicating inter-
action.
Third, there are indications that the level of autonomy of the
Fighter Aviation forces during the Great Patriotic War was quite high, and
this may have carried over to the present. This material is insufficient
for a definite conclusion on the degree of coordination between the two
forces, but there is reason to suspect that many problems still have not
been fully worked out.
While a shift of emphasis away from SAM forces towards Fighter Avia-
tion forces is visible in the late 1970s to early 1980s it is not clear
that this represents a shift in the relative power balance between the
branches. To some extent this may be a compensation for the missile-mania
of the early 1960s, or it may be a recognition of the greater flexibility
and maneuverability of Fighter Aviation forces. The latter is of great
importance if the VPVO is to reinforce forces in the TVD and fill gaps,
for only Fighter Aviation forces could be moved forward rapidly enough to
fulfill the mission. Finally, the apparent emphasis on Fighter Aviation
may have been due to a lull in the deployment of new SAM systems while a
new generation (SA-10) was under development.
9.2.3 Learning Behavior
VPVO learning from local wars appears to have been biased by precon-
ceptions and poor data. The lessons of Vietnam and the Middle East were
7 This was certainly the case for the U.S., given the very long develop-
ment of the Patriot SAM.
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selectively interpreted in a manner consistent with prevailing VPVO
beliefs and perceptions. Despite the abundant information showing the im-
portance of dogfighting skills in air combat no major effort in this area
was mounted until after the .incontrovertible evidence provided by the
Lebanon air war. Thus, biases and preconceptions have clearly hampered
the learning behavior of the VPVO.
9.2.4 Overview of Internal Behavior
The VPVO clearly exhibits behavior similar to that predicted by or-
ganization theory, and this behavior may have a significant impact on the
areas of operational art, tactics, and weapons development. Much of this
behavior may result in inefficiencies and hamper the creation of an effec-
tive force, as threats are misinterpreted and lessons misleamed. But
this does not mean that the VPVO is a completely moribund organization
with fundamentally flawed perceptions of the threat. Indeed, Egyptian
troops under VPVO tutelage demonstrated the effectiveness of dense air
defenses in the 1973 war. But this demonstration does not mean that the
VPVO would be able to achieve such results in a nuclear war, nor does it
mean that the VPVO is operating as efficiently as it might be. There are
still clear deficiencies in many areas of both equipment and troop per-
formance that if remedied could increase the effectiveness of the force.
While there is evidence that the Soviet military leadership is aware
of these problems and is now moving to try to eliminate them, the problems
arise from the entire incentive structure of the organizations and are not
likely to be easily alleviated. Even with a new leadership in place in
the VPVO there is unlikely to be a rapid change in effectiveness.
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9.3 Why the VPVO?
Having surveyed the application of theory and the history of the
VPVO we are now in a position to return to the original question: why the
VPVO?
The VPVO has gone through many changes and reorientations during the
forty years since it was first incorporated as a service. At the same
time the reasons behind the VPVO's support have shifted as new threats and
new missions have arisen. Therefore, no one single answer can be given to
the question "Why the VPVO?" Instead, we must treat the answer as one
evolving over time.
The decision to create the VPVOS in 1948 is the least discussed and
perhaps the most obvious of all the decisions in the VPVO history. Faced
with a growing strategic bombing threat from the U.S. the decision to
create a strong nationwide air defense system was a rational reaction.
The fact that Stalin had a predisposition to strong air defenses may have
colored this decision and influenced the priority given to it, but does
not appear to have made it less rational. But the form of the system and
the organizational structure were determined less by the threat than by
historical precedent and the experience of the Great Patriotic War. In
1948 the VPVOS apparatus was already partly in existence, and its exten-
sion to service status was an easy and straightforward decision. As long
as the VPVOS was only directed towards homeland defense the formation of a
separate service would seem to minimize problems of interaction between
Fighter Aviation and AAA forces. Even so, a lot of organizational tinker-
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ing took place in the late 1940s and early 1950s before arriving at a
satisfactory organization.
Similarly, the 1954 decision to upgrade the VPVOS to "a full service
status (by appointing a wan«md«C^lpfl^«T»*I>eputy Hinil
was largely in response to the growing U.S. threat, as was the greater
priority being assigned the service even before the upgrading. While the
decision was partly a result of political considerations and the struggle
between Malenkov and Khrushchev, the growing emphasis on the VPVOS did
have a clear logic given the expected effectiveness of new air defense
technologies. This qualification is important- - if the Soviet leadership
had been given an accurate estimate of likely PVO effectiveness, say 102
,
would the massive spending on strategic defenses have continued or would a
more moderate "tripwire" system have been created? The answer to this
counterfactual cannot be known, but it does appear that Khrushchev's bias
in favor of missiles (SAMs) combined with technological optimism and orga-
nizational biases gave rise to a seriously distorted estimate of PVO ef-
fectiveness that contributed to the decision to create an extensive PVO
system. Estimates of PVO effectiveness were also an important considera-
tion in weighing the balance between strategic offensive and defensive
forces, for with a low effectiveness it might have been more cost-
effective to stress offensive forces and counterforce missions.
By 1960 a new choice opportunity was emerging. The rapid develop-
ment of U.S. ballistic missiles presented the VPVOS with a new challenge.
Again, the top-level commitment to strategic defense, coupled with op-
8 These estimates of air defense effectiveness also appear to have been
an important factor in deciding not to pursue a large-scale intercontinen-
tal bomber program.
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timism concerning the rapid development of Soviet technology combined to
produce an initial optimism concerning the prospects for missile defense.
But with the installation of a new leadership with different priorities
and biases, new data on SAM performance, and the influx of views and in-
formation from the Western ABM debate, the basic assumptions concerning
PRO and strategic defense were reexamined. By this time the political and
military consensus had shifted significantly, urging a return to a more
conventional (and traditional) theater warfare orientation. These factors
led to the final decision to engage in the SALT negotiations and the ABM
treaty. They do not, however, explain the continued support of a strong
air defense system.
The continued support for the VPVOS was a combination of military
requirements, organizational conservatism and sunk costs, On the milita-
ry side new missions were found for the existing arms and the VPVOS 's
basic mission was extended to support Soviet conventional operations by
providing defense of rear areas and lines of communication for the advanc-
ing troops. At the same time the homeland defense mission was retained as
a hedge against the U.S. bomber force and to prevent any possibility of a
conventional bombing campaign in the event of a non-nuclear war. While
the VPVO may not have been highly effective, its very existence caused
"virtual attrition" against th' U.S. bomber force and while this might not
have been an adequate reason for creating such an air defense system from
scratch, it was an acceptable rationale for its maintenance. While each
of these reasons is in itself insufficient to justify the continuation of
the PVO, taken %m]^^^^fy*xp*of.^g^tts- that fit both
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nuclear and conventional strategies while keeping open the option of an
eventual return to a large-scale strategic defense mission.
But the redefinition of the roles and missions of the VPVOS also
raised a number of new problems, such as interaction with the PVO SV, the
Ground Forces, and the Air Force. These problems, combined with the grow-
ing stress on conventional warfare by the General Staff, led to the at-
tempt to more closely integrate the VPVOS with theater forces. But the
attempts to resolve the problem of interaction by reorganizing the VPVO
clearly did not work. Instead of producing a clearer organizational
structure the reorganization appears to have complicated and hampered the
command and control of the homeland defense forces, rather than providing
a clear and efficient control system.
In the 1980s the VPVO is again faced with a new threat in the form
of cruise missiles and there are a range of options available. First,
given the tremendous difficulty of detecting and destroying cruise mis-
siles the Soviets could decide to forego active defense against them
entirely, instead trying only to create a tripwire detection system that
would warn of a cruise missile attack without attempting to inflict high
attrition. Such a system would not be simple or cheap, but it would be
much less expensive than the second option, a system designed to destroy a
significant fraction of cruise missiles. A third option would be the
creation of a force able to warn of, and destroy some fraction of, cruise
missiles and a larger fraction of penetrating bombers. It appears that
this third option has been chosen, and it is consistent with Soviet tech-
nological and economic limits, although it is unlikely to be very effec-
tive. The VPVO may face even more difficulties in the future, as new
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technologies and weapons (cruise missiles, stealth technology) seem to be
advancing the offense more rapidly than the defense and we may see a large
Q
drop in expected PVO effectiveness.
For the future it appears likely that the VPVO will continue to fol-
low a mixed scheme: conventional theater defense combined with a homeland
defense system intended to provide detection and at least some moderate
level of interception of cruise missiles. To do much more would require a
significant and extremely expensive buildup of VPVO forces during a period
of budget restrictions. Such a buildup appears highly unlikely. For the
present the answer to the question, "why the VPVO?" is that it has taken
on new missions that it can feasibly execute while retaining some of its
old reasons for existence as well. A single answer misses the importance
of its evolution over time and the role of conservatism and sunk costs.
9.4 Conclusion
The VPVO grew and evolved over time, and as it did so the reasons
and rationales for its existence also changed to meet the needs of Soviet
strategy and the capabilities of its forces. In examining modern force
structure it is important to be aware of the historical and organizational
factors at work, rather than to leap to rational -actor type conclusions
from a cursory examination of modern forces. While the VPVO is not a
vestigial organization, its continued existence does indicate the impor-
9 If one believes that they might score up to 10Z now, then one could im-
agine a figure of less than half than that against cruise missiles and
even less against stealthy cruise missiles or bombers. Even these figures
seem far too optimistic in view of historical experience and the dif-
ficulties of operating in a nuclear environment.
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SAM PERFORMANCE IN VIETNAM
In early 1965 North Vietnam requested air defense aid from the
Soviet Union, and in 1965 a Soviet-North Vietnam communique was released
noting that the USSR would supply SAMs and other military equipment. In
July 1965, SA-2 missiles saw their first action over North Vietnam, on
July 24th scoring their first kill against an F-4C. Towards the end of
the year SAM sites increased and by early 1966 an integrated PVO system
had been established, with extensive supplying of SAMs continuing through
early 1966. When the U.S. Rolling Thunder bombing campaign resumed in
February 1966, however, the effectiveness of the SAMs appears to have
decreased due to "poor missile quality, inadequately trained missile
crews, and the evasive tactics and effective electronic countermeasures
(ECM) used by the USAF aircrews." The U.S. also began systematically
1 O'Ballance (1981; 80).
2 Here the problem of wartime statistics raises its ugly head. The USAF
version of this incident is that a SAM detonated in a tight formation of
three aircraft, destroying one and damaging the other two. (See Air War-
Vietnam (1978; 232-233).) The North Vietnamese claim that they destroyed
all three aircraft with one missile. (See Hai Thu (1967; 26), also note
that the date of the incident is listed as July 26).) In general, North
Vietnamese estimate* of U.S. losses appear to be inflated by a factor of
two or three.
3 O'Ballance (1981; 90), Air War- -Vietnam (1978; 236).
4 Air War- -Vietnam (1978; 236-237).
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attacking and suppressing the SAM sites under the "Iron Hand" program.
MiGs were also suppiled to North Vietnam, but their number was never
•
-
great enough to create a major threat to U.S. air operations over the
North, and their effectiveness was reduced by MiG sweeps and combat air
patrols (CAPs). U.S. accounts claim that by the end of October 1967 the
advantage had turned to the U.S., with the success of defense suppression
7 i
missions and the deployment of aircraft-mounted ECM pods. In 1966, after
the installation of the Soviet air defense system, U.S. losses over North
Vietnam due to hostile action reached/280 aircraft) while conducting ap-
o
proximately 80,000 sorties. This gives an overall probability of kill
per sortie of approximately 0.0035, or an attrition rate of 0.35Z. While
not all U.S. sorties encountered SAM fire or the densest air defense con-
centration, this effectiveness is fairly low, even when compared to World
War II experience. More specific data on SAM launches and U.S. losses
is given in Table A.l below.
5 Air War- -Vietnam (1978; 239).
6 Air War- -Vietnam (1978; 241-248), O'Ballance (1981; 103), Momyer (1978;
137-150).
7 Air War- -Vietnam (1978; 240-241). Littauer's data suggests that attri-
tion increased in 1967 but decreased in 1968, although the latter estimate
is based on less reliable data. Littauer (1972; 274, 283). For a discus-
sion of ECM, chaff, pod use and formations see Momyer (1978; 125-133).
8 Littauer (1972; 267, 274). Note that two sortie figures are given, I
have used an approximation to the lower which gives a Pk more favorable to
the SAMs. Littauer's book appears to be the most complete listing of
statistics on the U.S. air war against North Vietnam. While sortie data
for 1965 is available, loss rates are not disaggregated for that year.
Also note that aircraft lost as a result of mechanical failure, pilot er-
ror or "operational causes" are not included in the data. Other tables in
Littauer's book suggests that inclusion of these figures could raise the
total losses by approximately 502.
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TABLE A.l: SA-2 Effectiveness 9








* Bombing in 1968 was only conducted for three months.
As the data show, SA-2 performance was markedly better than that of
previous PVO means in terms of single-shot kill probability, but still did
not live up to the very high claims made for it. Furthermore, the overall
attrition rates for U.S. attacks against North Vietnam did not show a
great increase over historical attrition rates. SAMs actually made a rel-
atively small contribution to overall U.S. losses, as out of the approxi-
mately 500 aircraft downed over North Vietnam most were lost to AAA, with
only approximately 46 downed by SAMs . °
North Vietnamese defenses were often effective in decreasing bomb-
ing accuracy, causing aircraft to jettison bombs in order to maneuver, and
causing damage to aircraft, but they were not sufficient to force a cessa-
tion of the attacks. * Furthermore, U.S. aircraft were limited in their
9 This data may be found in both Momyer (1978; 136) and Isby (1981; 246-
7). The 1972 figures may also reflect some SA-3 launches. Note that this q£
^ .,*>does not include failed missile launches- -missiles that never left the ,4^'
launch rails.
10 Littauer (1972; 44-45). Note that this total differs slightly from
that cited by Isby. Given the "fog of war" however the agreement is quite
good.
11 For a vivid description of the difficulty of penetrating North Viet-
namese defenses see Broughton (1969). See also Momyer (1978; 136).
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tactics and approach patterns by .political considerations that made the
deployment of air defense forces easier for the North Vietnamese. 2 In
short, while the air defenses of North Vietnam were adequate against a
conventional tactical attack the results would not be adequate when ex-
trapolated to a strategic attack with nuclear weapons against the USSR,
where effectivenesses of much greater than ,2X would be required to blunt
an attack.




THE 1978 KAL INCIDENT
On April 20, 1978 a Korean Airlines (KAL) Boeing 707 airliner on a
polar-route flight from Paris to Seoul (via Alaska) flew far off course
and penetrated Soviet airspace over the Kola peninsula. The Kola is one
of the most sensitive and densely defended areas of the USSR as it is the
home to the Northern Fleet. According to Seymour Hersh's detailed account
based on Western intelligence sources, the VPVOS failed to intercept the
airliner before it crossed the Soviet border, and then lost the aircraft
over the Kola peninsula after Su-15 interceptors had been scrambled.
When the interceptors did finally find the aircraft Soviet sources
claim that the Su-15 pilots tried unsuccessfully to contact the flight
crew and order the plane to land, while the flight crew contends that they
were unable to make contact with the interceptors by radio and did not
receive any instructions. After several minutes the Su-15 fired two
missiles at the aircraft, one of which hit, causing damage to the rear
fuselage, killing two passengers and injuring thirteen. Hersh, citing
Western intelligence intercepts, claims that the Soviet pilot had clearly
1 Hersh (1986; 3,7)
.
2 Hersh (1986; 3, 14). Suvorov (1982; 80-81) claims that there are no
interceptors based on the Kola peninsula due to the poor weather, that all
Kola PVO consists of SAMs , and that an Su-15 had to be flown in from
Leningrad. This clai» is preposterous, as there is substantial evidence
of VPVOS IA bases, and Soviet Air Force bases, on the Kola. See, for
example, Rles (1984; &7Tf «h© lists the VPVOS as having 120 interceptors
on the Kola.
3 Paul (1978; 140-41), Hersh (1986; 6).
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identified the aircraft as a 707 with civilian markings, but that he was
directly ordered by a VPVOS general to ^ire^wrtha-plam despite this
identification.^ The damage to the cabin caused a depressurization and a
temporary loss of control, but regaining control the pilot put the plane
into a steep dive in order to reach an altitude where oxygen masks would
not be required.^ Leveling off at only 3000 faat the Korean flight crew
realized that the interceptors were probably still searching for them and
started a search for a landing site. For an hour and a half the aircraft
flew over the Kola peninsula searching for a landing area, until a frozen
lake was found where the pilot made a successful crash landing. It took
two hours for Soviet forces to locate the aircraft and dispatch
helicopters to the scene of the landing, some 230 miles south of Murmansk.
Later, arrangements were made for repatriating the passengers, and after
their interrogation, the crew.
This incident, coming only two weeks after the celebration of PV0
Day, was a great embarrassment to the VPVOS. From the rather sketchy
evidence it is clear that the VPVOS had some difficulty intercepting the
airliner (flying at 39,000 feet in a straight line) and it is very likely
that after the aircraft was damaged and flying at low altitude that it was
lost again. In short, the VPVOS had proven only marginally effective
against a very simple target, and once the target had become more
difficult the VPVOS became ineffective. Clearly, the inability to locate
4 Hersh (1986; 12-14).
5 It's also possible that the pilot realized he had been fired upon and
tried evasive action.
6 Paul (1978; 142-43).
7 Paul (1978; 143-144).
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an airliner flying at 3000 feet without the benefit of jamming or defense
suppression would not reflect well on the VPVOS ' s ability to intercept
bombers (even less fighters) using electronic countermeasures , flying at
lower altitudes, and equipped with nuclear missiles for defense
suppression. Moreover, the "troops of constant combat readiness" were
found wanting in their combat readiness as well. Given a surprise target
they reacted slowly and ineffectively.
Soviet (and for that matter, Western) coverage of the incident was
restrained. In Krasnaya zvezda coverage was limited to two small TASS
communiques tucked away on page three. The first communique claimed that
the KAL flight had ignored orders to land and had flown for two hours over
the Kola before making a forced landing. No mention was made of VPVOS
forces firing on the aircraft, leaving the impression that the aircraft
just flew around with the interceptors in tow for two hours. The second
communique was a little more informative, stating that VPVOS "actions"
caused the aircraft to land, and reporting that the flight crew had
confessed its guilt for violating Soviet borders and not obeying orders to
land. These communiques were the only explicit comments on the incident
to appear in the Soviet military press, in stark contrast to the reaction
to the KAL incident (after a few days of denial), and the Rust incident.
8 Krasnaya zvezda April 22, 1978, p. 3.
9 Krasnaya zvezda, April 30, 1978, p. 3.
10 The most detailed and explicit discussion of the 1978 incident was
published after the 1983 shoocdown by Col. Gen. Yurasov. Yurasov argues
that Che two flights had many similarities, that the 1978 flight crew knew
where they were at all times, that the flight was synchronized with U.S.
Ferret electronic intelligence satellite overflights, and that a Western
reconnaisance aircraft was in the region at the time. These charges are
clearly intended to bolster the similar charges leveled against the KAL
007 flight but they may In fact reflect real VPVOS views on the nature of
both of these flights. See Yurasov (1983; 3).
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In addition, there is no evidence of a major campaign in Krasnaya zvezda
to eliminate the problems encountered by the VPVOS forces. ^ There do
appear to have been repercussions for the top leadership, however.
The most obvious result was the replacement of Batitskiy by the
First Deputy Commander A. I. Koldunov \iiMi&f i?9?8 .^ 2 On this matter
there is some uncertainty, though, as there was a long ialay before
Batitskiy was replaced. Furthermore, as Jones points out, Batitskiy had
missed at least one important meeting before the KAL incident, and several
afterwards indicating he may have been battling an illness. 3 Thus, there
is no direct, explicit connection between the incident and Batitskiy'
s
departure but given the relatively poor performance of the VPVOS it may
have been an important factor in deciding to replace Batitskiy. It is
possible that a decision was made to wait a decent interval before
replacing Batitskiy.
Batitskiy' s replacement was certainly not an outsider. Koldunov was
a VPVOS career officer with a background in aviation. During the Great
Patriotic War he was a fighter ace with 46 kills to his credit, and after
11 There are critical articles concerning Radiotechnical Troops
performance in Krasnaya zvezda in the period following the KAL incident,
but these are not particularly unusual and are not clearly tied to the KAL
incident. Again, the case is quite different in the Rust incident which
triggered a series of very critical articles in Krasnava zvezda. As noted
below, there does appear to have been a new campaign launched in Vestnik
PVO, although it is not harshly critical of the VPVOS.
12 Batitskiy' s last appearance as Commander in Chief is reported in
Krasnaya zvezda July 2, 1978, p. 2. Koldunov signs an obituary as
Commander in Chief in Krasnaya zvezda, July 26, 1978 p. 4.
13 On the missed PVO day ceremony see Krasnaya zvezda April 8, 1978 p. 1.
For the list of post-KAL absences see Jones (1979; 26). I have confirmed
this list through a scan of Krasnaya zvezda articles from January through
August 1978.
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che war he commanded an IA regiment, then was a deputy commander,
commander of IA of a PVO district, followed by deputy, then commander of
the entire district. Koldunov's biography also lists the command of an
ob'yedineniy (army or front), but no details are given. From November
1970 Koldunov was commander of the Moscow PVO district and in 1975 was
promoted to First Deputy Commander in Chief.
Koldunov changed some top personnel in the VPVOS , but there does not
appear to have been a "purge." 15 Colonel General V. D. Sozinov, the
long-time head of the VPVOS Main Staff was promoted to the position of
First Deputy Chief, as was Col. Gen. Ye. S. Yurasov.16 The other First
Deputy Chief under Batitskiy, Colonel General I.D. Podgornyy , may have
been removed. Neither of these officers was imported from the outside,
14 Akhromeyev (1986; 339).
15 Jones (1979; 25-27) claims that there was rapid turnover in the
leadership, giving an "impression of turmoil." This judgement appears to
have been a bit premature , however, as it was based on identifications
from obituaries which do not appear to have been borne out. Instead the
promotions appear to have been from within and most incumbents were
retained in their posts.
16 Yurasov's previous position is unknown. His promotion to FDC seems to
have been a big jump. Yurasov did sign some VPVOS obituaries during the
1970s in a position indicating some responsibility for the SAM troops,
possibly Chief of Staff of the SAM troops. One source, however, suggests
that he was an electronics and communications specialist. See "Gen
Tretyak Reorganises Air Defense," (1988; 278-279.
17 CIA (1980; 19), CIA (1978b; 19). Podgomyy's role is rather
uncertain. Judging from his articles in Vestnik PVO, Podgornyy had
special responsibility for interaction with Warsaw Pact PVO forces, see
Podgornyy (1970), (1972), (1976), (1981). Podgornyy disappears from VPVOS
obituaries after approximately 1976, but he published an article in 1981
in Vestnik PVO on a Warsaw Pact theme, suggesting that he was still
associated with the PVO and the Warsaw Pact. Jones (1980; 153), (1981;
114), (1982; 140-141) lists Podgornyy as First Deputy Chief but does not
list Sozinov as First Deputy Chief, even though the latter is listed in
the 1980 CIA directory. As Jones notes, it is possible that Podgornyy was
transferred to the Warsaw Pact staff to coordinate PVO forces, but he does
not appear on the CIA lists of Warsaw Pact personnel. (Jones observes
that the fact that Podgornyy is not identified in the 1981 article as
First Deputy Chief suggests that he was not in that post. However, none
of Podgornyy' s articles ever listed his position, so the omission in this
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but the new Chief of the Main Staff (who was probably brought in sometime
in late 1979) was a former First Deputy Chief of Staff of the Warsaw
Pact. ° Finally, it should be noted that the position of Commander of IA
Forces had changed hands in March (from Borovykh to Moskvitelev) , and so
Koldunov may not have seen any need to make further changes in this
1 9branch. x
The most puzzling personnel change was the appointment of Colonel
General V. V. Druzhinin to the post of First Deputy Chief of the VPVOS
Main Staff. Druzhinin had been commander of the VPVOS Radiotechnical
Troops in the late 1960s, and in 1970 was promoted to Deputy Chief of the
General Staff for Armaments. x While in the General Staff he was
responsible for the widespread development and introduction of computers
and electronics, including automated systems of control, and published the
definitive Soviet text on cybernetics in military affairs. 2 There are
two possible explanations for Druzhinin's sudden change of jobs: a) that
he was brought in by Koldunov to clean house after the KAL affair, or b)
(continued)
case does not mean much.) Podgornyy also appears in the 1983 CIA
directory (1983; 9) listed as a First Deputy Chief. In the 1986 directory
he is not listed, but in a 1985 obituary he appears to sign with the
retirees and inspectors. On balance it does not appear that Podgornyy was
replaced when Koldunov took over, and the two First Deputy Chief positions
may have been increased to three at least temporarily. Sozinov may have







21 Scott and Scott (1984; 121).
22 Scott and Scott (1984; 121). The book mentioned is V. V. Druzhinin
and D.S. Kontorov, Ideya, algoritm, resheniye
,
(Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1972),
available in english as Concept, Algorithm and Decision, (Washington,
D.C. : US GPO, 1978).
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that the command and control systems developed by Druzhinin were found
wanting in the KAL incident and he was consequently demoted. Neither of
these explanations is particularly satisfactory. First, if Druzhinin were
brought in to shake up the VPVOS , it is surprising that he would be placed
in such a low- level position. One would expect him to be given an FDC or
Deputy Chief position. Second, if there were serious problems with the
work of the Main Staff, Sozinov should have been immediately replaced,
which does not appear to have been the case. (Albeit the importing of
Romanov may suggest some problems with the Main Staff.) However,
concerning the second explanation there is little evidence that the VPVOS
or other control systems did not function properly. Clearly there were
problems, but the best evidence is that these were of a tactical or
decision-making nature, rather than having to do with technical systems.
Furthermore, if Druzhinin were disgraced the usual response would have
been to either retire him or farm him out to the Main Inspectorate of the
Ministry of Defense.
Druzhinin' s appointment is thus quite a mystery. The best
explanation may be a mixture of the two outlined above. Perhaps problems
revealed with command and control systems reflected badly upon Druzhinin'
s
work at the General Staff, but that instead of being retired he was given
the opportunity to return to the VPVOS and try to correct the problems.
This explanation, while less than satisfactory, seems plausible.
Koldunov thus made several high-level changes in the VPVOS, but
almost all of his appointments were of VPVOS personnel (or alumni) . The
fresh blood, then, was not so fresh and there do not appear to have been
any major policy changes as a result of this new administration.
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Indeed, the VPVOS responded somewhat slowly to KAL incident, and
when it did respond it was with a new campaign to £itprovS*ci£b«c r« tfdines s
and to instill a "Leninist style of work." While there are some
indications of editorial rea'ction during the preceding months, 3 the
December 1978 issue of Vestnik PVO kicked off the campaign with a report
from a meeting of the VPVOS Military Soviet. Koldunov criticized some
officers of the central apparatus for not living up to the demands of
their job:
The majority of officers do a good job, but, as shown by
concrete facts and examples, the style of work of certain officers
and generals still does not in complete measure answer the
conditions of the XXV Congress and demands of the Ministry of
Defense. Not all leading cadres scientifically work expediently,
disciplinedly
,
qualitatively and effectively to solve growing
complex tasks of preparation of troops to fulfill their combat
tasks. 25
The Chief of the VPVOS Military-Political Administration, Bobylev,
then addressed the Military Soviet calling for greater attention to party
work, greater responsibility, and communist ideals. Koldunov wrapped up
the affair by calling again for higher combat readiness and noting that
concrete measures were being taken to improve the performance of the
officer corps and raise combat readiness.
23 See the August Vestnik PVO (1978a), "Za dal 'neyesheye povbysheniye
boyegotovnosti , " for the Military Soviet meeting that introduced Koldunov
and Yurasov to the VPVOS, "Vypolnaya konstitutsionnyy dolg" in the
September issue.
24 The Military Soviet is composed of the top leadership of the service.
See "Sovershenstvovat' stil' raboty ofitserkikh kadrov," (1978) in Vestnik
PVO for December.
25 "Sovershenstvovat' stil' raboty ofitserkikh kadrov," (1978; 9).
26 "Sovershenstvovat' stil' raboty ofitserkikh kadrov," (1978; 9).
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This new emphasis on combat readiness and officer performance was
reflected in the articles in the December Vestnik PVO: Svetlishin
contributed a historical article ("The Key to Victory") on the importance
of combat readiness in the GPW, Colonel General Konstantinov the Commander
of the Baku Air Defense Distict contributed an article on officer
training, and Koldunov signed the editorial calling for increased combat
27
readiness . *'
Thus the KAL incident, while it seems to have precipitated a
leadership change in the VPVOS , was taken in stride by the system.
Instead of the vociferous and detailed criticisms triggered by the Rust
affair, the reaction was muted and the proposed solution merely carried on
the old campaigns, albeit with more energy. The VPVOS ' s response was
typical of that of many large conservative organizations: in the case of
failure ascribe it to a specific set of people or circumstances rather
than recognizing the systemic implications. A business-as-usual but under
better management approach was adopted by the new leadership. Certainly,
little consideration seems to have been given to the possible consequences
of actually shooting down a civilian airliner, and rules of engagement do
27 Svetlishin (1978b), Konstantinov (1978), Koldunov (1978). Note that
Koldunov (1978; 7) notes the need to correct the deficiencies revealed in
the last training year and specifically criticizes the work of three
officers. This sort of call is fairly standard but the naming of the
officers is somewhat unusual and may be directly tied to the KAL incident.
28 Articles calling for increased combat readiness, improved officer
training and performance, and a Leninist style of work were already common
in Vestnik PVO before the KAL incident. See, for example, Sozinov (1978),
Batitskiy (1978a) on combat readiness, Koldunov (1978a) on the need for
officer education and a Leninist style of work, Sosnovtsev (1978) on the
need for discipline and following regulations, Trofimov (1978) on the
attestation of officers, on combat readiness, and Kraskovskiy (1978) on
officer staff competence.
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not seem to have been amended to make such an incident less likely, as .»/- *Ls
shown in the 1983 KAL disaster. Indeed, the only difference between the
two cases is that in 1978 the missile damaged but did not cripple the |
aircraft. This inability to foresee the possibility of another accidental f
intrusion led directly to the KAL 007 shootdown. 9
29 Curiously, few in the West in the civil aviation field reacted
strongly to this incident. Had a system for establishing contact between
Soviet interceptors and Western airliners been developed after the 1978
incident the 1983 shootdown might have been avoided.
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